Attorney Grievance Comm. for the First Judicial Dep't v. Rogan (In re Rogan)

170 N.Y.S.3d 556

In the MATTER OF Elizabeth Vila ROGAN, (admitted as Elizabeth Jean Vila), an attorney and counselor-at law:

Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner,

v.Elizabeth Vila Rogan, (OCA Atty. Reg. No. 2063287), Respondent.

Motion No. 2022-01932

Case No. 2022-01937

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Entered July 5, 2022

Jorge Dopico, Chief Attorney, Attorney Grievance Committee, New York (Raymond Vallejo, of counsel), for petitioner.

Respondent, pro se.

Dianne T. Renwick, J.P., Cynthia S. Kern, Jeffrey K. Oing, Martin Shulman, John R. Higgitt, JJ.

Per Curiam

Respondent Elizabeth Vila Rogan was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on May 5, 1986, under the name Elizabeth Jean Vila. Although respondent does not currently have an office in New York, this Court maintains jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of her admission in the First Judicial Department (Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [ 22 NYCRR] § 1240.7 [a][2]).

The Attorney Grievance Committee seeks an order, pursuant to the doctrine of reciprocal discipline as set forth in Judiciary Law § 90(2) and 22 NYCRR 1240.13, disbarring respondent from the practice of law, predicated upon similar discipline imposed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, or in the alternative sanctioning respondent as this Court deems appropriate. Respondent, who appears pro se, does not object to the imposition of the reciprocal discipline requested by the Committee.

On February 19, 2020, respondent, pro se, filed a petition for voluntary discipline with the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia, requesting a suspension from the practice of law for twelve months. According to her petition, in 2018 respondent represented a client in successfully vacating a felony conviction. The following year, however, the client contacted her because he had been denied a concealed carry permit in Florida, based on the agency's belief that his firearm rights had been suspended in Georgia. She returned to the court on several occasions to obtain a clarifying order, which the judge agreed to sign once he modified some of the language contained therein. On May 22, 2019, respondent went to the court again to obtain the judge's signature on the order, evidently believing he was presiding that day. When she learned the judge was not, she signed his initials to the order, with full awareness that she did not have permission to do so. She then presented the order to the clerk of the court.

On June 11, 2019, respondent was indicted in Superior Court, Fulton County, Georgia, on one count of forgery in the first degree, a felony.¹ On January 6, 2020, respondent entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to the misdemeanor crime of obstruction of officers² , pursuant to the First Offender Act,³ and she was sentenced to one year probation, with a special condition not to practice law for twelve months while on probation. Respondent admitted that her conduct and plea constituted a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (GRPC) rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(a)(3), (4), and (8). She asserted, however, that her conduct, while serious and violative of duties owed to the public pursuant to ABA standards 5.0 and 6.0, did not warrant disbarment, especially given her 34-year legal career and representation of indigent defendants. She contended that her act was abhorrent, uncharacteristic, and inexplicable in her otherwise exemplary career, she promptly accepted responsibility for her conduct and cooperated with the State Bar,⁴ she enjoys an outstanding reputation in the legal community and expressed sincere remorse and contrition.

The State Bar disagreed. In fleshing out respondent's underlying actions, it noted in its response to her petition that the clerk realized that the signature was not that of the judge. Further, respondent told the clerk that the judge had signed it that morning. Observing that it did not look like the judge's signature, the clerk's supervisor advised respondent that she was going to call the judge, ultimately sending him a text copy of the document. The judge confirmed that he had not signed the order and wanted to speak with respondent, but respondent had left, later asserting that she had had an emergency. The forgery was reported to the police, who collected the falsified order, text messages, and video footage. In his statement, the judge told the police that he was not comfortable signing the draft order without rewording, despite respondent's later claim that it was a "misunderstanding."

The State Bar asserted that respondent's admissions were sufficient to establish the elements of forgery, despite her plea to misdemeanor obstruction (which was not an included offense). Accordingly, her misconduct was both serious criminal conduct or misrepresentation, and intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflected on her fitness to practice. Notwithstanding her plea bargain, the State Bar argued that her presumptive sanction should be disbarment. It further pointed out that, had the judge's staff accepted the order for filing, it could have put her client in jeopardy of arrest and incarceration. Moreover, respondent's actions caused actual harm in waste of resources. The State Bar outlined the aggravating and mitigating factors. Finally, it noted that first degree forgery by an attorney (which she was charged with but not convicted of), in particular, of a judge's signature on an order, justified disbarment, and the court routinely accepted petitions for voluntary surrender in felony convictions involving dishonesty.

On June 3, 2020, respondent requested that her petition for voluntary discipline be converted to voluntary surrender of her license to practice law. In reply, the State Bar noted that both petitions could be considered together as a complete petition for voluntary surrender of her law license. The maximum penalty for a single violation of GRPC rules 4.1(a), 8.4(a)(3), 8.4(a)(4) and 8.4(a)(8) was disbarment. It asked the court to grant her petition as amended which, it noted, was tantamount to disbarment (GRPC rule 1.0[r]).

In an order dated August 10, 2020, the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed to accept respondent's petition for voluntary surrender of her license, as the proposed discipline was commensurate with her misconduct. This order forms the basis of the Committee's reciprocal discipline petition.

In a proceeding seeking reciprocal discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13, respondent may raise the following defenses: (1) a lack of notice of an opportunity to be heard in the foreign jurisdiction; (2) an infirmity of proof establishing...