Asamoah v. Capstone Logistics, LLC

MICHAEL ASAMOAH, Plaintiff, v. CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC, et al., Defendants.

MICHAEL ASAMOAH, Plaintiff, v. THE SYGMA NETWORK, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action 2:19-cv-5292

Civil Action 2:19-cv-5507

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

November 25, 2020

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Jolson

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon consideration of three matters.

I. Order and Report and Recommendation

First before the Court is an Order and Report and Recommendation (R&R) issued by the Magistrate Judge on September 11, 2020. (ECF No. 86 in 5292; ECF No. 103 in 5507.) In that filing, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Sygma Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions (ECF No. 76 in 5292 and ECF No. 92 in 5507) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, she recommended that the Court: DENY without prejudice the Sygma Defendants' request for this case to be dismissed as a sanction for Plaintiff's conduct in discovery; SANCTION Plaintiff for his conduct in discovery and award the Sygma Defendants' attorneys' fees; and GRANT the Sygma Defendants' request to compel discovery and award them attorneys' fees and costs related to their Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 86 in 5292; ECF No. 103 in 5507).

The time for filing objections has passed, and no objections have been filed. For the reasons set forth in the R&R, the Court hereby ADOPTS the R&R (ECF No. 86 in 5292; ECF No. 103 in 5507) as to ECF No. 76 in 5292 and ECF No. 92 in 5507.

Additionally, the R&R denied Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Production of Documents (ECF No. 77 in 5292; ECF No. 94 in 5507) and Plaintiff's Motions to Compel Payment of Expenses (ECF Nos. 78, 79 in 5292; ECF Nos. 93, 95, 96 in 5507.) No objections have been filed. For the reasons set forth in the R&R, the Court hereby ADOPTS the R&R (ECF No. 103) as to ECF Nos. 77-79 in 5292 and ECF Nos. 93-96 in 5507. Those motions are DENIED.

II. Plaintiff's Motions to Compel and for Sanctions

Plaintiff's Final Motion to Compel Payment of Expenses (ECF No. 88 in 5292; ECF No. 105 in 5507) seeks an order requiring Defendants to pay him for his costs incurred in filing his motions to compel. Plaintiff's Final Motion to Compel Production of Documents (ECF No. 87 in 5292; ECF No. 106 in 5507) seeks an order compelling Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's discovery requests.

Plaintiff has previously filed these motions numerous times. See ECF Nos. 20, 30, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 77, 78 and 79 in 5292; ECF Nos. 30, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39 and55 in 5507. The Court has denied each one. See ECF Nos. 22, 48, 57 and 86 in 5292; ECF Nos. 57, 103 and 107 in 5507. For the reasons set forth in those orders, these motions are likewise DENIED. (ECF Nos. 87-88 in 5292; ECF No. 105-106 in 5507.)

III. Joint Motion for Summary Judgment

Also before the Court is the Joint Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all Defendants on September 4, 2020. (ECF No. 85 in 5292; ECF No. 102 in 5507). Plaintiff Asamoah has not responded to the Motion.

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be achieved by demonstrating the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388-89 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

A genuine issue exists if the nonmoving party can present "significant probative evidence" to show that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt asto the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1993). In other words, "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (concluding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact to find for the non-moving party). Even where, as here, "a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, a district court must review carefully the portions of the record submitted by the moving party to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists." F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 630 (6th Cir. 2014). See also Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 64-65 (6th Cir. 1979).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff Asamoah asserts three claims against the Defendants: (1) an age discrimination claim in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.; (2) a race discrimination claim in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; (3) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and; (4) Infliction of Emotional Distress. (ECF No. 1 in 5292 and ECF No. 1 in 5507).

i. Plaintiff's Discrimination Claims

Where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, courts permit a plaintiff to use circumstantial and indirect evidence of discrimination in order to evaluate the claims. "The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formula is the evidentiary formula applicable not only to claims brought under Title VII, but also claims underADEA ..." and the ADA. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re Brantley, 34 Ohio App.3d 320, 518 N.E.2d 602 (1987)); see also Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying McDonnell Douglas to an ADA claim). Therefore, Plaintiff's age, race, and discrimination claims can be analyzed together for purposes of the instant Motion.

In response to the Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff Asamoah has not presented direct evidence of discrimination. The next step is for the Court to apply the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach, with the burden on Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). A Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: 1) he was a member of a protected class [because of age, race, and/or disability]; 2) he was terminated; 3) he was qualified for the position; and 4) he was replaced by a person outside of the class. Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 940 (6th Cir.1987) (applying McDonnell Douglas to the age discrimination context). The Plaintiff must establish this by a preponderance of the evidence. McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir.1990) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824). Then, if and only if the Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the Defendant to "articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the [termination]." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. "Finally, should the employercarry this burden, the plaintiff then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 'that the legitimate reasons offered by the [employer] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.'" McDonald, 898 F.2d at 1160 (quoting Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981)).

Despite the fact that the Joint Motion was filed more than two months ago, Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion. Nevertheless, the Court has carefully reviewed the portions of the record submitted by the moving parties to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Considering all of this and the applicable law, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's discrimination claims.

ii. Plaintiff's Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

In his Complaint in Case No. 2:19cv5507, Plaintiff Asamoah does not specify if his Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim is an intentional or negligent tort claim (ECF No. 1); in Case No. 2:19cv5292, he alleges that the conduct was intentional (ECF No. 1). However, as a general matter, Ohio law does not recognize a separate tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context. See, Dodge v. United States, 162 F.Supp.2d 873, 879 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (Rice, CJ) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court will assume that Mr. Asamoah intended tobring a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED") in both actions. The elements of such a claim are:

(1) the defendant intended to cause emotional distress or knew or should have known that its conduct would result in serious emotional distress to the plaintiff;

(2) defendant's conduct was outrageous and extreme and beyond all possible bounds of decency and was such that it can be considered as utterly intolerable in a civilized community;

(3) defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's psychic injury; and

(4) plaintiff's emotional distress was serious and of such a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.

Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1110 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ekunsumi v. Cincinnati Restoration, Inc., 120 Ohio App.3d 557, 698 N.E.2d 503, 506 (1997)). Conduct giving rise to an IIED claim must be "'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in...