Arroyo v. Olde English Gardens

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VICTOR HUGO ARROYO, Plaintiff, v. OLDE ENGLISH GARDENS and CHAD STAUBER, Defendants.

No. 20-cv-2751

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

November 21, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEFFREY I. CUMMINGS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Plaintiff Victor Hugo Arroyo brings this action against his former employer, defendants Olde English Gardens and Chad Stauber for, inter alia, unpaid overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and unpaid final compensation upon separation in violation of the Illinois Wage Payment Collection Act. On March 18, 2024, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, (Dckt #90), and filed a Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (Dckt. #92 (“PSOF”)), supporting memorandum, (Dckt. #91), and Local Rule 56.2 Notice, (Dckt. #89). Defendants, currently proceeding without counsel, did not file a response to plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff filed a reply on May 3, 2024. (Dckt. #85). For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, (Dckt. #90), is granted in part and denied in part.

I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR CONSIDERATION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Issues of fact are material if they are outcome determinative. Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). When the moving party has met that burden, the non-moving party cannot rely on mere conclusions and allegations to create factual issues. Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003). Instead, it must “marshal and present the court with the evidence [it] contends will prove [its] case.” Goodman v. Nat. Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).

Evidence considered on a summary judgment motion “need not be admissible in form, but must be admissible in content, such that, for instance, affidavits may be considered if the substitution of oral testimony for the affidavit statements would make the evidence admissible at trial.” Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2016). Furthermore, courts do not weigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the record at summary judgment; instead, they review the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. NES Rental Holdings, Inc. v. Steine Cold Storage, Inc., 714 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is granted only if “no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).

II. FACTUAL RECORD

A. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 governs the procedures for filing and responding to motions for summary judgment in this Court. The rule is intended “to aid the district court, ‘which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,' in determining whether a trial is necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Local Rule 56.1(a) requires the moving party to provide a statement of material facts that complies with Local Rule 56.1(d). LR 56.1(a)(2). In turn, Local Rule 56.1(d) requires that “[e]ach asserted fact must be supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material, including the specific page number, that supports it. The court may disregard any asserted fact that is not supported with such a citation.” LR 56.1(d)(2).

The opposing party must then respond to the movant's proposed statements of fact. Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005); LR 56.1(e). If a party fails to respond to the Rule 56.1 statement of uncontested facts, those facts are deemed admitted to the extent they are supported by the evidence in the record. Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2012); Parra v. Neal, 614 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010); L.R. 56.1(e)(3).

In this case, plaintiff filed a Rule 56.1 statement of material facts with his motion for summary judgment, (Dckt. #92), which included a proper citation to the evidentiary material supporting each fact. Because defendants do not have counsel, plaintiff also served them with a “Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment” as required by Local Rule 56.2. (Dckt. #89). This notice explains the meaning of a motion for summary judgment, the requirements for responding to both the movant's motion and its Rule 56.1 statement of material facts, and - perhaps most significantly - the consequences of failing to properly respond to a summary judgment motion and statement of material facts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1. Despite this warning, defendants failed to respond to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment at all, let alone submit a response to plaintiff's statement of material facts. As such, the Court deems plaintiff's statement of material facts admitted to the extent they are supported by the evidence in the record. Keeton, 667 F.3d at 880. The Court does so even in consideration of defendants' pro se status given that plaintiff provided defendants with the requisite Local Rule 56.2 notice to unrepresented individuals. See Coleman v. Goodwill Indus. of Se. Wisconsin, Inc., 423 Fed.Appx. 642, 643 (7th Cir. 2011). Again, as the Seventh Circuit has made clear, “status as a pro se litigant does not excuse [defendants] from complying with Local Rule 56.1.” Brown v. Erickson, No. 16 C 50337, 2019 WL 1532887, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 9, 2019); Coleman, 423 Fed.Appx. at 643 (“Though courts are solicitous of pro se litigants, they may nonetheless require strict compliance with local rules.”).

B. Relevant Facts

Defendant Olde English Gardens is a landscaping company that provides lawn maintenance services, the hanging of Christmas lights, and snow removal. (“PSOF ¶2). Defendant Chad Stauber (“Stauber”) is the sole and only member or officer of Olde English Gardens, which Stauber testified is set up “like a DBA.” (Id. ¶1). Apart from an outside accountant who provides some services, Stauber handles the books, accounting, and payroll for Olde English Gardens. (Id. ¶3; Dckt. #92-1 at 6). On average, approximately five individuals work for Stauber in the summer, and two to three work for him during the winter. (PSOF ¶3; Dckt. #92-1 at 9-10).

Plaintiff worked for defendants as a laborer between 2010 and July of 2018. (PSOF ¶15). From 2010-2011, plaintiff worked part-time, and from January 2012 onward, he worked fulltime. (Id.). Between January 2012 through January 2017, plaintiff worked six days a week from 8:30 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. (approximately 72 hours per week). (Id. ¶16). From January 2017 through his separation in July 2018, plaintiff worked five to six days a week, on average 54.75 hours per week. (Id. ¶17).

Plaintiff's duties while working for defendants included grass cutting, some Christmas light hanging, and snow removal, when required. (Dckt. #92-1 at 15). At all relevant times, Stauber directed and controlled the performance of plaintiff's work after he reported to the garage each morning, and Stauber typically stayed with his workers on each job for the entire workday “to keep everybody together” and “keep an eye on them.” (PSOF ¶¶23-25; Dckt. #92-1 at 10). Plaintiff did not work for his own company at any relevant time when he worked for defendants. (PSOF ¶26).

It is undisputed that in order to get paid for the work he performed, plaintiff (like all of defendants' workers) sent Stauber a text message every week of the number of hours he worked. (Id. ¶6). Stauber then multiplied the number of hours worked by plaintiff's hourly rate of pay -which he did not recall at his deposition - and paid plaintiff via check from Stauber's account at TCF Bank that is under his name, “DBA Olde English Gardens.” (Id. ¶¶5, 9-10). Stauber testified that he did fill out timesheets from the text messages he received, and then tracked the workers' payroll in QuickBooks. (Id. ¶7). However, Stauber did not maintain copies of the text messages, the QuickBooks payroll records before 2019, or his old computer which contained the older payroll records. (Id. ¶¶7-8,11).

According to plaintiff, defendants failed to pay him overtime wages for the time he worked in excess of 40 hours from July 2016 through July 2018, and any wages for his final week of work. (Id. ¶¶18, 21). Instead, plaintiff maintains he was paid his regular rate of pay for all hours worked. (Id. ¶19). Plaintiff has submitted a spreadsheet reflecting the overtime hours for which he was not properly compensated, amounting to approximately $41,250 remaining due. (Id. ¶20; Dckt. #92-3). When asked about the spreadsheet at his deposition, defendant Stauber did not deny that plaintiff worked the hours claimed, but instead stated that he did not know if plaintiff worked those hours. (PSOF ¶12; Dckt. #92-1 at 19). In Stauber's view, plaintiff is not entitled to any additional overtime pay because he “was a 1099 employee.” (PSOF ¶14; Dckt. #92-1 at 19).

In his five-count complaint, filed in May 2020, plaintiff asserted claims against defendants for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq., and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq., for failure to pay overtime wages and for his final week of work (Counts I and II, respectively); violation of the Illinois...