Armbruster v. Eskola

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BIANCA ARMBRUSTER, Plaintiff, v. BRADLEY D. ESKOLA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:21-CV-02070

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

July 15, 2024

MEMORANDUM

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants William Wheeler (“Wheeler”) and Advantage Transportation (“Advantage”) (collectively “Moving Defendants”). (Doc. 159). This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint (“Complaint”) on December 9, 2021, by Bianca J Armbruster (“Plaintiff”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges negligence claims against Defendants Bradley D Eskola, Anvarkhon Akbarov, Carl H. Innocent, Henryk W. Biront, Bradly A. Connor, JX Enterprises, Inc., JX Leasing, Inc., Eco Trucking, LLC, Viva Express, Inc., BTE Trucking, Inc., Western Express, Inc., Danielle Vega, Justin Majewski, Uni Trans, LLC, Bekzod Isoev, Advantage and Wheeler (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1; Doc. 142). On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative second amended complaint (“Second Amended Complaint”). (Doc. 142). For the following reasons, Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint will be GRANTED. (Doc. 159). Count IX of the Second Amended Complaint will be DISMISSED. (Doc. 142, ¶¶ 78-79).

I. Background and Procedural History

The following factual summary is taken from Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 142). On December 16, 2020, at approximately 3:00 PM, Plaintiff was driving In westward on Interstate 80 during a snowstorm when she was involved in a multi-vehicle pileup (“the accident”). (Doc. 142, ¶¶ 39-51). The snowstorm was a predicted weather event that caused deteriorating road conditions so severe that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation lowered the maximum speed limit from 70 miles per hour to 45 miles per hour. (Doc. 142, ¶¶ 37-38). Prior to the Accident, there were three separate groups of vehicle collisions on Interstate 80, each involving three to five vehicles. (Doc. 142, ¶ 39). These accidents caused traffic on Interstate 80 to come to a complete stop. (Doc. 142, ¶ 40).

Plaintiff was significantly injured from the accident. (Doc. 142, ¶¶ 58-59). She was trapped in her vehicle for nearly six hours as the snowstorm continued, until first responders were finally able to rescue her from the wreckage. (Doc. 142, ¶¶ 56-57). Because she was trapped for so long, first responders on scene had to perform a cricothyrotomy in the field to establish an airway for her to breath. (Doc. 142, ¶ 57). After being extricated, Plaintiff was transported to the Emergency Department at UMPC Susquehanna Williamsport, where she received treatment for life-threatening injuries. (Doc. 142, ¶¶ 58-59).

Seeking recovery and damages for the injuries sustained and impact from the accident, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing the Complaint on December 9, 2021. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on November 23, 2023, adding Moving Defendants as defendants to this action. (Doc. 142). In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim of Negligence against Moving Defendants in Count IX. (Doc. 142, at 25). In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff demands compensatory and punitive damages from each Defendant individually as well as through their employers related to her injuries and medical costs. (Doc. 142, ¶¶ 60-61).

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Moving Defendants on January 26, 2024, along with their brief in support. (Doc. 159; Doc. 160). Plaintiff filed an incorrectly labeled brief in opposition, found on the docket as a “reply brief,” to Moving Defendants' motion on February 20, 2024.^[1] (Doc. 172). Moving Defendants filed a reply brief on March 1, 2024. (Doc. 175). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 1; Doc. 87; Doc. 142; Doc. 159; Doc. 160; Doc. 171; Doc. 172; Doc. 175).

II. Motion to Dismiss Standards

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v.Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although a court must accept the factual allegations in a complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

III. Discussion

The issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff's negligence claim against Moving Defendants is barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 160, at 6; Doc. 171, at 5; Doc. 172, at 7). A two-year statute of limitations applies to personal injury claims in Pennsylvania. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7). A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Smith v. Delaware Cty. Ct., 260 Fed.Appx. 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008) see also Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The determination of the time at which a claim accrues is an objective inquiry,” concerned with “what a reasonable person should have known.”). Typically, statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and the asserting defendants have the burden of proof. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1); Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989). However, a district court may order a complaint dismissed as In time-barred where it is obvious from the face of the complaint that the statute of limitations has run and no further development of the factual record would be needed to properly consider the defense's application. See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014); Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2002) (permitting a limitations defense to be raised in a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “only if ‘the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations.'”). Still, “‘[i]f the bar is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it may not afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).'” Robinson, 313 F.3d at 134-35 (quoting Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Co., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978)).

Pennsylvania courts have developed, and the Pennsylvania Legislature codified, tolling principles which allow plaintiffs to bring certain claims beyond the period ordinarily allowable under the statute of limitations. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 2005; see also Zilich v. Doll, No. 3:13-CV-02814, 2017 WL 1356367, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:13-2814, 2017 WL 1330038 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2017). One such principle is the discovery rule, an equitable doctrine created by courts to ease some of the harshest effects of the statute of limitations. Brady v. W.C. Eshenaur & Son, Inc., 490 F.Supp.3d 827, 831 (M.D. Pa. 2020). The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known that another party caused an injury. Brady, 490 F.Supp.3d at 831. Similarly, under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2005, a plaintiff may use a “Doe” designation to name a yet to be identified party provided that:

(1) a defendant's actual name is unknown to the plaintiff or joining party after having conducted a reasonable search with due diligence; (2) the Doe designation is averred to be fictitious; (3) a factual description of the unknown defendant is averred with sufficient particularity for identification; and (4) the plaintiff or joining party avers that a reasonable search to determine the actual name has been conducted.

Pa. R. Civ. P. 2005(b)(1)-(4).

The discovery rule and Rule 2005 are not without their limits. Courts generally do not allow the use of the Doe designation “‘if the plaintiff's ignorance of the defendant's true identity is the result of willful neglect or lack of reasonable inquiry.'” Beckerman v. Weber, No. CIV.A. 1:06-CV-1334, 2007 WL 2301049, at *5 n.9 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2007) (citing 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 10.02[2][d][i] (3d ed 2006)). Dismissal is appropriate when “...