Artman v. Gualandri

TORI ARTMAN, Plaintiff, v. DAVE GUALANDRI and THE CITY OF OTTAWA, Defendants.

No. 20 C 4501

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

June 3, 2021

Judge Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

After being acquitted by a jury of official misconduct and theft charges, Plaintiff filed suit under federal law and Illinois state law alleging that Defendant Gualandri, a City of Ottawa police officer, fabricated evidence that led to her arrest and subsequent criminal prosecution. Defendants move for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff Tori Artman was a deputy auditor at the LaSalle County Auditor's Office. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Dave Gualandri, a City of Ottawa police officer, fabricated confessions to crimes of official misconduct and theft on the part of Plaintiff and Pamela Wright, a co-worker at the LaSalle County Auditor's Office. The basis of the misconduct was that Plaintiff intentionally inflated her overtime hour amounts to receive financial compensation for work she didn't perform. Plaintiff was charged with several crimes, turned herself in, and later was released on bond on September 25, 2018. During the pendency of her criminal case, Plaintiff was terminated from her position with the LaSalle County Auditor's Office. Plaintiff's case went to trial, and on August 14, 2019 she was found not guilty by a jury. After this, Plaintiff was offered her position back as a deputy auditor if she repaid all the money she received from overtime pay. Plaintiff agreed and was reinstated as a deputy auditor for the LaSalle County Auditor's Office.

Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against Gualandri and the City of Ottawa under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Her claims include a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest (Count I); a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention (Count II); a state-law claim for malicious prosecution (Count III); a state-law claim for willful and wanton conduct (Count IV); and a claim against Ottawa for indemnification of any damages awarded against Gualandri (Count V).¹

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under the notice-pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, but mere conclusions and a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not suffice. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must be plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Allegations that are as consistent with lawful conduct as they are with unlawful conduct are not sufficient; rather, plaintiffs mustinclude allegations that "nudg[e] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570.

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draws permissible inferences in favor of the non-movant. Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2018). Conclusory allegations "are not entitled to be assumed true," nor are legal conclusions. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 680-81 (noting that a "legal conclusion" was "not entitled to the assumption of truth[;]" and rejecting, as conclusory, allegations that "'petitioners 'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]' to harsh conditions of confinement").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Probable Cause

Defendants move to dismiss Counts I, II, and III² on the basis that the factual allegations in Plaintiff's complaint establish probable cause for her arrest and subsequent prosecution. Because Defendants' probable cause argument overlaps all these separate counts, the Court addresses probable cause within this section. The existence of probable cause would defeat Plaintiff's claims for false arrest, unlawful detention, and malicious prosecution. See Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016) ("To prevail on a false-arrest claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for his arrest"); Williams v. City of Chicago, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1071 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (holding that a claim for unlawful detention under the Fourth Amendment requires a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legalprocess unsupported by probable cause); Vaughn v. Chapman, 662 Fed. App'x 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution).

Under federal law "[a]n officer has probable cause to arrest if at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Neita, 830 F.3d at 497. (internal quotation marks omitted). Illinois law has a similar definition, defining probable cause as "'a state of facts that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or to entertain an honest and sound suspicion that the accused committed the offense charged.'" Gauger v. Hendle, 2011 IL App (2d) 100316, ¶ 112 (quoting Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App. 3d 635, 642 (2002)).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's factual allegations essentially plead her out of court because they establish the existence of probable cause for Defendants' alleged conduct. Although allegations within a complaint constitute binding admissions on a party, in this case the allegations to not compel an inference that probable cause existed. The difficulty in adopting Defendants' position is that it requires reasonable inferences that Defendants are not entitled to at this stage. The non-movant, in this case the Plaintiff, is entitled to all reasonable inferences, not the movant. Boucher, 880 F.3d at 365. Under this guiding principle, the Court finds that Plaintiff adequately alleges a lack of probable cause for her arrest and subsequent detention. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations support a finding of probable cause because Plaintiff admits that she received money for overtime work she didn't perform. Therefore, Defendants contend that these allegations compel an inference that Plaintiff misappropriated government funds. But even if Plaintiff acknowledges that she received unearned overtime pay, all charges levied againstPlaintiff still required an element of knowledge or intent. See Dkt. 1 at ¶28; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/8-2(a); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/19-1(a)(1)³; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/33-3(a)(2). Plaintiff alleges that during her interview with Defendant Gualandri, she denied intentionally or knowingly inflating her overtime hours to receive payment for work that was not performed, and that Gualandri misreported this conversation. Therefore, even if Plaintiff received funds for unearned overtime pay, that, by itself, does not imply that she did so with the requisite degree of intent. At this stage, Plaintiff is entitled to this reasonable inference, which could support a lack of probable cause for her detention.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also move to dismiss Counts I and II and the basis of qualified immunity, "which protects government officials from liability 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutional right and whether the constitutional right "was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Purvis, 614 F.3d at 720.

It has been clear since at least Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), that falsifying the factual basis for a judicial probable-cause determination violates a clearly establishedconstitutional right. 438 U.S. at 171-172. What's more, Defendants' reliance on Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 2016) is misplaced. In Bianchi, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendants, specially-appointed prosecutors, were entitled to qualified immunity in a malicious prosecution case because the plaintiff's unlawful detention claim was predicated on an arrest that occurred after and as a consequence of formal legal process (i.e., a warrant). First, Bianchi was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Manuel v. City of Joliet (hereafter "Manuel I") and is clearly abrogated to the extent that it held that an unlawful detention claim cannot be maintained after and as a consequence of formal legal process. See Manuel I, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017) ("Our holding—that the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process—does not exhaust the disputed legal issues in this case"). Second, Bianchi specifically noted that there was no detention—the plaintiffs "were never held in custody; rather, they were immediately released on bond and not detained." 818 F.3d at 315. Bianchi is simply not applicable to this case. Unlike Bianchi, Plaintiff alleges that she was arrested and detained until she posted bond. Therefore, accepting Plaintiff's allegations that Gualandri fabricated his conversation with Plaintiff to...