Arthur West v. Wash. State

162 Wash.App. 120

252 P.3d 406

Arthur WEST, Appellant,

v.Washington STATE, WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY OFFICIALS, Respondent,Washington State Association of Counties, Washington State Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, Defendants.

No. 39366–2–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

June 1, 2011.

Arthur West, Olympia, WA, pro se.Josh Weiss, WA State Assn of Counties, Olympia, WA, for Defendants.Jeffrey Scott Myers, Law Lyman Daniel Kamerrer et al., Olympia, WA, for Respondent.QUINN–BRINTNALL, J.

[162 Wash.App. 125] ¶ 1 Arthur West appeals the dismissal of his claim that the Washington Association of County Officials (WACO) violated the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), ch. 42.30 RCW. West also appeals the imposition of CR 11 sanctions against him. We hold that WACO is subject to the OPMA. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of West's OPMA claim and remand. In addition, we affirm the CR 11 sanctions against West.

FACTS

¶ 2 In November 2008, West filed a complaint in Thurston County Superior Court against WACO and the Washington State Association of Counties (WSAC) for violations of the Public Records Act (PRA), ch. 42.56 RCW, the OPMA, and RCW 36.47.070 and .040. West moved for summary judgment arguing that Telford v. Thurston County Board of Commissioners, 95 Wash.App. 149, 974 P.2d 886, review denied, 138 Wash.2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999), held that WACO and WSAC were subject to the public records portions of the PRA ¹ and to the OPMA.

¶ 3 WACO filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that (1) West failed to allege any particular violation of the PRA, (2) there is no actionable claim to enforce the legislative merger request in RCW 36.47.070,² (3) West failed to allege any violation of the reimbursement provisions of RCW 36.47.040,³ and (4) WACO is not a “public agency” under the OPMA. West responded to WACO's motion, arguing that (1) WACO and WSAC were collaterally estopped from arguing against his PRA and OPMA claims under Telford, and (2) he had standing to bring the claims.

¶ 4 On March 27, 2009, the trial court granted WACO's motion to dismiss finding that (1) there was no PRA request made prior to West's suit and a subsequent filing did not cure the fact that there was no violation giving rise to a cause of action, (2) there is no actionable claim for a violation of the legislature's merger request in RCW 36.47.070 against WACO, and (3) West's OPMA claim was unsupported by evidence overcoming the differences in the “public agency” definitions in the PRA and OPMA.⁴ The trial court then denied West's motion for summary judgment because it found that Telford, which addressed the campaign finance portions of the PRA only, did not stand for the proposition that either WACO or WSAC are subject to the OPMA.

¶ 5 On March 30, 2009, West filed a “Declaration re Continuing Fraud by WACO Counsel,” alleging that counsel materially misrepresented WACO's creation to the trial court. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 20. WACO's counsel wrote a letter to West on April 3, requesting that he withdraw the declaration or face motions to strike and for sanctions. Receiving no response, WACO moved to strike West's declaration and for CR 11 sanctions on April 17. The trial court granted the motion on May 8, imposed $4,029 as CR 11 sanctions against West, and entered a written order and judgment containing findings pursuant to CR 54(b). The trial court simultaneously denied West's motions for reconsideration and to amend his complaint to allege that WACO violated the PRA.

¶ 6 West timely appeals the dismissal of his OPMA claim and the CR 11 sanctions.

DISCUSSION

Open Public Meetings Act—Public Agencies

¶ 7 West asserts that our holding in Telford that WACO is an “agency” for purposes of the campaign funding portions of the PRA precludes WACO from challenging whether it is subject to the OPMA. Alternatively, West argues that if Telford does not preclude WACO from challenging his OPMA claim,⁵ we should apply the Telford test to hold that WACO is the functional equivalent of a “public agency” subject to the OPMA. For its part, WACO argues that the trial court properly dismissed the OPMA claim because the definition of “public agency” in the OPMA is narrower than in the PRA and unambiguously excludes WACO.

¶ 8 Both the trial court's summary judgment claim dismissal and the question of law regarding whether collateral estoppel bars an action are subject to de novo review in this court. Torgerson v. One Lincoln Tower, LLC, 166 Wash.2d 510, 517, 210 P.3d 318 (2009) (citing Troxell v. Rainier Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 307, 154 Wash.2d 345, 350, 111 P.3d 1173 (2005)); Lynn v. Dep't of Labor & Ind., 130 Wash.App. 829, 837, 125 P.3d 202 (2005). The de novo standard also applies to our review of a trial court's granting of a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rodriguez v. Loudeye Corp., 144 Wash.App. 709, 717, 189 P.3d 168 (2008) (citing Cutler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 Wash.2d 749, 755, 881 P.2d 216 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 115 S.Ct. 2634, 132 L.Ed.2d 873 (1995)).

¶ 9 CR 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Rodriguez, 144 Wash.App. at 717, 189 P.3d 168 (citing State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 135 Wash.2d 618, 623, 957 P.2d 691 (1998)). Such dismissals are disfavored and are warranted only if the trial court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts justifying recovery. Rodriguez, 144 Wash.App. at 717, 189 P.3d 168 (citing Tenore v. AT & T Wireless Servs., 136 Wash.2d 322, 330, 962 P.2d 104 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1171, 119 S.Ct. 1096, 143 L.Ed.2d 95 (1999)). Under CR 12(b)(6), we presume all facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint are true. Rodriguez, 144 Wash.App. at 717, 189 P.3d 168 (citing Tenore, 136 Wash.2d at 330, 962 P.2d 104). But we are not required to accept the complaint's legal conclusions as true. Rodriguez, 144 Wash.App. at 717–18, 189 P.3d 168 (citing Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash.2d 107, 120, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987)).

¶ 10 As an initial matter, we hold that the trial court properly concluded that Telford did not preclude WACO from challenging whether it is subject to the OPMA. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars a second round of litigation of previously litigated issues that resulted in a final judgment. Yakima County v. Yakima County Law Enforcement Officers Guild, 157 Wash.App. 304, 331–32, 237 P.3d 316 (2010). The party seeking to bar litigation of an issue based on collateral estoppel must show that (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the second, (2) the prior adjudication ended in a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) application of the doctrine would not work an injustice. Yakima County, 157 Wash.App. at 331–32, 237 P.3d 316.

¶ 11 In Telford, we applied a four-factor balancing test to hold that WACO was an “agency” for purposes of the campaign finance portions of the PRA. 95 Wash.App. at 162, 974 P.2d 886. The four factors used to evaluate an entity's status under the PRA are (1) the entity's governmental function, (2) the entity's government funding, (3) government control over the entity, and (4) the entity's origin. Telford, 95 Wash.App. at 162–63, 974 P.2d 886. The Telford court did not discuss the OPMA. Here, the trial court, relying on 2002 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2, found that because the parties in Telford had agreed to limit the issues to whether WACO was a public agency subject to the campaign finance portions of the PRA, the Telford court's holding was limited to that issue. We agree.⁶

¶ 12 West's assertion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to preclude litigation on the issue of whether WACO is required to hold open public meetings under the OPMA because WACO has had the opportunity to litigate on the issue of whether it was subject to the campaign finance portions of the PRA fails. The trial court did not err when it denied West's motion for summary judgment and dismissed his OPMA claim based on West's collateral estoppel argument.

¶ 13 Next, we consider whether the Telford test is appropriate to evaluate WACO's status under the OPMA. WACO argues that because the OPMA does not include the PRA's catchall “other local public agency” language in its definition of “public agency,” the OPMA unambiguously excludes associations like WACO. See Telford, 95 Wash.App. at 157–58, 974 P.2d 886 (holding that the “other local public agenc[ies]” language renders the PRA definition ambiguous). West argues that because the legislature enacted both the OPMA and PRA with the same intent, the Telford test is appropriate for an entity's evaluation under both Acts. See Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash.2d 46, 52, 186 P.3d 1055 (2008); Telford, 95 Wash.App. at 159–60, 974 P.2d 886; see also RCW 42.30.010 (“The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.”).

¶ 14 In order to ascertain the meaning of the OPMA, we look first to its language. Cerrillo v. Esparza, 158 Wash.2d 194, 201, 142 P.3d 155 (2006). If the language is not ambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning. Cerrillo, 158 Wash.2d at 201, 142 P.3d 155. As part of the determination of whether a plain meaning can be ascertained, it is appropriate to look at the statute's language in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. Belleau Woods II, LLC v. City of Bellingham, 150 Wash.App. 228, 240, 208 P.3d 5, review denied, 167 Wash.2d 1014, 220 P.3d 208 (2009). We derive a statute's “plain meaning” from all that the legislative body has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question. Belleau Woods II, 150 Wash.App....