Armont v. Harrell

1

DOMINIQUE ARMONT and LENRON BROWN, Plaintiffs, v. SHANTEL DEMETRIUS HARRELL, WYNNE TRANSPORTATION, LLC, JAMIE VEGA, and RANGER ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:21-CV-365

United States District Court, E.D. Texas

February 5, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARCIA A. CRONE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court is Defendants Jamie Vega (“Vega”) and Ranger Energy Services, LLC's (“Ranger Energy”) (collectively, “Ranger Defendants”) First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (#73). Plaintiffs Dominique Armont (“Armont”) and Lenron Brown (“Brown”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a response (#74) in opposition, and the Ranger Defendants filed a reply (#75). Defendants Wynne Transportation, LLC (“Wynne Transportation”), and Shantel Demetrius Harrell (“Harrell”) (collectively, “Wynne Defendants”), however, did not file a response. Having considered the pending motion, the parties' submissions the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the Ranger Defendants' motion should be denied.

I. Background

Plaintiffs' claims arise from a collision that occurred on July 16, 2019, on Interstate 10 between a Van Hool motorcoach and a National Oilwell Varco workover rig. Plaintiffs, both of whom are legally blind, were passengers aboard the motorcoach, which was owned by Wynne Transportation and driven by Harrell. The workover rig^[1] was driven by Vega and owned by Ranger Energy.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the events of July 16 took place as follows. Both the motorcoach and the workover rig were traveling eastbound through a construction zone on Interstate 10 at approximately 11:00 a.m. Throughout the construction zone, and at all times relevant to this action, Interstate 10 was reduced to two lanes. Vega, driving the workover rig, was in the right lane, and Harrell, operating the motorcoach, was traveling in the left lane. Harrell's motorcoach was equipped with a dash camera. The camera was recording at the time of the accident and was situated such that at least part of the workover rig is in view throughout the portion of the video relevant to this lawsuit. Vega and the workover rig were accompanied by two escort vehicles-one in front of the workover rig and one behind. The trailing escort vehicle was a pickup truck pulling a small box trailer. The truck and trailer's hazard lights were flashing, and the workover rig itself had an “oversize load” banner affixed to the back. The workover rig was “properly permitted” for its trip, was allowed to travel in construction zones, and did not require escort vehicles. Moreover, the workover rig, the top speed of which was only about 55 miles per hour, was traveling below the posted speed limit of 65 miles per hour.

Prior to his departure on July 16, Vega was familiar with the route and was aware that he would have to travel through a construction zone on Interstate 10, where, at various points, the interstate's lanes would narrow. In addition, on the workover rig's left side, a driller stand^[2] was protruding out from the rig. Vega was aware of this; he even attached a small red flag to the driller stand, apparently in an effort to provide a warning. The flag, however, was red-the same color as the workover rig.

As the vehicles were traveling through the construction zone, Harrell, who was driving a bit faster than Vega, planned to pass the workover rig while maintaining her position in the left lane. As she approached the workover rig, the interstate's left shoulder, which separated the left lane from a concrete barrier, started to dissipate. Near milepost 832, Harrell's motorcoach began to overtake the workover rig, and, at this point on Interstate 10, the left shoulder had narrowed significantly. The two vehicles then collided, shattering one of the motorcoach's front-right windows. On the other side of that window sat Armont and Brown, who were showered with glass. It appears from the summary judgment evidence that it was the driller stand-which was scratched and slightly bent as a result of the collision-that made contact with the motorcoach's window. A Texas Department of Public Safety trooper responded to the scene and produced a crash report. The trooper viewed the motorcoach's dash-cam video but was unable to determine if either the motorcoach or workover rig veered from their respective lanes.

Plaintiffs suffered various injuries as a result of the collision and initiated this lawsuit on July 15, 2021. In their complaint, Plaintiffs contend that both Vega and Harrell “operated their vehicles in a reckless, imprudent and improper manner so as to . . . violently collide with each other.” Plaintiffs assert negligence causes of action against Harrell and Vega, contend that Wynne Transportation and Ranger Energy are liable for their drivers' actions by way of respondeat superior, allege that both Wynne Transportation and Ranger Energy were directly negligent under various theories, and assert gross negligence causes of action against all four defendants. Both the Ranger Defendants and Wynne Defendants dispute Plaintiffs' allegations and point the finger at each other.

In that vein, the Ranger Defendants move for summary judgment and assert that “[t]he summary judgment evidence shows that . . . Vega's vehicle consistently maintained its lane of traffic before, during, and after the subject collision” and “was traveling under the speed limit.” As a result, the Ranger Defendants contend that “Vega did not cause the subject accident” and “[t]he fault lies squarely on . . . Harrell” because she “attempt[ed] to pass . . . Vega's vehicle in a construction zone” after the left shoulder had significantly narrowed. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that the Ranger Defendants' actions contributed to the collision. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the Ranger Defendants created a foreseeable risk of harm by driving the “workover rig through a hazardous construction zone with a driller stand protruding into the left lane of travel” without properly warning the passing traffic.

II. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Palestine, 41 F.4th 696, 703 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 579 (2023); United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Anderson, 9 F.4th 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2021). The parties seeking summary judgment bear the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which they believe demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada v. Proplant Inc., 25 F.4th 360, 368 (5th Cir. 2022); Goldring v. United States, 15 F.4th 639, 644-45 (5th Cir. 2021).

“A fact issue is ‘material' if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Hemphill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 805 F.3d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 945 (2016); see MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada, 25 F.4th at 368. “An issue is ‘genuine' if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.” Gerhart v. Barnes, 724 Fed.Appx. 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001)), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1239 (2019). Thus, a genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Hefren v. McDermott, Inc., 820 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2016); accord MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada, 25 F.4th at 368.

Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n.3; see Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)); MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada, 25 F.4th at 368. The court “should review the record as a whole.” Black v. Pan Am. Lab'ys, LLC, 646 F.3d 254, 273 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)); see Hacienda Recs., L.P. v. Ramos, 718 Fed.Appx. 223, 234 (5th Cir. 2018). All the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the court will not weigh the evidence or evaluate its credibility. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; Seigler v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 30 F.4th 472, 476 (5th Cir. 2022).

B. The Ranger Defendants' Initial Summary Judgment Burden

For a movant to satisfy the initial summary judgment burden, the movant must either provide evidence to disprove conclusively the non-movant's claims or, instead, “point[ ] to evidence that is lacking in the record (evidence necessary to support a particular element or claim that the non-movant has failed to adduce).” Shofner v. Shoukfeh, No 5:15-CV-152-C, 2017 WL 3842349, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2017). At the outset, the Ranger Defendants satisfied their initial summary judgment burden with respect to the causation element of Plaintiffs' negligence claim against Vega. The Ranger Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, Vega's claimed...