Arreola v. Cnty. of Fresno Pub. Defender's Office

HARONERE WILTRON ARREOLA, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF FRESNO PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-00272-AWI-SAB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 11, 2020

SCREENING ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE

Haronere Wiltron Arreola ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court for screening is Plaintiff's complaint, filed February 24, 2020. (ECF No. 1.)

I.SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Notwithstanding any filing fee, the court shall dismiss a case if at any time the Court determines that the complaint "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal required of in forma pauperis proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune defendants); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). The Court exercises its discretion to screen the plaintiff's complaint in this action to determine if it "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability . . . 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore, the complaint must contain sufficient factual content for the court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

II.COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff filed this complaint while incarcerated, however the allegations described occurred while Plaintiff was being arrested and while he was a pre-trial detainee and/or in relation to court proceedings that occurred while imprisoned. Plaintiff is not challenging hisconditions of confinement. The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Plaintiff names the following Defendants: (1) the County of Fresno Public Defender's Office; (2) Ciummo and Associates; (3) the City of Fresno; (4) the City of Fresno Police Department; (5) Officer J. Delgado; (6) Officer C. Moreno; (7) Sergeant B. Williams; and (8) Kojo Moore. (Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 1.)

A. First Cause of Action

Plaintiff's first claim is: "illegal search and seizure; profiling; and probable cause."¹ (Compl. 3.) The Court reproduces Plaintiff's claim verbatim here:

It will be the Plaintiff[']s assertion that from the moment officers exceeded the constitutional bounds of probable cause, they became in violation of his civil rights. Irrespective of his personal legal status of probation the officers['] right to search was limited to the driver of the vehicle itself. In this case the driver was on probation herself for driving under the influence thus giving officers the scope of a cursory search for open containers.

However prior to any detailed search, the Plaintiff was removed from proximity of the area searched and was not present when items were found. In fact once the Plaintiff who was the passenger, was removed, he was absolved of all responsibility solely due to the operator of the vehicle. After being removed from the vehicle and subsequently transported to the police station for identification, the Plaintiff was charged for possession of items in the vehicle. It would be my contention that in fact the Plaintiff can not be charged for specific possession of any item in constructive possession of the vehicle operator. (That is to say it would be illegal to use the contraband in the prosecution of one and not the other until motions are heard to determine either).

The issue of possession not withstanding the core violation at heart of the Plaintiff's complaint lies within probable cause. The protection of the 4^th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution clearly outline[s] the rules of probable cause determination. In this case, officers are clearly with cause to effect a traffic stop due to a tail light infraction. However once established that there was no physical danger to their operation, the scope of their authority ended with the operator of the vehicle. The plaintiff will demonstrate that the officers clearly by their own admission "profiled" him as one thought to be earlier contacted due to a domestic violence restraining order. That is to say that the officer felt that as a couple the operator of the vehicle and the Plaintiff should not be together or looked like a "couple" that should not be together. This admission by the acting officer now gives rise to the question of the validity of the traffic stop in general.

In any case, the Plaintiff asserts that at the point officers exceeded the scope of probable cause and reasonable search is the point where the numerous violationsof civil rights begin. The Plaintiff contends that point was at the point when officers established that he was a passenger of the vehicle that offered no credible threat to officer safety. Because all of the actions of the officers were based upon a traffic stop, the driver of the vehicle is clearly the focus and thus limits [the] officers['] scope of authority. The Plaintiff also contends that the same limitation of authority also confines the responsibility of the vehicle and its contents as that of the operator and owner of such. That is to stay without doubt that once officers removed the Plaintiff from the vehicle, they removed him from criminal liability related to the vehicles operation, ownership and contents.

In summary, the facts of the events are clear in linear order and represent successive violations of the Plaintiff[']s civil rights in the same fashion. As a passenger in a vehicle with no control of action or contents he was removed, detained, transported then charged with the contents of the vehicle in which he had no interest or control. Not only did officers have no true cause to detain him, but they proceeded to charge him with possessing items and contraband after clearly establishing those items in possession of others.

The Plaintiff asks the courts to further consider the total lack of valid foundation for even criminal charges as from the point that probable cause was no longer valid, that all successive findings would be in theory and action "fruit of the poisonous tree" therefor any assigned officer of the court would be duty bound to dismiss with prej[u]dice. It is important to further understand that the Plaintiff[']s status of probation requires him to submit to search of his person and his property therefor limiting his criminal liability to those areas. But this matter is compounded by the overt action of officers who exceeded the scope of search authority for one suspect then utilized those tainted fruits to charge another.

It is clear that criminal prosecution of the Plaintiff in this case is baseless. The probable cause to detain and subject him to search did not even exist let save the actions of the vehicle operator, and further, his subsequent charge of possession of contraband can only be based upon the testimony of the vehicle operator who was clearly in constructive possession of said contraband at all times after the initial contact. In terms of criminal liability and civil responsibility this set of circumstances would seem complex upon prima fa[cie] review. However the Plaintiff contends that when taken in linear succession the nature of violations are clearly based upon racial and social profiling and are clearly documented by officers['] own admission and the presence of recording equipment that gives clear representation of events for review by judicial authority.

The Plaintiff will submit this evidence as core in this complaint in support of his claim as it will show that officers abused authority and exceeded their scope of authority for search of the vehicle operator, then bullied one subject into implicating another with the use of illegally obtained evidence. At the point the officers passed the line of a closed container the subject of who's possession that object is confine[d] to is no longer germa[ne] as any reasonable suspicion would give rise to a warrant easily obtained. In the end this is a simple case of overt and excessive abuse of power under the color of authority. The actions of officers transgress the

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