Arreguin v. Sanchez

398 F.Supp.3d 1314

Julio Medina ARREGUIN, et al. Plaintiffs,

v.Manuel SANCHEZ, Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-133

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division.

Signed July 31, 2019

Lisa J. Krisher, Solimar Mercado-Spencer, Georgia Legal Services, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

ORDER

HON. LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE

Before the Court is an Amended Motion for Default Judgment, dkt. no. 11, filed by Plaintiffs Julio Medina Arreguin, Juan Arellano Malagon, Eduardo Flores Maydon, Jose Ernesto Gomez Lopez, Maximino Juarez Sanchez, Jose Rolando Lopez Gomez, Cruz Luna Villela, Agustin Oviedo Olvera, Luis Patino Mendiola, Esgar Perez Flores, Asael Rodriquez Juarez, Miguel Sanchez Cervantes, Mario Silguero Reyes. Because Defendant Manuel Sanchez has been duly served with notice of this case and Plaintiffs' Motion but has failed to respond or appear at all in this case, Plaintiffs' Motion is ripe for review.¹ For the following reasons, in accordance with the Court's oral Order during the Default Judgment Hearing on July 25, 2019, Plaintiffs' Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this case are immigrant workers from Mexico who were recruited by Defendant Manuel Sanchez through the Department of Labor's H-2A foreign agricultural worker program.² Through their sworn affidavits, Plaintiffs have shown that Defendant recruited them in Mexico to bale pine straw in Georgia, promised them specific wages and benefits like free housing and food, required them to pay substantial pre-employment expenses such as visa costs and recruitment fees while knowing that Plaintiffs could not afford such expenses, and transported them to Georgia. However, upon arriving in Georgia in February 2018, Defendant did not pay Plaintiffs as agreed–or even the minimum wage–and paid some nothing at all. In addition, Plaintiffs were not reimbursed for any of their pre-employment expenses that they were able to pay; rather, Defendant told Plaintiffs that they could work to pay him back for the remainder of the expenses that he said they owed him. Defendant told Plaintiffs that they would not be paid until they bailed pine straw, but he left them at the work sites all day with no equipment to bail the pine straw, no bathrooms, and no transportation.

Defendant also subjected Plaintiffs to overcrowded and deplorable living conditions. He first placed Plaintiffs in a motel with multiple people forced to sleep in the same rooms. Then he moved Plaintiffs in the middle of winter to a small house with no heat, mattresses on the floor with no blankets, and one bathroom for nineteen people to share. The conditions of the house were dirty and unsanitary. Some Plaintiffs were forced to sleep behind the house in sheds. Later, Defendant moved some of the Plaintiffs to a trailer that was equally as deplorable and dirty as the house.

Defendant threatened Plaintiffs with deportation on multiple occasions. He told Plaintiffs that if they left his employment, he would report them to immigration services, and they would be deported. He also told them that if they were deported, they would never be allowed to enter the United States again through a work visa.

During Plaintiffs' time in Georgia, Defendant provided Plaintiffs with very little food, and when they ran out, Plaintiffs were forced to seek help from a local church. The church also provided Plaintiffs with blankets so that they did not have to cover themselves with plastic at night to try to keep warm.

People from the church who had helped Plaintiffs eventually connected Plaintiffs with attorneys from Georgia Legal Services who were able to assist Plaintiffs in their plight. Plaintiffs eventually left Defendant's employment throughout February and March of 2018. Afterwards, with the help of Georgia Legal Services, Plaintiffs sued Defendant on November 11, 2018, for failure to pay minimum wage and provide reimbursement for expenses under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (Count I), failure to pay overtime pay as required by the FLSA (Count II), breach of contract for failing to pay the wages offered in the H-2A job order (Count III), breach of contract for failing to provide housing as detailed in the H-2A job order (Count IV), violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPRA) (Count V), and negligence (Count VI).³ After Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint or appear in the case, Plaintiff moved for a clerk's entry of default on December 11, 2018. Dkt. No. 5. The clerk entered default that same day. Dkt. No. 6. On April 29, Plaintiffs filed their initial Motion for Default Judgment. Dkt. No. 9. On July 22, 2019, Plaintiffs. filed their Amended Motion for Default Judgment. Dkt. No. 11. On July 25, the Court held a Default Judgment hearing. Dkt. No. 12. During the hearing, Plaintiffs presented video evidence showing the living conditions of the house in which Defendant forced them to stay, and Plaintiff Julio Medina Arreguin testified to the events that took place and the harm he experienced. Id. At the end of the hearing, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion with notice that this written Order would follow. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 allows a party to seek an entry of default and, subsequently, a default judgment against another party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend a lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Securing a default judgment is thus a two-step process. "First, the party seeking a default judgment must file [an application] for entry of default with the clerk of a district court by demonstrating that the opposing party has failed to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint, and, second, once the clerk has entered a default, the moving party may then seek entry of a default judgment against the defaulting party." Gladden v. Homewood Florist, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-01547-HGD, 2011 WL 13286008, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 6, 2011) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) ; see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Harris, No. 1:17-CV-1201-CAP-JSA, 2017 WL 8186606, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 30, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-1201-CAP, 2017 WL 8186601 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2017) ) (describing the "two-step procedure for obtaining a default judgment").

In deciding a motion for default judgment, a district court may, in its discretion pursuant to Rule 55 (b)(2), hold a hearing to "(A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2). "When considering a motion for default judgment, a court must investigate the legal sufficiency of the allegations and ensure that the complaint states a plausible claim for relief." Mevi Avocados, Inc. v. Maya Foods, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-3984-WSD, 2017 WL 908471, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2017) (citing Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F. 3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) ; Bruce v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 905, 906 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ). "If ‘the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief,’ a motion for default judgment is warranted." Id. (quoting Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F. 3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) ). "Conceptually, then, a motion for default judgment is like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Id. (quoting Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246 ). "[W]hile a defaulted defendant is deemed to admit the plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations of fact, he is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law." Id. (quoting Cotton, 402 F.3d at 1278 ).

The allegations relating to damages suffered ordinarily are not accepted as true. Wehrs v. Wells, 688 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2012). Rather, "[d]amages must be proved unless they are liquidated or capable of calculation." Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch Mortg, Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246, 253 (7th Cir. 1990) ). It is the Court's duty to "determine both the amount and character of damages." PNCEF, LLC v. Hendricks Bldg. Supply LLC, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (quoting Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Lacey, 510 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 n. 5 (S.D. Ala. 2007) ). Even in the default judgment context, "[a] court has an obligation to assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it enters." Anheuser Busch, Inc., v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

In considering a default judgment, the Court must examine (1) jurisdiction, (2) liability, and (3) damages. See Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356 (S.D. Ga. 2004). The Court will take up each in turn.

I. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court cannot enter default judgment against Defendant unless it has personal jurisdiction over him and subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Here, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because the Complaint alleges that Defendant is a resident of Georgia, see dkt. no. 1 ¶ 6, 8, and Defendant was served in Hazlehurst, Georgia, on November 15, 2018. See Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Torian, No. CV 113-071, 2014 WL 4926390, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2014). This court also has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiffs' Complaint invokes federal-question jurisdiction under the FLSA and the TVPRA. The Court therefore has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Finally, venue is proper in the Southern District of Georgia because the Complaint alleges that Defendant resides within this district and a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in Baxley and Blackshear, Georgia, which are cities within this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b).

II. Liability

In order for the Court to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiffs must have properly alleged FLSA claims for pre-employment expenses, minimum wage, and overtime compensation against Defendant, a claim for breach of...