Ashcel Cos. v. Cnty. of Dodge

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Ashcel Companies, Inc., a Minnesota Corporation, Respondent, v. County of Dodge, Appellant.

No. A24-0056

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

August 5, 2024

Dodge County District Court File No. 20-CV-21-453

Chad D. Lemmons, Kelly & Lemmons, PA, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jay T Squires, Alexander P. Halladay, Squires, Waldspurger &amp Mace, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Segal Chief Judge; and Slieter, Judge.

SYLLABUS

Under Minn. Stat. § 282.03 (2022), a county may attach a condition to the sale of a tax-forfeited property requiring the buyer to demolish a building or structure on the property.

OPINION

BRATVOLD, JUDGE

This case arises from the sale of a tax-forfeited property by appellant Dodge County (the county) to respondent Ashcel Companies Inc. (Ashcel). As a condition of the sale, the county required the buyer to demolish "all buildings" on the tax-forfeited property, which is located in Kasson (the Kasson property). After purchasing the Kasson property, Ashcel requested permission from the county for Ashcel's president to occupy the house on the property and for Ashcel to be relieved of the condition that it demolish all buildings. The county denied Ashcel's request, and Ashcel petitioned for a writ of mandamus.

The district court denied the county's motion for summary judgment and certified the following question: "Whether counties have the authority to impose a condition requiring demolition of pre-existing structures as a part of a tax-forfeiture sale." We first determine that the certified question is important and doubtful. We then answer the certified question in the affirmative and conclude that Minn. Stat. § 282.03 authorizes a county to require the buyer of a tax-forfeited property to demolish a building or structure on the property as a condition of the sale.

FACTS

The following summarizes the undisputed facts as determined by the district court and supplemented by the record when helpful to the issue on appeal.

In May 2017, the board of commissioners for the county (the county board) authorized a public sale of the Kasson property, a tax-forfeited parcel located on 230th Avenue. The Kasson property included a single-family home. County employees inspected the Kasson property and observed that the house was "in poor condition" and "all building components" were "in a questionable state of repair." The county employees also observed that "there appeared to be no functional and legal well and septic system on the property that would serve residential use." The county board "determined the public interest was best served by [the] removal" of the house.

On May 17 and 24, the county published a "notice of public sale of tax-forfeited lands" in the newspaper. The Kasson property was listed along with other properties in a table, which stated across the top, "Please note the conditions of sale at the bottom of this table." The conditions of sale for the Kasson property stated, "All buildings including the mobile home and the septic system must be demolished." The notice also specified the time, date, and location of the sale. Ashcel's president, Patrick Brown, visited the Kasson property before the auction and then appeared at the auction on Ashcel's behalf. On June 14, Ashcel purchased the Kasson property at the public auction. On June 30, the Minnesota Department of Revenue conveyed the Kasson property to Ashcel via a written "Conveyance of Forfeited Lands." The conveyance listed no conditions of sale.

Over three years later, on August 25, 2020, Brown appeared before the county board on behalf of Ashcel to request permission for Brown "to occupy the home" on the Kasson property rather than demolish it. The county board discussed the Kasson property's well and septic-system issues with Brown.

On September 8, 2020, Brown again appeared at a county-board meeting to report that it was not "an issue to put in a new well" but that he "would need to determine where the septic [system] is going" before drilling the well. Brown again "requested authorization to proceed with occupying" the house on the Kasson property. The county board denied Ashcel's request for Brown to occupy the house and informed Brown that "the house needs to come down."

On July 6, 2021, Ashcel petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus directing the county "to issue to [Ashcel] a permit for construction of an onsite sewage treatment system." Ashcel alleged that the county "refused to issue said permit," thereby preventing Ashcel from occupying the home on the Kasson property. The district court issued an order for a writ of mandamus compelling the county to "issue a permit as applied for by" Ashcel or file an answer within 20 days of service of the order.

The county filed an answer and counterclaim, requesting that the district court compel Ashcel to "remove the residential structure from the . . . [Kasson] property as required by the condition of conveyance of the property." Ashcel answered the counterclaim, conceding that it "failed to demolish the structure" on the Kasson property but denying that it had "any obligation to do so." The case was set for trial.

The county filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence "regarding the condition of the residential structure on the [Kasson] property . . . or the suitability or design of the septic system to serve the pre-existing residential structure." The county's accompanying memorandum argued that such evidence was "not relevant to the fundamental issue in this case-the validity of the . . . demolition condition of sale." Ashcel opposed the county's motion.

After a discussion with the district court, the parties conferred and agreed that (1) "the county's in limine motion will be put in abeyance"; (2) "the parties will bring cross-motions for summary judgment"; and (3) Ashcel "will amend its petition to reflect the fact [that] what is sought is an order directing a septic site evaluation of the [Kasson] property, not issuance of a septic permit." The district court approved these stipulations.

Ashcel then amended its petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking "an order directing the County of Dodge to meet with a representative of [Ashcel] at the [Kasson] property and conduct an on-site soil verification."

Both parties moved for summary judgment. Ashcel argued that the county did not "have the statutory authority to require the correction or removal of hazardous structures" as a condition of the sale of a tax-forfeited property. The county argued that "the conditions of sale are valid" because "Minn. Stat. § 282.03 specifically authorizes a county to place conditions of sale on a tax-forfeited property."

The district court granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the county's request to compel Ashcel to demolish the house on the Kasson property in accordance with the condition of sale. The district court relied on two statutes. First, the district court cited Minn. Stat. § 282.04, subd. 2(e) (2022), and stated that it "allows for the county to demolish the structure while the county is in possession of the property if certain economic conditions are met." Second, the district court reasoned that Minn. Stat. § 282.03 "allows for the county to place conditions upon a subject property for certain economic purposes."^[1] The district court determined that "[n]either statute allows the county to place the burden of demolition on the purchaser" and that, "[b]ased upon the statutory language, [the] condition of sale was beyond the scope of the county board's authority."

The district court also denied Ashcel's petition for a writ of mandamus. The district court determined that the "mere fact that Dodge County cannot require demolition of a structure as a condition of sale does not necessitate a meeting for an on-site soil verification" and that Ashcel "provided no legal basis by which the court could consider the issue."

The district court did not direct the entry of judgment. In a letter to the district court, the parties stipulated to certification of a question to this court as important and doubtful. The district court agreed and certified the following question: "Whether counties have the authority to impose a condition requiring demolition of pre-existing structures as a part of a tax-forfeiture sale." The county appeals from the district court's orders denying summary judgment and certifying the demolition-condition question.

ISSUES

I. Is the certified question important and doubtful?

II. Does a county have the authority to impose a condition of sale requiring a buyer to demolish buildings or structures on a tax-forfeited property?

ANALYSIS

I. The certified question is important and doubtful.

The Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure provide that an "appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . if the trial court certifies that the question presented is important and doubtful, . . . from an order which denies a motion for summary judgment." Minn. R. Civ. App. P 103.03(i). Appellate courts must determine whether the district court "properly certified the question[] for appellate review." Fedziuk v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 696 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 2005).

"[N]ot every vexing question is important and doubtful." Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc., 418 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 1988).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has provided "factors to consider in determining whether a question is important." Jostens, Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins Co., 612 N.W.2d 878, 884 (Minn. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). A question is important if "(1) it will have statewide impact, (2) it is likely to be reversed, (3) it will...