Atutis v. Knapp

ADRIAN M. ATUTIS, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE KNAPP, et al., Defendants.

No. 9:21-cv-00715(DNH/TWD)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

November 23, 2022

ADRIAN M. ATUTIS Plaintiff, Pro Se

BROOME COUNTY JENNIFER L. CHURCH, ESQ. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorneys for Defendants

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

THERESE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter has been referred for a Report and Recommendation by the Honorable David N. Hurd, United States District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(c). Adrian M. Atutis (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging wrongdoings while he was confined at the Broome County Correctional Facility (“Facility”) as a pretrial detainee. (Dkt. No. 1.) Following initial review of the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) & 1915A, only Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against George Knapp, Renee Stock, Nicholas Bixby, Sean Pomeroy, and Richard Hrebin (collectively, “Defendants”) remains. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 9.) Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No. 32.) Plaintiff opposes the motion and Defendants have replied. (Dkt. Nos. 34, 35.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion be denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2020, Plaintiff was involved in an incident with Defendants, which admittedly involved the use of force. (Dkt. No. 7 at 4; Dkt. No. 32-1 at ¶¶ 22-25.) The facts and circumstances of that use of force, however, are highly disputed.

In the verified amended complaint, Plaintiff states Defendants “beat him in a cell extraction for no good reason.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 4.) At approximately 12:24 a.m., Plaintiff was quietly doing legal work in his cell in the G-Pod unit when Officer Troutman^[1] told him to “go to bed”. (Dkt. No. 34-1 at 8.) After Plaintiff explained that he was “doing his legal work”, Troutman brought an “empty” 24-hour keep lock form and told Plaintiff to sign it. Id. at 9. Plaintiff admits that he refused to sign the form and crumpled the form into a ball, and flushed it down the toilet. Id.

Shortly after, Defendants arrived at Plaintiff's cell and told him to “get on the bed” and “turn around.” Id. Plaintiff complied. Id. Defendants then pushed Plaintiff face down into the mattress, “piled on top of [him] and started punching [him on his] body, head, back, arms, legs, and feet.” Id. Plaintiff was punched and kicked for approximately two to three minutes. Id. After he was “beaten and bruised and handcuffed,” Plaintiff was then “dragged” out of his cell and taken down the corridor to the “D-Block”, and beaten again. Id. at 10. As a result, Plaintiff suffered from bruising all over of his body, a fat lip, lacerations to his ankles and wrists, and he lost a toenail the next day. Id. On October 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaint for the “unwarranted beating.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 11.)

Defendants, Officer Troutman, and other employees at the Facility present a different version of events. (Dkt. Nos. 33-3 through 33-10.) To that end, Defendants maintain that at approximately 12:18 a.m., Plaintiff disrupted quiet hours by making comments while standing in the doorway of his cell of the G-Pod unit at the Facility. (Dkt. No. 32-1 at ¶ 12.) After hearing Plaintiff's comments, Officer Troutman checked on Plaintiff to see if he was okay. Id. at ¶ 15. In response, Plaintiff became belligerent and made several verbal threats directed at Officer Troutman. Id. Officer Troutman told Plaintiff he would be receiving a 24-hour keep lock for the verbal threats. Id. at ¶ 17. When Officer Troutman approached Plaintiff's cell with a keep lock notice, he explained to Plaintiff that he must sign the notice or he would be transferred to the D-Pod unit, also known as the “special housing unit.” Id. at ¶ 18. After Plaintiff was asked a third time to sign the notice, Plaintiff grabbed the form in an “aggressive manner” and “began pacing in his cell out of anger.” Id. Plaintiff then crumbled the notice and flushed it down the toilet while stating “fuck off”, which prompted Officer Troutman to call Central Control. Id.

At approximately 12:24 a.m., Defendants arrived to transfer Plaintiff to the D-Pod unit. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff refused several direct orders to kneel on his bunk. Id. Defendants proceeded to enter Plaintiff's cell. Id. Upon entering Plaintiff's cell, Defendants attempted to handcuff Plaintiff, but he resisted and curled up in the fetal position. Id. at ¶ 23. Defendants used “soft hands” to attempt to gain control of Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 24. “When Plaintiff's resistance became more violent Defendant Pomeroy applied a hands-only bent arm technique, as well as a hands-only use of force known as the Hypoglossal pressure point technique, to attempt [to] gain control of the Plaintiff to handcuff him which was unsuccessful.” Id. at ¶ 25.

Plaintiff refused to comply with their orders and proceeded to grab Defendants' hands, wrists, pepper spray, and batons. Id. at ¶ 26. In response, Defendants moved Plaintiff to the floor in an attempt to gain control, and Plaintiff violently kicked the entire time. Id. at ¶ 27. Plaintiff was given several orders to stop resisting and comply with orders, and he continued to refuse them all. Id. Defendant Hrebin then applied the “Hypoglossal pressure point technique” with “hands only” once more to place handcuffs on Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 32-1 at ¶ 28.) Defendants gained control of Plaintiff, handcuffed him, and escorted him to the D-Pod unit without further incident. Id. at ¶ 29. An investigation into this incident was conducted after Plaintiff submitted a grievance complaint. Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiff's allegations of assault were unfounded. Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing, through the production of admissible evidence, that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Salahuddin v. Gourd, 467 F.3d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006). The movant may meet this burden by showing that the nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must move forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 273. In that context, the nonmoving party must do more than “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Conclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998).

On summary judgment motions “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005). “At the summary judgment stage, a nonmoving party must offer some hard evidence showing that [his] version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, statements “that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir. 1999).

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008). Where a party is proceeding pro se, the court is obligated to “read [the pro se party's] supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).

In applying the summary judgment standard, the district court should not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Hayes v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996), IV. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

The Court recommends denying summary judgment to Defendants. “Excessive force claims frequently involve factual disputes that make them difficult to resolve pursuant to summary judgment.” Velleca v. Pangburn, No. 9:20-CV-0887 (BKS/DJS), 2022 WL 2392543, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 2, 2022) (citation omitted), report-recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2390243 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 2022). This case is no different.

1. Legal Standard

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). The Supreme Court has held that “pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015). “An officer's actions can amount to punishment if they are taken with ‘an expressed intent to punish.'” Frost v. New York City Police Dep't, 980 F.3d 231, 252 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)). Alternatively, in the absence of an expressed intent to punish, “a pretrial detainee can nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not rationally...