Arnold v. Willis

1

KEISHA ARNOLD, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. AVERY WILLIS, et al. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL No. 3:23-CV-267-DPJ-ASH

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division

June 28, 2024

ORDER

DANIEL P. JORDAN III, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

According to Plaintiffs, three Jackson, Mississippi, police officers beat and tased Keith Murriel before handcuffing him and loading him into the back of a patrol car. Paramedics found him there about an hour later, he was nonresponsive. Murriel died, and his wrongful-death beneficiaries have sued those officers, their supervisor, the city of Jackson, and various others. The supervisor, Cazinova Reed, seeks dismissal of the claims against him [78]. Reed is entitled to qualified immunity.

I. Facts and Proceedings

For purposes of the motion, the Court takes Plaintiffs' well-pleaded allegations as true. The Third Amended Complaint says that on New Year's Eve, 2022, Murriel visited a friend staying at a Jackson hotel, where a security guard harassed and then called 911 on him. 3AC [43] ¶¶ 23-24. Jackson police officers Avery Willis and Kenya McCarty answered the call and ordered Murriel to leave the property. Id. ¶ 24-25. Murriel walked off the grounds but soon returned to retrieve his belongings, when the officers attacked him. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Although Murriel did not resist, officers Willis and McCarty tackled him to the ground and then tased him repeatedly, soon joined in their assault by a third officer, James Land. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. After tasing him around 80 times, the three handcuffed the unconscious Murriel and stuffed him into the back of a patrol car. Id. ¶¶ 27-30.

Reed, a police sergeant, arrived soon after Murriel was put into the car, so he never witnessed the altercation. Id. ¶¶ 31, 79. According to body-camera footage attached by Reed to his motion and quoted by Plaintiffs in opposing it, the three officers encouraged Reed to go see how big Murriel was (Reed declined), opined that Murriel was probably on drugs and would likely “wake up and start swinging,” and eventually began to wonder where the ambulance was.^[1]Pls.' Mem. [84] at 17. When an ambulance finally arrived-over an hour after the police first subdued Murriel-the paramedics “immediately started working on Murriel[,] who was not responding[,] but it was too late.” 3AC [43] ¶ 32. Willis, McCarty, and Land were indicted for his death. Id. ¶ 103(d).

Plaintiffs sued Reed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, saying he violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide medical aid to Murriel. Id. ¶¶ 64-65, 73-83. They also asserted bystander and supervisory liability. Reed moves for judgment on the pleadings (or else summary judgment), arguing qualified immunity and failure to state a claim. Mot. [78]. Plaintiffs responded in opposition [83, 84], and Reed replied [85]. Subject-matter jurisdiction exists because Plaintiffs pleaded a federal question.

II. Standard

Reed moved for dismissal under Rule 12(c) or alternatively for summary judgment under Rule 56. The Court declines to consider this pre-discovery motion under Rule 56, but it is debatable whether Rule 12(c) controls. That rule applies when the pleadings close, and not every officer in this case has answered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a) (discussing what constitutes a pleading). Regardless, “the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(c) is the same as under Rule 12(b)(6).” Magee v. Reed, 912 F.3d 820, 822 (5th Cir. 2019).

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the courts will “accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true” but will not “accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Watkins v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 90 F.4th 814, 817 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting King v. Baylor Univ., 46 F.4th 344, 356 (5th Cir. 2022)). “Conclusory” means “[e]xpressing a factual inference without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based.” Black's Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019); quoted in Favela v. Collier, 91 F.4th 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 2024).

Thus, to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). It follows that “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'- ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). “This standard ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary claims or elements.” In re S. Scrap Material Co., 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Section 1983 claims implicating qualified immunity are subject to the same Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal as all other claims; an assertion of qualified immunity in a defendant's answer or motion to dismiss does not subject the complaint to a heightened pleading standard.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 590 (5th Cir. 2016)).

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs sued Reed under § 1983 for violating Murriel's constitutional right to medical attention. Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against any “person” who, “under color of” state law, deprives another of his federal rights. This Order first considers the record the Court may consider when deciding this motion. It then addresses Reed's assertion that qualified immunity bars the § 1983 claims against him.

A. Scope of Review

Reed attaches four exhibits to his amended answer [74] and motion to dismiss-the body-camera recordings from the three officers (not Reed) who tased and struck Murriel. Although Plaintiffs did not attach the videos to the Third Amended Complaint, they mention “the video recording” and quote from it in paragraphs 26 and 27 of that pleading.

Review under Rule 12(b)(6) “is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” IAS Servs. Grp., L.L.C. v. Jim Buckley & Assocs., Inc., 900 F.3d 640, 646-47 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)). The Fifth Circuit applied this rule to body- and dash-cam video in Terrell v. Town of Woodworth, No. 23-30510, 2024 WL 667690 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2024). That case addressed excessive-force claims under § 1983. Id. at *1. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to consider the police videos under Rule 12(b)(6) because-like the Plaintiffs here-the Terrell plaintiff referenced them in the complaint, and they were “clearly central to his claims.” Id. at *5.

Plaintiffs object to the videos Reed proffered because he failed to cite specific portions by time stamp and because they are not authenticated. Pls.' Mem. [84] at 6 & n.1. But Plaintiffs cite the videos in the Third Amended Complaint and rely on them in response to Reed's motion. 3AC [43] ¶¶ 26, 27; Pls.' Mem. [84] at 4, 5 (citing videos to support “undisputed facts”). Thus, Plaintiffs raise no real objection to the videos' authenticity and cite them as factual.

For these reasons, the videos may be properly considered under Rule 12(c). That said, they do not change the outcome. Plaintiffs' response to this motion relies heavily on select excerpts from the videos rather than the pleaded facts. Confined to the pleadings, the Court would reach the same conclusions.

B. Qualified Immunity

Reed says qualified immunity precludes Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against him. Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability “as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). If qualified immunity is raised in a motion to dismiss, “it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for ‘objective legal reasonableness.'” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982)). And to defeat an assertion of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Khan v. Normand, 683 F.3d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).

“To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Dyer v Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 383 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). Thus, the relevant precedent clearly establishing the right must have “placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. “The court need not decide the...