Arredondo v. Vill. On the Lake

681 S.W.3d 853

Sylvia ARREDONDO, Appellant

v.VILLAGE ON THE LAKE, LTD and VOTL I GP, Inc., Appellees

NO. 14-22-00169-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed December 14, 2023

On Appeal from the 151st District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2020-40619

Timothy A. Hootman, Joshua Stein, Houston, for Appellant.

Breton Rycroft, Colby M. Binford, Andrew Bender, Houston, Elliot Kudisch, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Poissant.

OPINION

Margaret "Meg" Poissant, Justice

Appellant Sylvia Arredondo ("Arredondo") filed a lawsuit against appellees Village on the Lake, LTD ("the Village") and VOTL I GP ("VOTL") for familial status discrimination, breach of contract, constructive eviction, and breach of warranty of quiet enjoyment. The Village filed a counterclaim for breach of lease. The Village and VOTL filed a traditional and noevidence motion for summary judgment on Arredondo’s claims and on the Village’s counterclaim, which the trial court granted. Arredondo appeals. We affirm.

I. Background

Arredondo signed a one-year lease beginning March 26, 2020, for a three-bed-room apartment. Arredondo moved in with her eight-year-old daughter and fourteen-year-old son, and Arredondo’s four-year-old twin boys came for Easter.¹

March 2020 was the unexpected start of the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in shutdowns and school closures. As a result, adults and children were suddenly home fulltime. Arredondo’s downstairs neighbor had lived at the Village for five months and had already complained about the previous tenants in Arredondo’s apartment. This downstairs neighbor had documented her problems with the prior tenants and had also previously complained to a parent about their children’s "rambunctious" behavior outside her ground floor apartment.

On Easter weekend, the downstairs neighbor started complaining about Arredondo and her children. Specifically, she was upset at the children’s noise and activity and contended that Arredondo and another parent did not properly control their children. The neighbor wrote to the Village, stating that the grassy common area had "become the playground for about 8 kids from sunup to sundown," and that Arredondo and her daughter disturbed her by tossing a football from the common area to their balcony. The neighbor asked Arredondo if she could "stop allowing the kids to run around and make so much noise." Arredondo apologized and explained that her little boys were active.

On Easter Sunday, the neighbor was so disturbed by the children’s playing that she left her apartment to calm herself. At 9:30 p.m. that night, the neighbor sent an email to the Village’s manager, complaining that "the new tenants above me and beside me are absolutely inconsiderate and have created an intolerable living environment." She also requested a mutual termination of her lease.

On Monday, one of the Village’s employees stopped by Arredondo’s apartment to discuss the noise complaint. On Tuesday, just nineteen days into her lease, the Village followed up with a written notice of lease violation. The Village ticked boxes, on the notice for "disturbance," "disturbing others," "excessive noise," "loud or obnoxious behavior," and "trash by your entry," attaching a photograph of snack wrappers on the ground. Arredondo was incredulous, noting that there was a shutdown for the pandemic and she was being asked to keep her children quiet both indoors and outdoors. Later that day, a police officer also came to Arredondo’s apartment to discuss the noise complaint.

One week later, the Village delivered a second written notice of lease violation, ticking the same boxes. The notice specified that the apartment management had responded to another noise complaint and had observed Arredondo’s apartment for ten minutes. Per the notice, the manager witnessed constant running, screaming, loud banging, running in and out of the apartment, slamming doors, and "obnoxious" behavior in the common area. The Village warned Arredondo that it was a violation of the lease to disrupt other residents. The notice also stated that "[i]f disturbances do not stop then possible eviction" and if Arredondo failed to reach a satisfactory resolution with management, "additional action will follow." Arredondo explained to an employee of the Village that the kids had been playing while on a break from at-home school and were laughing, but not yelling.

That night, one of the twins woke crying from a nightmare. The downstairs neighbor called police, who knocked on Arredondo’s door at 2:00 a.m.

To Arredondo, it became "clockwork" that almost every other day she was receiving a call or a visit from a Village employee. When an employee came to her door, the on-site police officer would also come. On May 4, 2020, the Village suggested relocating Arredondo to a first-floor apartment if one became available. After this, the Village manager again approached Arredondo with a police officer—this time while she was in her car at the apartment exit. Finally, on May 14, a police officer again came to Arredondo’s door. Feeling hopeless after two written lease violations, at least three police visits, and multiple telephone calls and visits from the Village management, Arredondo started looking for a home to rent.

Just two months after moving in, Arredondo moved out of the apartment—but did not give notice—on May 30, 2020. She paid rent through June 2020, and the Village issued Arredondo a final account statement for $14,031.25 for rent and fees under the lease terms. Arredondo sued the Village and its general partner, VOTL, on July 8, 2020. The Village countersued for the unpaid rent and fees, and appellees filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment after the close of the discovery period. The trial court granted appellees’ motion in December 2021. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

[1–3] "When a party moves for both traditional and no-evidence summary judgments, we first consider the no-evidence motion." First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. 2017) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004)). "To defeat a no-evidence motion, the nonmovant must produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements." Parker, 514 S.W.3d at 220 (citing Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600). "If the non-movant fails to meet its burden under the no-evidence motion, there is no need to address the challenge to the traditional motion, as it necessarily fails." Id. (citing Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013)). "Thus, we first review each claim under the no-evidence standard." Id. Any claims that survive the no-evidence review will then be reviewed under the traditional standard. Id. at 219–20.

[4, 5] In a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant asserts that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the claim or defense for which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); see Timpte Indus. v. Gish, 286’ S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements specified in the motion. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). We will affirm a no-evidence summary judgment when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).

[6] A party moving for traditional summary judgment meets its burden by proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). "A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions." Parker, 514 S.W.3d at 220 (internal quotations omitted). The evidence does not create an issue of material fact if it is "so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion" that the fact exists. Kia Motors Carp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 601).

III. Arredondo's Claims

Arredondo sued appellees for familial status discrimination under the Texas Fair Housing Act, Tex, Prop, Code Ann, § 301.021, and the Federal Fair Housing Act., 42 U.S.C. § 3604, She also brought claims for breach of contract, constructive eviction, and breach of warranty of quiet enjoyment. The Village and VOTL filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment on these claims.

A. Waiver

As a preliminary matter, appellees argue that Arredondo has waived any challenge to the judgment by failing to offer substantive analysis, proper record citations, and applicable authority in her appellate briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) ("The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record."); WorldPeace v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 183 S.W.3d 451, 460 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (concluding that appellate arguments were waived due to the absence of "argument or citations to the record or to authority"). Recognizing this court’s obligation to construe the rules of appellate procedure "reasonably, yet liberally," we address Arredondo’s arguments to the extent possible; that is, when her arguments are supported by appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Republic Underwriters Ins. v. Mex–Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Verburgt v. Domer, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. 1997)).

B. Familial Status Discrimination

[7]...