Arrington v. Shouppe

1

RICHARD ARRINGTON, Plaintiff, v. BILL SHOUPPE, WARDEN; AND ETHEL WHITE, DEPUTY WARDEN; Defendants,

No. 2:21-CV-01020-CRE

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh

July 13, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Cynthia Reed Eddy, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Recommendation

This prisoner civil rights action was initiated in this court on August 2, 2021, by pro se Plaintiff Richard Arrington, who was then incarcerated at the Beaver County Jail, against Defendants Bill Shouppe, Warden, and Ethel White, Deputy Warden. See Compl. (ECF No. 4). In his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (ECF No. 38) Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the “4^th, 5^th, 6^th, 8^th, [and] 14^th Amendments” to the United States Constitution. SAC (ECF No. 38) at 1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Presently before the court is a motion by Defendants to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 48). For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.

II. Report

A. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff's claims arise out his arrest and subsequent incarceration at the Beaver County Jail. On June 25, 2021, a criminal complaint was filed against Plaintiff in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, charging Plaintiff with retail theft and criminal mischief for stealing several items from a Wal-Mart and then damaging property in the parking lot. FAC (ECF No. 16) at 16-1. Plaintiff was transported to the Beaver County Jail that day. Id.

On August 2, 2021, Plaintiff initiated the instant action. According to Plaintiff, Defendants detained Plaintiff “illegally” prior to trial. SAC (ECF No. 38) at ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause were “illegal” because they were not signed by the magistrate, and therefore Defendants were falsely imprisoning him. Id. at ¶ 1(a). Plaintiff also asserts that the preliminary arraignment was “illegal” because of the “illegal” criminal complaint, and also because he was not provided counsel at arraignment. Id. at ¶ 1(b).

Plaintiff then goes on to assert a number of issues related to the conditions of his confinement at the Beaver County Jail. Specifically, he claims there were “HIPPAA [sic] violations by forcing inmates to take Covid shots in front of other inmates,” and further claims that the jail was not following CDC guidelines regarding the use of masks. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff also claims there are not enough computer tablets for the use of the number of inmates; that he “had to defend [him]self from convicted drug dealers [] who are aggressive and disrespectful;” he broke out into “a rash from the showers that are invaded with black mold;” and that the understaffing of corrections officers was putting him in danger. Id.

On January 18, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 48, 49). Plaintiff filed a response to this motion on February 8, 2022. (ECF No. 59). On February 9, 2022, in his underlying criminal case, Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to the retail theft charge, and was sentenced to a minimum term of seven months of incarceration. On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff informed this Court that he was no longer incarcerated at the Beaver County Jail, and he was now at his home address. (ECF No. 61). This motion is now ready for disposition.

B. Standard of Review

To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The reviewing court must “determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper where the factual allegations of the complaint conceivably fail to raise, directly or inferentially, the material elements necessary to obtain relief under a legal theory of recovery. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated, with the court accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and disregarding all legal conclusions. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). Under this standard, civil complaints “must contain more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Fowler v. UPMCShadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). A court in making this determination must ask “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 583 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoads, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (internal quotations omitted)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may take into consideration “the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record” as well as “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

Furthermore, a pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). As such, a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In a section 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 2102 (10th Cir. 1996).

In addition, “when a complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court should permit a curative amendment.” Thompson v. Police Dep't of Philadelphia, 2011 WL 4835831, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011). “However, we need not provide a plaintiff with leave to amend if amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Id. “Where a claim is frivolous, amendment is necessarily futile and, thus, leave to amend is not warranted. A claim is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

C. Discussion

i. False Imprisonment Claim

Plaintiff is first asserting a claim of false imprisonment based upon his allegedly unlawful incarceration at the Beaver County Jail. SAC (ECF No. 35) at 5. It is his position that the criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause were invalid, and then that the procedures utilized at his preliminary arraignment violated his rights. Id. Defendants contend, inter alia, that Plaintiff's claims regarding his allegedly unlawful detainment are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 US. 477 (1994). Defs.' Br. (ECF No. 49) at 8.

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.... A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

512 U.S. at 486-87. While Heck, itself, involved a malicious prosecution claim, courts have held that Heck “may also serve as a bar to § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims when the plaintiff has been convicted.” Curry v. Yachera, No. CIV.A. 14-5253, 2015 WL 1186014, at *6 n.15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2015) (collecting cases).

Fields v. City of Pittsburgh, 2016 WL 7324594, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2016), aff'd, 714 Fed.Appx. 137 (3d Cir. 2017).

On February 9, 2022, in his underlying criminal case, Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to the retail theft charge, and was sentenced to a minimum term of seven...