Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.

ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS- CWA, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff,

v.SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

Civil Case No. 2:12-CV-15641

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: May 2, 2013

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

The Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO ("AFA" or "Union") initiated this action on December 26, 2012, seeking relief under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. Presently before the Court is Defendant Spirit Airlines, Inc.'s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and/or (6), filed January 23, 2103. The motion has been fully briefed. The Court held a motion hearing on April 25, 2013, and now grants Defendant's motion.

Factual and Procedural Background

AFA is a labor organization representing the flight attendants employed by Sprit Airlines, Inc. ("Spirit"). (Compl. ¶ 1.) Spirit is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce. (Id. ¶ 2.) AFA and Spirit are parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") which became effective February 7, 2003 and renews itself annually without change. (Id. ¶ 6.)

Section 22 of the CBA governs the filing and processing of grievances under the agreement. (Id. ¶ 7, citing Ex. A.) Pursuant to Section 22, the process culminates in final and binding arbitration of unresolved grievances before a board of adjustment known as the Sprit Airlines, Inc. Flight Attendant System Board of Adjustment ("System Board"). (Id. Ex. A § 22.) The CBA provides that the System Board "shall consist of three (3) Board Members: a Union representative, a Company representative, and an arbitrator." (Id. § 22.F.3.a.) The CBA further provides that the Union and Company representatives must be full-time Spirit employees. (Id.) Arbitrators are selected from a panel of five individuals agreed to by the parties. (Id. § 22.F.3.d.)

On January 28, 2011, AFA filed a grievance regarding domestic partner health benefits, grievance number 39-99-02-01-11. (Compl. ¶ 16.) The grievance proceeded to arbitration before the System Board on July 26, 2012. (Id.) The System Board Members at the time were Union representative Carmen Linn, Company representative Costin Corneanu, and Arbitrator Susan Brown. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13, 17.) It was noted at the hearing that Linn intended to retire from Spirit possibly in September 2012. (Id. ¶ 18.) In anticipation of her retirement, the Union had appointed Ramona Rios, another full-time employee, to serve as Linn's replacement upon her retirement. (Id. ¶ 19.) Rios attended the arbitration and was introduced as Linn's successor. (Id. ¶ 20.)

The System Board did not convene or consult after the July 26, 2012 hearing. (Id. ¶ 21.) Pursuant to the CBA, the System Board must render a decision within thirty (30) days after the close of the grievance hearing and/or submission of briefs. (Id. Ex. A§ 22.F.4.a.) The CBA further provides that decisions of the System Board "shall be by a majority vote and shall be final and binding on all parties." (Id. § 22.F.4.a.)

Linn retired effective September 1, 2012. (Id. ¶ 22.) On September 26, 2012, Arbitrator Brown circulated a "draft" opinion and award in favor of the Union. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 25.) Arbitrator Brown's usual practice on the System Board was to draft the opinion and award and share it with the other members prior to an "executive session" where the case would be discussed among the members. (Id. ¶ 14.)

According to AFA, party System Board members (i.e., the Union member and Company member), "in all previous cases . . . signed decisions in favor of their own party and dissented in decisions favoring the opposing party." (Id. ¶ 10.) In conformance with this practice, Corneanu, as the Company representative, will not sign to affirm Arbitrator Brown's draft decision. (Id. ¶ 28.) AFA proposes to have Linn or Rios sign on behalf of the Union. Spirit objects to Linn because only full-time employees are eligible System Board members and she now is retired. (Id. ¶ 31; see also Ex. A ¶ 22.F.3.a.) Spirit also objects to Rios because she was not designated as the System Board member at the hearing itself. (Id. ¶ 33.) Spirit maintains that only three options are available at this juncture: (1) proceed with the existing board of Arbitrator Brown and Corneanu and hope to reach a majority decision or a deadlock which results in the effective denial of the grievance; (2) start anew by appointing a new arbitrator (as Brown no longer is on the list of agreed-to neutral arbitrators) and rehear the grievance; or, (3) withdraw the grievance. (Id. ¶ 36.) AFA has proposed as an alternative that the grievance be heard de novo by anew System Board chaired by Arbitrator Brown. (Id. ¶ 38.) Spirit rejected this proposal. To resolve this impasse, AFA filed this lawsuit.

In its Complaint, AFA alleges that by refusing to recognize Linn or Rios, "Spirit is seeking to circumvent the finalization and enforcement of an Opinion and Award that is favorable to AFA." (Id. ¶ 41.) AFA maintains that this constitutes a violation of Section 204 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153 and 184. (Id. ¶ 43.) AFA asks the Court to inter alia issue an order requiring Spirit to either: (a) recognize Linn as a member of the System Board for the purpose of completing the arbitration of the grievance or (b) recognize Rios as a substitute member for that purpose. Alternatively, AFA asks the Court to compel Spirit to resubmit the grievance for de novo hearing before a System Board chaired by Arbitrator Brown.

Spirit responded to AFA's Complaint by filing the present motion to dismiss the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and/or (6). Spirit argues that dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(1) because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide the "minor dispute" raised by AFA's Complaint. Alternatively, but for the same reason, Spirit contends that AFA fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and thus dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

Applicable Standards

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but it must contain more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). A complaint does not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct at 1966).

As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). The plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct]." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.

In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a "plausible" claim, the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id.; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). This presumption, however, is not applicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Therefore, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965-66).

Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) "come in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack." Gentek Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). When a facial attack is asserted, all of the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. Under a factual attack, however, the court can actually weigh evidence to confirm the existence of the factual predicates for subject-matter jurisdiction. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996).

In support of its claim that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Spirit offers evidence outside AFA's Complaint. However, the Court finds it unnecessary to consider that evidence to decide Spirit's motion under Rule 12(b)(1). Thus it is treating Spirit's challenge as a facial attack and, as the Court will do in evaluating Spirit's alternative argument for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), will consider only the facts alleged by AFA in its pleading.

Applicable Law and Analysis

AFA invoked the jurisdiction of this federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,because its claims "arise under" the RLA. The RLA establishes mandatory methods for resolving disputes between employers subject to the act and their employees "to promote peaceful and efficient resolution of those disputes." Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Central Region, 558 U.S. 67, -, 130 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2009) (citation omitted). Which method is applicable depends on which of two types of disputes are at issue: "major disputes" or "minor disputes."

Major...