Ass'n of Am. Railroads v. Hatfield

435 F.Supp.3d 769

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, Plaintiff,

v.Martin L. HATFIELD, in his Official Capacity as the County Attorney of Pulaski County, Kentucky, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 3:18-cv-00028-GFVT

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division. Frankfort.

Signed January 28, 2020

Christopher Blake Rambicure, Michael P. Abate, Kaplan & Partners LLP, Louisville, KY, Raymond A. Atkins, Tobias Loss-Eaton, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, fro Plaintiff.

Mark A. Wohlander, William Nicholas Wallingford, Wohlander Law Office, Lexington, KY, for Defendants Martin L. Hatfield, Greg Speck.

John F. Kelley, Jr., Jason E. Williams, Williams & Towe Law Group, PLLC, London, KY, Bruce W. Lominac, Lominac Law Office, Stearns, KY, for Defendant Randy Waters.

Jason E. Williams, Williams & Towe Law Group, PLLC, London, KY, for Defendant Conley Chaney.

OPINION & ORDER

Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on two separate motions. First, both the Pulaski County and McCreary County Defendants move for reconsideration of this Court's March 26, 2019 Order, which denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [R. 32; R. 34.] In a subsequent motion, Plaintiff Association of American Railroads moves for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. [R. 39.] These motions concern two separate issues, one procedural and one substantive: (1) whether AAR has standing to pursue the requested relief, and (2) whether the two Kentucky statutes that are the focal point of this suit are federally preempted. Each issue will be taken in turn and, for the reasons that follow, the Defendants' Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED .

I

Defendants initially moved to dismiss this case on a number of different bases, including, as relevant here, the contention that AAR lacked associational standing. That contention was necessarily rejected when this Court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. [R. 31 at 3–5.] Both sets of Defendants now ask the Court to reconsider that specific issue based on the recent Sixth Circuit ruling in Waskul v. Washtenaw Cty. Cmty. Mental Health , 900 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2018). [R. 32; R. 34.] Waskul , however, does not have the effect that Defendants claim and this Court declines to reconsider the Motion to Dismiss as ruled upon in the prior Order.

This Court has the authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)¹ and common law "to reconsider and modify interlocutory judgments any time before final judgment." Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund , 89 Fed. App'x 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The arguments that can be raised in a motion for reconsideration are limited. Generally, reconsideration is proper only in three circumstances: "when there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Id. at 959.

Here, Defendants request reconsideration under the first prong, pointing to what they believe is an intervening change of controlling law. Specifically, they claim the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Waskul , decided four days after they filed their reply brief in support of the Motion to Dismiss, effected a change in the controlling law concerning the first element of associational standing. [R. 32 at 2.] Most directly stated, Defendants claim that " Waskul reflects that prospective relief alone is insufficient to establish associational standing." [R. 37 at 2.]

As noted in this Court's prior Order, to establish associational standing all AAR must show is that: (1) one of its members would have standing to sue in its own right; (2) the relief it seeks is germane to its purpose; and (3) none of its members need to participate in their individual capacity. [R. 31 at 3 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n , 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) ).] As to the first element of associational standing, an association must show one of its members "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). Importantly, an association must abide by the general rule that "a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought." See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (citations omitted); Summers v. Earth Island Inst. , 555 U.S. 488, 493, 498, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009).

Applying these established principles of associational standing, this Court found that at least one member of AAR, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, would have standing to sue on its own accord if seeking an injunction. [R. 31 at 3–4.] As such, it was determined AAR properly established the first element of associational standing. Id. at 4. Waskul does nothing to change this analysis.

In Waskul , the association at issue sought to establish associational standing in order to pursue a "very discrete" form of injunctive relief on behalf of its members: the provision of certain notices and hearing rights. Waskul , 900 F.3d at 256. When the association brought suit seeking this injunctive relief, it did so on behalf of three named plaintiffs, along with certain unnamed plaintiffs. Id. at 254. Importantly, during the pendency of the federal lawsuit, the three named members of the association received the requested administrative relief in the form of favorable decisions from a state administrative law judge. Id. The association, however, pressed on and claimed associational standing on behalf of its unnamed members to pursue the requested injunctive relief which its three named members had already received. Id. at 256. Relatedly, the association contended that it sufficiently established associational standing to pursue a separate form of relief on behalf of its members—a due process claim. Id. at 255.

The Waskul court focused specifically on whether associational standing remained as to the requested injunctive relief. Id. at 256 ; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. 528 U.S. at 185, 120 S.Ct. 693 ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought."). Because the named members had already received the requested relief in the form of favorable decisions, the Court held the association lacked associational standing going forward as to the requested injunctive relief. Waskul , 900 F.3d at 256–57. Specifically, the Court stressed the importance of establishing standing for each form of relief sought, stating: "In sum, even assuming at least one named member (and thus the Association) has standing to advance a due process claim , the requested injunctive relief on this interlocutory appeal simply would not have provided redress to any named member for any actual or imminent injury ...." Id. at 257 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

AAR is therefore correct in stating that " Waskul ... stands for two uncontroversial points: Standing is evaluated for each claim and form of relief sought, ... and an association lacks standing to seek relief that would not redress any injury suffered by a named member[.]" [R. 33 at 3.] Here, Norfolk Southern has not received any relief resembling that received by the named members in Waskul , and, instead, the specter of future criminal liability remains. [See R. 31 at 4.] Waskul does not constitute an intervening change of controlling law and this Court's findings as to associational standing will remain undisturbed.

II

The Court now turns to the substantive issue at hand: whether the two Kentucky statutes that are the focal point of this suit, KRS § 277.200 and KRS § 525.140, are federally preempted. These two statutes serve as the basis for enforcement actions by local Kentucky officials against AAR's named member, Norfolk Southern, for blocking grade crossings with public roads. Now, AAR, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, seeks a ruling that these statutes are expressly preempted by federal law in the form of the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. § 20101, et seq. As the state statutes at issue relate to railroad safety and neither of the FRSA savings clauses apply, the Court finds that both statutes are expressly preempted by federal law, and AAR, on behalf of its members, is entitled to the requested relief.

A

Beginning in March 2017 and March 2018, respectively, the Pulaski County and McCreary County Sheriff's Offices issued numerous citations to Norfolk Southern Railway Company, an AAR member, for obstructing a highway. [R. 1 at 11–12; R. 41-1.] These citations were issued pursuant to KRS § 277.200 and KRS § 525.140, as a result of Norfolk Southern trains blocking grade crossings for prolonged periods of time. [See e.g. , R. 41 at 2–3.]² Both the Pulaski County Attorney and McCreary County Attorney enforced the respective citations, pursuing fines in state court. [R. 1 at 11–12; R. 40 at 2; R. 41 at 2–3.]

Following the enforcement actions against Norfolk Southern, Plaintiff AAR brought the present case in a representational capacity, seeking a declaration that both of the "anti-blocking" state statutes are preempted by federal statutes, as well as seeking permanent injunctive relief against the state actors. [R. 1 at 2–3.] As noted above, the Defendants moved to dismiss the federal action on a number of bases and this Court denied that motion. [R. 31.] AAR now moves for partial judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), arguing that, as a matter of law, the two Kentucky statutes are expressly preempted by the FRSA specifically and are therefore void and unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause. [See R. 39.]

B

"After the pleadings are closed ... a party may move for judgment on...