Atkinson v. Godfrey

100 F.4th 498

Leslie ATKINSON, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Brent GODFREY, In his individual capacity as a law enforcement officerwith the Harnett County Sheriff's Office; Wayne Coats,In his official capacity as Sheriff of Harnett County,North Carolina, Defendants - Appellants,andJohn Doe, as Surety, Defendant.

No. 23-1344

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued: January 23, 2024

Decided: May 2, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:22-cv-00369-WO-LPA)

Brian Florencio Castro, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. Russell Snow Thompson, IV, THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW GROUP, PC, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded in part, dismissed in part by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Rushing join. Judge Wilkinson wrote a concurring opinion.

QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

The primary issue in this appeal is whether a law enforcement officer called to the scene of a private repossession of a vehicle is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim that the officer unreasonably seized the vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Neither the Supreme Court, our Court, the highest court of the state where the conduct occurred nor a consensus of other circuit courts of appeals have determined that conduct similar to that of the officer is unconstitutional. So, the right alleged to be violated was not clearly established. As a result, we reverse the district court's denial of the officer's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and remand with instructions to grant.

I.¹

A.

To purchase a 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche, Leslie Atkinson executed a retail installment sales contract that granted the seller a security interest in the vehicle. The seller assigned the sales contract, and the security interest, to Credit Acceptance Corporation. A few years later, Credit Acceptance engaged Primeritus Financial Services to repossess the vehicle. Primeritus, in turn, hired Carolina Repo to conduct the repossession.

When a Carolina Repo representative arrived at Atkinson's house to conduct the repossession, he found the vehicle parked by the back door. The Carolina Repo representative backed his tow truck toward Atkinson's vehicle. Noticing the repossession in progress, Atkinson exited her home. Atkinson jumped into her vehicle and attempted to drive off while the Carolina Repo representative "continued backing up [the truck] and slid its tow bar under the [v]ehicle." J.A. 15. This lifted the vehicle's back tires into the air. Concerned for her safety, Atkinson put the vehicle in park. The Carolina Repo representative walked over to her and demanded she exit the vehicle.

After the Carolina Repo representative and Atkinson argued about the repossession, the representative called the Harnett County Sheriff's Office for assistance. The representative asked whether Atkinson had any outstanding warrants. The Sheriff's Office sent Brent Godfrey, a deputy, to Atkinson's home. When he arrived, Godfrey saw Atkinson in the vehicle, the back end of which was still suspended in the air by the Carolina Repo truck's tow bar. Godfrey ordered her out of the vehicle so that the Carolina Repo representative could repossess it. Because she was intimidated by Godfrey, Atkinson got out of the vehicle as requested.

B.

Atkinson sued Godfrey and Sheriff Wayne Coats under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.² Relevant here, she alleges Godfrey, in his individual capacity, violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures of property by improperly facilitating Carolina Repo's repossession. Atkinson maintains that despite her objections to the seizure of the vehicle, Godfrey actively took part in its repossession. She alleges Godfrey told her that Carolina Repo was taking the vehicle despite her protests. She also contends that Coats, in his official capacity as the sheriff and final policy maker of the sheriff's office, failed to train officers and created policies and customs that deprived her of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures of property.

Godfrey and Coats moved to dismiss Atkinson's § 1983 claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). They asserted (1) that Atkinson's § 1983 claim should be dismissed because she did not allege facts showing they acted under color of law, (2) that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity and (3) that, without an underlying constitutional violation, Atkinson failed to bring an actionable claim against the Sheriff's Office through Coats in his official capacity. The district court denied the motion, finding it could not determine as a matter of law (1) that Godfrey's actions did not constitute state action, (2) that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity and (3) that the Sheriff's Office's liability could be ruled out. Godfrey and Coats timely appealed the district court's denial of their motion.

II.

Before addressing the merits of the defendants' appeal, we consider our federal appellate jurisdiction.³ Our jurisdiction is generally limited to the review of final decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss does not constitute a "final decision" and, therefore, most of the time is not the proper basis of an appeal. Davis v. City of Greensboro, 770 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2014). But under the collateral order doctrine,⁴ "[w]hen a district court denies a motion to dismiss that is based on qualified immunity, . . . the action is a final order reviewable by this court" to the extent it turns on an issue of law. Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1997); Davis, 770 F.3d at 282.

We begin with our jurisdiction to consider the defendants' challenge to the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss the claim against Godfrey. The defendants' motion to dismiss accepts Atkinson's factual allegations from the complaint as true but contends that, even so, Godfrey is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Thus, since the defendants' challenge to the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Godfrey turns on a legal question, we have jurisdiction to review it.

III.

With our jurisdiction to review the district court's ruling on Atkinson's § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure against Godfrey established, we turn to his assertion of qualified immunity.⁵

A.

"Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012). The immunity balances two important interests: "the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The protection applies regardless of whether the government official's error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact. Id. It gives "government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6, 134 S.Ct. 3, 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013) (per curiam) (internal quotes and citation omitted). While qualified immunity provides a defense to liability, it is also intended to free officials from litigation concerns and disruptive discovery. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

In reviewing a district court's decision rejecting a defendant's assertion of qualified immunity, we apply a two-step analysis. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Under the first prong of the analysis, we ask "whether a constitutional violation occurred." Melgar ex rel. Melgar v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on this question. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022). Under the second prong, we ask whether the right at issue was "clearly established" at the time of the events in question. Id.; see also Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 2014). The officer bears the burden on this question. Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233.

We may address these questions in the order that would best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of the case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808. That means that we may grant qualified immunity on the ground that the purported right was not clearly established without resolving the "often more difficult question whether the purported right exists at all." Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088. The flexibility in approaching the questions "comports with [the Supreme Court's] usual reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily." Id.

B.

Exercising the analytical discretion permitted for considering qualified immunity, we begin with prong two. Under that prong, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if, at the time of the challenged conduct, the law did not clearly establish that the officer's conduct was unconstitutional. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63, 138 S.Ct. 577, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018).

Atkinson claims Godfrey violated her Fourth Amendment right, made applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from unreasonable seizures. She contends that, during Carolina Repo's repossession efforts, Godfrey crossed the line from keeping the peace into actively participating.

The Fourth Amendment...