Ass'n for L. A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of L. A.

94 Cal.App.5th 764

312 Cal.Rptr.3d 520

ASSOCIATION FOR LOS ANGELES DEPUTY SHERIFFS et al., Appellants,

v.COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents.

B316067

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Filed July 27, 2023

Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinski, Santa Monica, and Brian P. Ross for Appellants.

Miller Barondess, Mira Hashmall, Los Angeles, Eleanor S. Ruth and Lauren M. Brody for Respondents.

BENDIX, J.

Three former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (department) were discharged from their employment for alleged misconduct. The former deputies filed administrative appeals with the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (commission). While their appeals were pending, the former deputies executed settlement agreements with department personnel that purported to reinstate the former deputies to employment. The County of Los Angeles (county) thereafter refused to comply with these settlement agreements.

The former deputies and a labor union for department personnel (collectively, appellants) filed suit against the county, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (board of supervisors or board), the department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff (sheriff), the Los Angeles County Counsel (county counsel), and the Director of Personnel for the County of Los Angeles (director of personnel) (collectively, respondents). Appellants sought enforcement of the settlements through mandamus, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims. They also requested a declaration that the county's rejection of the settlements is unlawful, and that the county's supposed blanket refusal to settle disciplinary cases against department employees violates the due process rights of labor union members.

The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrers to appellants’ pleading without leave to amend. Among other things, the court ruled the settlement agreements are void because county counsel did not approve them, and section 21 of the county charter (section 21) confers upon county counsel "exclusive charge and control of all civil actions and proceedings in which the County or any officer thereof, is concerned or is a party." (Fn. omitted.) Appellants seek review of the ensuing judgment of dismissal.

On appeal, we hold that section 21 of the charter does not grant county counsel exclusive authority to settle appeals of discipline that are pending before the commission. Under the original version of the charter, which included section 21,¹ the commission did not hear appeals from discipline of county employees. Further, the grammatical structure of the phrase "civil actions and proceedings" in section 21 indicates county counsel's exclusive authority extends only to civil actions and civil proceedings. This conclusion is supported by provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that existed when the original charter was drafted and ratified, and by subsequent Attorney General opinions. Respondents fail to show that the drafters and ratifiers of the original charter intended to grant county counsel exclusive charge and control of later-invented administrative appeals of discipline, or that subsequent amendments to the charter were intended to provide this exclusive authority to county counsel.

Notwithstanding our construction of section 21, we conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrers to the contract and mandamus claims because appellants have not demonstrated that the sheriff and his subordinates are authorized to bind the county to settlements of appeals before the commission. Furthermore, appellants fail to show that despite this defect, they can recover on their promissory estoppel and declaratory relief causes of action.

We also conclude that with the exception of the portion of appellants’ declaratory relief cause of action that is premised on an alleged procedural due process violation, the trial court erred in denying appellants leave to amend. Given that the trial court was reviewing appellants’ first pleading and that appellants could potentially discover the legal basis (if any) for the department's alleged long-standing apparent belief that its personnel have authority to settle commission appeals on their own (i.e., without the consent of other county officials), we conclude that allowing appellants to file an amended pleading would not be an exercise in futility.

We thus reverse the trial court's judgment of dismissal and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition of this appeal.

1. The verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint

On December 5, 2019, appellants filed their verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint (petition/complaint).³ Deputy John Doe I, Deputy John Doe II, and Deputy Jane Doe are former deputies of the department (collectively, the deputy appellants). "Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (‘ALADS’) ... is[ ] a recognized employee organization as defined in the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act [citation] representing sworn non-management peace officers employed by the Department and the County District Attorney's Office with regard to all matters concerning wages, hours and working conditions." ALADS brought suit "on behalf of all of its represented employees."

In the petition/complaint, each of the three deputy appellants alleges one cause of action for writ of mandate (the first, fourth, and seventh causes of action), one cause of action for breach of contract (the second, fifth, and eighth causes of action), and one cause of action for promissory estoppel (the third, sixth, and ninth causes of action). The tenth cause of action for declaratory relief is brought on behalf of ALADS and the deputy appellants.

It appears that in or about 2017, the deputy appellants were served with letters of intent to be discharged from employment. The deputy appellants participated in predeprivation hearings held in 2017 pursuant to Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774 ( Skelly ), and were subsequently discharged from employment for alleged misconduct.⁴ Each deputy appellant filed an appeal of his or her discharge with the commission.

In 2019, while their respective appeals were pending, each deputy appellant entered into a settlement agreement with a chief at the department, the terms of which purported to reduce the discipline imposed and reinstate the deputy appellant's employment. Respondents thereafter refused to comply with the terms of the settlements. Although the petition/complaint does not detail the circumstances under which Deputy John Doe I became aware that respondents "refused ... to reinstate [him] to his employment with the County and to provide him with all emoluments of employment," the pleading alleges that approximately two months after their settlements were executed, Deputy John Doe II and Deputy Jane Doe were "advised" that "County Counsel and/or ... [the] Director of Personnel and/or ... [the] Board of Supervisors vetoed" their settlements.

In their appellate brief, respondents assert that the settlement "agreements were not [in fact] approved by County Counsel or the Board[ of Supervisors,]" and appellants tacitly concede that point by failing to dispute it in their reply. (See Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 849 ( Rudick ) [concluding that the appellants made an implicit concession by "failing to respond in their reply brief to the [respondent's] argument on th[at] point"].) Appellants also do not contest respondents’ representation that the deputy appellants’ appeals were still pending before the commission when they filed their petition/complaint.

(See Rudick , at pp. 89–90, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 849.)

2. The trial court's rulings sustaining respondents’ demurrers, the judgment, and appellants’ notices of appeal

The matter was initially assigned to the writs department of the trial court. Respondents demurred to the petition/complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer, without leave to amend, as to the three causes of action for mandamus, to wit, the first, fourth, and seventh causes of action. The court ruled that appellants had "failed to state a claim for a writ of traditional mandamus without regard to a substantive determination concerning the validity of the settlement agreements." The court reasoned, "[I]t is well settled ‘mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to enforce a contractual obligation against a public entity’ " because "breach of contract is an adequate remedy at law, and the duty which mandamus enforces is not the contractual duty of the entity, but the official duty of its officer or board." After the court sustained this initial demurrer, the case was reassigned to the civil department of the trial court.

Respondents then filed a demurrer in the trial court to appellants’ remaining causes of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer on the remaining causes of action without leave to amend.⁵ In support of its decision, the trial court agreed with respondents that only the board of supervisors or county counsel could settle appeals before the commission. With regard to the board of supervisors’ authority, the court observed that under Government Code section 25203, "the Board ‘shall direct and control the conduct of litigation in which the county, or any public entity of which the board is the governing body, is a party.’ " (Quoting Gov. Code, § 25203.)

The trial court also agreed with respondents that section 21 establishes that the department lacked authority to enter into the settlements. In pertinent part, section 21 provides: "The County Counsel shall represent and advise the Board of Supervisors and all County, township and school district officers, in all matters and questions of law pertaining to their duties, and shall have exclusive charge and control of all civil actions and...