Asalone Iula v. Voos

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KAREN MARY ASALONE IULA, Plaintiff, v. JAMES VOOS, Defendant.

No. 23-CV-2277 JLS (AHG)

United States District Court, S.D. California

January 16, 2024

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2) WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; AND (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

(ECF NOS. 5, 6).

HON JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Karen Mary Asalone Iula's Amended Complaint for Monetary, Declaratory, and Injunctive Relief (“Am. Compl.,” ECF No. 5) and Renewed Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Renewed TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 6). Having carefully considered Plaintiff's submissions and the law, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and DENIES her Renewed TRO Motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing her original Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1) on December 14, 2023. She also moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) the same day. See ECF No. 2. Then, on December 15, Plaintiff filed her initial Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“First TRO Mot.,” ECF No 3).

The original Complaint alleged that, after Plaintiff and her children moved into Defendant James Voos' rental home pursuant to a sublease agreement, Defendant began “demanding sexual favors” from Plaintiff “in exchange for housing and associated benefits.” Compl. at 1, 4, 6. The Complaint further alleged that Plaintiff had “endured a relentless series of harassment and discrimination” at Defendant's hands, id. at 1; that said harassment had “rendered [Plaintiff's] living conditions unbearable,” id. at 3; and that when Plaintiff refused Defendant's sexual demands, he “retaliat[ed]” by “unlawfully evicting” Plaintiff, id. at 1-2. The Complaint listed four causes of action: (1) quid pro quo harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604, id. at 3-4; (2) “interference and intimidation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617,” id. at 5; (3) “unlawful eviction and retaliation” in violation of the “provisions of the Fair Housing Act” (“FHA”), id. at 6; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) see id. at 7-8.

In its December 21, 2023 Order (the “Order,” ECF No. 4), the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and screened the Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Order at 2-3. The Court explained that, to avoid dismissal, the Complaint needed to contain allegations of fact from which the Court could reasonably infer Defendant's liability. See id. at 3-4. And while the FHA provided for Plaintiff's first three causes of action, the Court found the Complaint devoid of factual allegations to support them. See id. at 5-8. The Complaint neither alleged facts regarding the timing, frequency, or circumstances of Defendant's conduct, nor provided details about any specific act of harassment. Instead, the Complaint contained only legal conclusions, like that Defendant “engaged in sexual harassment, intimidation, and coercion.” Id. at 6 (quoting Compl. at 4). As Plaintiff's IIED claim was equally unsupported, the Court dismissed the Complaint for failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted.

Plaintiff's First TRO Motion, which the Court interpreted to request the enjoinment of a state eviction proceeding, was no more successful. The Court determined that it was precluded from granting Plaintiff's request by the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”), under which federal courts “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court” unless certain narrow exceptions apply. See id. at 9-10 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283). And to the extent Plaintiff sought to prevent Defendant from committing further harassment, the Court found that Plaintiff had not shown any likelihood of succeeding on the merits because her Complaint did not state a claim. See id. at 10. Accordingly, the Court denied the First TRO Motion. Id. at 11.

The dismissal of Plaintiff's original Complaint and denial of Plaintiff's First TRO Motion were both without prejudice. See id. The Court granted Plaintiff forty-five days to file an amended complaint. Id. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Renewed TRO Motion followed.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

As Plaintiff continues to proceed IFP, her Amended Complaint remains subject to sua sponte dismissal if it is “frivolous, [is] malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). For the reasons below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has again failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Court thus DISMISSES Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend.

I. Standard of Review

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility requires a plaintiff to plead facts supporting a claim for relief rather than make conclusory allegations or present a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, courts have a duty to construe a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). A district court should grant leave to amend if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988)).

II. Analysis

The Amended Complaint lists three causes of action. First, Plaintiff brings a federal claim for “a violation of the [FHA], 42 U.S.C. § 3604.” Am. Compl. at 3. The Amended Complaint also contains state law IIED and negligence claims. Id. at 3-4. The Court will first summarize Plaintiff's present allegations and then analyze each of Plaintiff's causes of action in turn.

A. Allegations in the Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that after she moved into Defendant's property, “Defendant immediately began exhibiting unwelcome sexual advances towards [her], creating a hostile living environment.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff further claims that she consistently rejected Defendant's advances, and that he “retaliated by manipulating living conditions and threatening eviction.” Id. The alleged harassment intensified to the point where Plaintiff's living situation became “untenable.” Id. Defendant then filed an unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff in February of 2023, eventually receiving a favorable judgment on December 15. Id. at 3. Plaintiff states that, as a result of Defendant's actions, she suffers from “emotional and psychological distress” and “fac[es] imminent removal from the property by the sheriff.” Id. at 2.

B. Federal Claims

The Court liberally construes the Amended Complaint's federal cause of action to include the three FHA-related claims-quid pro quo harassment, hostile housing environment, and retaliatory eviction-Plaintiff brought in her initial Complaint. However, the Amended Complaint's allegations fail to support any of those claims.

1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment

As the Court previously explained, courts “apply Title VII discrimination analysis in examining [FHA] discrimination claims.” Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997). So, to state a quid pro quo harassment claim, the Amended Complaint must “include facts raising an inference that the receipt of [housing] benefit[s] was conditioned upon sexual consideration.” See Christie v. Reno Flying Serv., Inc., No. 3:21-CV-0368-RCJ-CSD, 2022 WL 1462661, at *3 (D. Nev. May 9, 2022). A plaintiff can raise such an inference by pleading that a tangible housing action resulted from her refusal to submit to a defendant's sexual demands. See Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 2010). Further, quid pro quo threats can be explicit or implicit. See Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 1993). To adequately plead an implicit threat, a complaint must allege facts suggesting that the defendant's words or actions could reasonably have been understood to condition the receipt housing benefits on sexual consideration. Cf. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Amended Complaint fails to state a quid pro quo harassment claim. Plaintiff alleges that she rejected Defendant's “unwelcome sexual advances,” and that he “retaliated” by threatening eviction. Am. Compl at 2. That allegation-like...