Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Hamilton

444 Md. 163

118 A.3d 958

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

v.John T. HAMILTON, Jr.

No. 18, Sept. Term, 2013

No. 3, Sept. Term, 2014

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 27, 2015.

Amy S. Paulick, Assistant Bar Counsel (Glenn M. Grossman, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland), for Petitioner.

No argument on behalf of the Respondent.

Argued before: BARBERA, C.J.,^* HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, and WATTS, JJ.

Opinion

HARRELL, J.

John T. Hamilton, Jr. (“Respondent”) was admitted to the Bar of this Court on 11 December 2001. He maintained an office for the practice of law in Anne Arundel County at all times relevant to this opinion.

The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”) asked us to disbar Hamilton for violating certain of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”), Maryland Rule 16–604, and Maryland Code, Bus. Occ. & Prof. Art., § 10–306. On 4 June 2013, Petitioner, acting through Bar Counsel, filed against Hamilton a Petition for Disciplinary of Remedial Action (“PDRA”), in response to its investigation of the complaints of two of Respondent's former clients, Bryan Manning and Richard DeVincent. On 19 March 2014, we designated the Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to hear this case.

On 28 March 2014, Petitioner filed a second PDRA against Respondent for alleged violations of the MLRPC, Md. Rule 16–604, and Md.Code, Bus. Occ. & Prof. Art., § 10–306, based on its investigation of a complaint by Windy Grauer, another of Respondent's former clients. We consolidated for hearing the two petitions.

Petitioner charged Respondent with violating MLRPC 1.1 (Competence),¹ 1.3 (Diligence), ² 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication),³ 1.15(c) (Safekeeping Property),⁴ 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation),⁵ 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters),⁶ and 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct)⁷ during Petitioner's investigation of Manning's complaint. Respondent was charged with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.15, and 8.4(a) and (d) while representing Richard DeVincent. Respondent was charged with violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer),⁸ 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a) (Fees),⁹ 1.15(a)¹⁰ and (c), 1.16(d), 8.1(b) and 8.4(a), (b), (c)¹¹ , and (d), in addition to Maryland Rule 16–604¹² and Maryland Code (2000, 2010 Repl.Vol.), Business Occupations & Professions Article, § 10–306 (“BOP”)¹³ in connection with the complaint of Windy Grauer.

Judge Harris set a hearing for 7–8 July 2014. Respondent requested a continuance because of his hospitalization. After receiving an acceptable confirmatory fax from Dr. Kevin Ferentz, Judge Harris rescheduled the hearing for 4–5 August 2014. On 4 August 2014, Respondent requested another continuance. Respondent provided another letter from Dr. Ferentz, dated 24 July 2014. This letter did not explain, however, why Respondent would be unavailable for the August hearing dates. Judge Harris denied the continuance and heard the case. Respondent did not appear.

Neither party filed exceptions to Judge Harris's written factual findings and legal conclusions. Respondent failed also to offer any recommendation contrary to Petitioner's written recommendation for disbarment or avail himself of the opportunity to appear and argue the proposed sanction before us.

Finding Judge Harris's findings not clearly erroneous and virtually all of his conclusions of law were supported by clear and convincing evidence, we disbarred Respondent in a per curiam order issued 13 May 2015. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hamilton, 442 Md. 740, 114 A.3d 708 (2015) (mem.). In this opinion, we explain that decision.

I. Background

A. The Hearing Judge's Findings of Fact

Judge Harris accepted fully as his own Petitioner's proposed “Factual findings and Conclusions of Law”. We parse here the hearing judge's findings of fact according to each client/complainant.

1. Complaint of Bryan Manning

Bryan Manning retained Respondent on 21 January 2010 to represent him in his divorce case. Respondent entered his appearance on Manning's behalf in the case in the Circuit Court for Howard County, and filed an answer to the spouse's complaint and a counter-complaint.

Manning paid Respondent for the representation a “flat” fee of $10,000, in two installments of $5,000.00. Respondent failed to place Manning's payments into an attorney trust account.

Despite Manning's requests for one, Respondent failed to provide a written retainer agreement.

On 4 March 2010, Manning's wife's attorney served upon Hamilton requests for discovery from his client. Manning provided promptly to Respondent responses to these discovery requests. Although Respondent was in possession of the responses, Manning's wife was compelled to file a motion to compel production of the items requested, claiming no responses had been received by her. On 16 April 2010, the trial court granted the motion to compel discovery and ordered Manning to provide, within 15 days, complete answers to the interrogatories and a response to the request for the production of documents. At about the same time, Respondent requested $500.00 more from Manning, ostensibly to obtain an extension of time to avoid missing a deadline. Manning gave Respondent a check for $500.00.

In early May, Respondent told Manning he needed Manning's responses to the interrogatories on 5 May 2010, so he could file them the next morning. Respondent demanded another $500.00 to submit the answers to interrogatories, which amount Manning paid in cash. Respondent failed to place either $500.00 payment into an attorney trust account.

As of July 2010, Respondent still had not submitted the answers to interrogatories or responded to the document production request. On 7 July 2010, the trial court granted Manning's wife's motion for sanctions. In the order granting sanctions, the court directed that, if Manning failed to provide full answers to the discovery requests by 8 September 2010, he would be prohibited from introducing contrary evidence at trial relative to the topics of the discovery requests. Despite the motion to compel and the sanctions imposed by the Court, Respondent never filed his client's discovery responses, which information was (or should have been) in his possession.

At trial, the Circuit Court granted Manning's wife's request for a divorce. The Court made also a marital award to Manning's ex-wife and awarded her attorney's fees in excess of $4,000.00 for Manning's failure to answer discovery. Manning learned, at trial and for the first time, that he had been sanctioned for failure to provide discovery responses.

Following Manning's divorce, Respondent refused to assist Manning with issues relating to the division of marital property. Respondent failed to inform Manning about court hearings and deadlines in his case. Finally, Respondent would not produce a copy of Manning's file upon request, despite Manning offering to pay for the copying.

Respondent failed to answer Bar Counsel's letter request for information regarding his representation of Manning and the client's complaint. Respondent failed to produce any response to Manning's complaint at trial or at any other time.

2. Complaint of Richard DeVincent

DeVincent hired¹⁴ Respondent in January 2010 to reopen his child custody case in order to seek full custody of his children. Respondent charged DeVincent a “flat” fee of $7500.00, which DeVincent paid in installments. Respondent did not deposit any of the funds into an attorney trust account because Respondent did not have an attorney trust account during the time he represented DeVincent.

In July 2010, DeVincent's wife served discovery requests on Hamilton. DeVincent provided his responses to Respondent approximately one week after service. Respondent confirmed that he received DeVincent's responses. The deadline for timely completion of discovery was 30 September 2010. Respondent failed to file the discovery responses provided to him by DeVincent. In November 2010, Respondent informed DeVincent they needed to meet to prepare answers to the discovery requests. In January 2011, Respondent told DeVincent he did not have the discovery responses DeVincent had provided in July 2010. DeVincent's fiancée located copies of DeVincent's earlier responses and forwarded them to Respondent via email.

On 8 February 2011, the court sanctioned DeVincent $250.00 for failure to respond to the discovery requests. The court required also that the answers be filed in 10 days or DeVincent's complaint would be stricken. On 10 February 2011, a family law master¹⁵ of the Circuit Court advised Respondent that he risked losing the case for his client based on his failure to respond to discovery. Respondent filed the discovery responses on 18 February 2011.

Respondent was often unresponsive to DeVincent's inquires during the representation. Respondent failed, on numerous occasions, to return DeVincent's telephone calls or text messages requesting to meet to discuss the case. Respondent did not meet with DeVincent to discuss the case until just before a November 2010 court hearing. DeVincent requested also that Respondent subpoena certain fact witnesses for trial, which persons Respondent did not subpoena. Throughout his representation of DeVincent, Respondent failed to provide DeVincent with copies of court orders, pleadings, or correspondence relevant to the case so as to keep him informed of the status of the case.

On 2 March 2011, Respondent met with DeVincent and advised him to settle the case. DeVincent agreed because he believed Respondent was not prepared for trial on the merits.

3. Complaint of Windy Grauer

Windy Grauer retained Respondent in January 2010 to represent her in an ongoing child custody dispute.¹⁶ Grauer paid Respondent $5,000. Respondent failed to deposit any of the $5,000 into an attorney account.

During the course of the representation, Grauer asked Respondent...