Arriaga v. Dart

568 F.Supp.3d 953

Selene Danielle ARRIAGA, Plaintiff,

v.Thomas J. DART, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois; the Northeast Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation d/b/a Metra; Cook County, Illinois ; Marie Rangel, Joseph Perez; Paul Riggio; David Cammack; Theodore Stajura; and Timothy O'Donnell, Defendants.

No. 20 C 4498

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed October 23, 2021

Cass Thomas Casper, Gianna Rochelle Scatchell, Navarrio Douglas Wilkerson, Disparti Law Group, P.A., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Kristina Marie Gregory, Nazia J. Hasan, Office of the Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendants Thomas J. Dart, Illinois Cook County.

Stephen Gregory Goins, Erum Raza Rizvi, Russal John Anderson, Sue-Ann Rosen, Thomas Joseph Platt, Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, Chicago, IL, for Defendants The Northeast Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, Joseph Perez, Paul Riggio.

Nazia J. Hasan, Office of the Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendants Marie Rangel, David Cammack, Theodore Stajura, Timothy O'Donnell.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Selene Arriaga brings suit against Defendants Northeast Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation ("Metra"), Cook County, Illinois, and seven other named Defendants for revealing her transgender status and failing to curb the discrimination and harassment that resulted from this disclosure. Arriaga alleges violations of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process and equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for disclosure of medical information and failure to supervise and protect. She further alleges violations under state law for discrimination on the basis of gender, Illinois Civil Rights Act, 740 ILCS 23/5(a), and indemnification. Before the Court are Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Dkts. 53, 60) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from Arriaga's First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 47) and are assumed true for purposes of this motion. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher , 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). Selene Arriaga is a male-to-female transgender individual who has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria (DSM-V). (Id. at ¶¶ 17; 19). In order to treat this condition, she underwent a series of medical interventions, including hormone therapy and gender confirmation surgeries. (Id. at ¶¶ 18; 20). While she was undergoing this treatment, she secured a job as a police officer at Defendant Metra and enrolled in the Cook County Sheriff's Police Academy ("Police Academy"). (Id. at ¶ 15). At the time, she was "living in stealth," that is, living as a transitioning person without disclosing that fact publicly. (Id. at ¶ 21). At all times leading up to the instant action, Arriaga sought to keep her transgender identity and associated medical treatments private. (Id. at ¶¶ 23; 29).

Around the time of her entry into the Police Academy, Defendants disclosed her identity as a transgender woman to Police Academy administrators and staff, her superiors and co-workers, and police chiefs in municipal departments. (Id. at ¶¶ 25; 31-2; 34). Defendants Perez and Riggio are the Metra Police Chief and Deputy Chief, respectively (collectively, along with Defendant Metra, the "Metra Defendants"). (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Defendants Rangel, Cammack, Stajura, and O'Donnell hold various supervisory roles at the Cook County Sheriff's Office and Police Academy (collectively, along with Defendants Cook County and Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County, the "Cook County Defendants"). (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6; 9-12). Recruits who went through the Academy with Arriaga also disseminated information about her gender identity among themselves and to another Metra police officer. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-6; 38-9; 40). Arriaga was not aware of the full extent of these disclosures until she received a subpoena from an attorney in July 2020, which advised that Defendants had "outed" her to a much larger group of people than she had been aware. (Id. at ¶ 26).

The divulgence of Arriaga's status as a transgender woman effectively revealed her history of procedures and her psychiatric condition. (Id. at ¶¶ 22; 24). As a natal male, her feminine voice and appearance could only be achieved through gender confirmation surgery and hormone treatments. (Id. at ¶ 22). Moreover, these procedures are only available to persons who suffer from gender dysphoria. (Id. at ¶¶ 22; 24). Arriaga therefore claims that the Defendants’ disclosures were tantamount to revealing her confidential medical history. (Id. )

As a result of these disclosures, Arriaga sustained discrimination and harassment by fellow recruits during her tenure at the Police Academy, including jokes, taunting, and inquiries about her procedures and protected status, both in-person and over group chat. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28). For instance, her colleagues distributed a years-old photographic image of her as a male prior to her transition, which they obtained by culling her brother's Facebook page. (Id. at ¶ 41). A fellow recruit also referred to her by a transphobic slur. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-36). These incidents caused her significant psychological distress in addition to her pre-existing dysphoric condition. (Id. at ¶ 28).

Arriaga reported this offensive conduct to Defendants, who took no remedial action regarding the illegitimate disclosure of her medical information or the gender-based harassment she sustained. (Id. at ¶¶ 25; 46-49; 53). The Cook County Defendants in fact concealed the fact that none of the offending parties had been disciplined, allowing Arriaga to believe that her complaint of a hostile work environment had met with redress, though this was not the case. (Id. at ¶ 50). Arriaga claims that these failures perpetuated the ongoing and continuous practice of private medical information dissemination and harassment. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-49). She continued to be mistreated on account of her gender until she graduated from the Academy on August 27, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 27).

On February 22, 2021 Arriaga amended her original filing with the instant First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), claiming that Defendants violated her 14^th Amendment substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by disclosing her private medical information via her transgender status (Count I) as well as failing to supervise Academy personnel and to protect her from harassment and discrimination (Count II). Arriaga also brings claims under state law for violations of the Illinois Civil Rights Act, 740 ILCS 23/5(a) (Count III) and indemnification (Count IV).

LEGAL STANDARD

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must construe the complaint "in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in the non-moving party's favor." Bell v. City of Chicago , 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016). The complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The plaintiff need not plead "detailed factual allegations," but the short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that when "accepted as true ... ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983 Claims (Counts I-II)

Arriaga's § 1983 claims originate in Defendants’ disclosure of her transgender status and attendant medical history in violation of her substantive due process right to medical privacy (Count I) and their failure to supervise CCSO personnel and protect Arriaga from discrimination and harassment in violation of her substantive due process rights (Count II). Counts I and II are brought against all Defendants. Defendants Metra, Dart, Perez, and Riggio assert that the claims against them should be dismissed on various grounds.

To bring a municipal claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that an official government policy, custom, or practice is not merely causal but the "moving force behind [a] deprivation of constitutional rights." Teesdale v. City of Chicago , 690 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2012). See also Monell v. Department of Social Serv. , 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). "[U]nconstitutional policies or customs take three forms: (1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice, that, although unauthorized, is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that a person with final policymaking authority caused the injury." Chortek v. City of Milwaukee , 356 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2004).

Arriaga alleges that Metra Police Chief Perez and Cook County Police Academy Director Rangel are final policymakers for Metra and Cook County, respectively, under state law. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 47, 53). See Pembaur v. Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 483-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). She claims that their failure to establish a policy enforcing CCSO employees’ obligation to refrain from divulging recruit medical information and to supervise and protect animated her deprivation of constitutional rights. (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 47-8). To demonstrate liability, a plaintiff must show that the defendant policymaker was "deliberately indifferent as to [the] known or obvious consequences" of the harmful policy, custom, or practice—that is, that a reasonable...