Augusta Jud. Cir. Off. of Pub. Def. v. Hodge-Peets

899 S.E.2d 363

AUGUSTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OFFICE OF the PUBLIC DEFENDER

v.HODGE-PEETS.

A23A1467

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 5, 2024

Christopher Michael Carr, Katherine Powers Stoff, Bryan Keith Webb, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Edward D. Buckley, Jamala Sumaiya McFadden, Ashley Elizabeth Wilson Clark, Atlanta, Andrew Ready Tate, Suwanee, Constance A. Parks, for Appellee,

Markle, Judge.

Necia Hodge-Peets sued the Augusta Judicial Circuit Office of the Public Defender (OPD) for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as Amended (ADAAA), 42 USCA § 12101, et seq.¹ OPD moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, finding that OPD had waived its sovereign immunity to Hodge-Peets’s federal claims pursuant to Willimson v. Dept. of Human Resources, where we held that the State had waived, its immunity to suit under federal disability discrimination claims by consenting to suit under a state disability discrimination act. 258 Ga. App. 113, 116 (1), 572 S.E.2d 678 (2002). On appeal, OPD contends that Williamson was incorrectly decided and should be overturned. For the following reasons, we agree that Williamson was wrongly decided, and we further conclude that OPD’s sovereign immunity to claims under the ADAAA has not been waived. We thus reverse tile trial court’s judgment.²

[1] "Whether sovereign immunity has been waived under the undisputed facts of this case is a question of law, and this Court’s review is de novo." Ga. Dept. of Labor v. RTT Assocs., 299 Ga. 78, 81(1), 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).

As alleged in the complaint, Hodge-Peets was employed as an administrative assistant with OPD when she was diagnosed with breast cancer. After missing work due to her illness, she was twice demoted, received a disciplinary write-up for her absences, and was ultimately terminated for absenteeism. Thereafter, Hodge-Peets sued OPD in the Superior Court of Richmond County,³ asserting claims for discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the ADAAA, and seeking monetary damages.

OPD moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting its sovereign immunity to these federal claims. The trial court denied the motion, citing to Williamson for its holding that the General Assembly had waived a state actor’s sovereign immunity to federal discrimination claims by enacting the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), OCGA § 45-19-20, et seq. The trial court issued a certificate for immediate review, and we granted OPD’s subsequent application for interlocutory appeal. This appeal followed.⁴

On appeal, OPD argues that the trial court erred by ruling that it had waived its sovereign immunity to claims under the ADAAA because Williamson, on which the trial court relied, was wrongly decided. We agree.

[2–4] "Sovereign immunity is the immunity provided to governmental entities and to public employees sued in their official capaci- ties." (Citation omitted.) Griffith v. Robinson, 366 Ga. App. 869, 870 (2); 884 S.E.2d 532 (2023).

Whether a [government entity] has waived sovereign immunity is a threshold issue and not a mere defense to liability. A waiver of sovereign immunity must be established by the party seeking to benefit from that waiver, and when a litigant fails to bear this burden, the trial court must dismiss the complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ramos v. Owens, 366 Ga. App. 216, 217-218, 881 S.E.2d 464 (2022).

OPD concedes that the trial court was bound by Williamson to conclude the legislature had waived the State’s sovereign immunity to Hodge-Peets’s federal disability discrimination claims. Under our rationale in Williamson, by waiving the State’s sovereign immunity to state disability discrimination claims under the FEPA, the General Assembly necessarily waived the State’s sovereign immunity to corresponding federal claims. Williamson, 258 Ga. App. at 116 (1), 572 S.E.2d 678. To find otherwise, we wrote, "would discriminate against federally based rights which the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States forbids states to do." Id.

We now conclude that Williamson was wrongly decided because (1) the Supremacy Clause did not demand our decision there; (2) the State is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity to AD AAA claims; and, (3) by enacting the FEPA, the State did not consent to suit under the AD AAA.

1. The Supremacy Clause.

The Supremacy Clause provides that the United States Constitution and ensuing federal laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby" regardless of any conflicting state laws. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

[5,6] However, the United States Supreme Court has explained that the Supremacy Clause does not preclude a state’s assertion of sovereign immunity to federal claims in state courts:

The Constitution, by delegating to Congress the power to establish the supreme law of the land when acting within its enumerated powers, does not foreclose a State from asserting immunity to claims arising under federal law merely because that law derives not from the State itself but from the national power…. We reject any contention that substantive federal law by its own force necessarily overrides the sovereign immunity of the States. When a State asserts its immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law but the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the States.

Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 732 (II) (A) (1), 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). As Alden makes clear, the Supremacy Clause does not demand a waiver of immunity here. Accordingly, we disapprove of Williamson to the extent that it based its holding on the Supremacy Clause.⁵ 258 Ga. App. at 116 (1), 572 S.E.2d 678; see Echols v. Ga. Piedmont Technical College, No. l:20-cv-02794-TWT-AJB, 2021 WL 1521987, at *7 (III) (C) (N.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2021), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, Echols v. Ga. Piedmont Technical College, 2021 WL 870717 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2021) (unpublished) (noting that the Supremacy Clause analysis in Williamson is "questionable").

2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity.

The question, then, is whether the State maintains its sovereign immunity to the federal claims raised here under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitu- tion. See Alden, 527 U. S. at 712 (I), 119 S.Ct. 2240 (framing the issue of whether the state of Maine was immune to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act in its own courts in terms of Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Ga. Ports Auth. v. Lawyer, 304 Ga. 667, 674-675 (3), 821 S.E.2d 22 (2018).

[7-9] The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U. S. Const., amend. XI. As the Court explained in Alden, a state’s sovereign immunity derives from the design of the Constitution itself, and is merely confirmed by the Eleventh Amendment. 527 U. S. at 728 (I) (C), 119 S.Ct. 2240. Thus, the language of the Eleventh Amendment is construed broadly to include a state’s immunity from suit by its own citizens. See Id: at 741-754 (II) (B) (1) to (4), 119 S.Ct. 2240. And Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to departments and agencies of the state. See Id. at 756 (III), 119 S.Ct. 2240 ("The immunity does not extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity which is not an arm of the State."); Ga. Ports Auth., 304 Ga. at 674 (3), 821 S.E.2d 22.

Regarding a state’s immunity from federal claims in its own courts, the Alden Court wrote:

Our sovereign immunity precedents establish that suits against nonconsenting States are not properly susceptible of litigation in courts, and, as a result, that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain such suits in the absence of the State’s consent. We are aware of no constitutional precept that would admit of a congressional power to require state courts to entertain federal suits which are not within the judicial power of the United States and could not be heard in federal courts.

527 U. S. at 754 (II) (B) (4), 119 S.Ct. 2240.

[10] In construing this language, the Supreme Court of Georgia explained, "if a state instrumentality enjoys immunity from suit in the federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment, its sovereign immunity from suits in the courts of its own state is inviolable and cannot be abrogated by federal law[.]" Ga. Ports Auth., 304 Ga. at 674 (3), 821 S.E.2d 22. In other words, if the State is immune from suits brought by private citizens under the ADAAA in federal court, the State is immune from such suits in our state courts — unless it has consented to suit. See Alden, 527 U. S. at 754-755 (III), 119 S.Ct. 2240; Ga. Ports Auth., 304 Ga. at 682 (5), 821 S.E.2d 22 (As an "arm of the state," Ports Authority is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court and thus is entitled to sovereign immunity in state court "except to the extent that the State has consented to the suit.").

Importantly, in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress had not abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims for monetary damages brought by private citizens under Title I of the ADA.⁶ 531 U. S. 356, 368, 374 (III), 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001).

[11] Applying the foregoing law to the case at hand, then, because OPD maintains Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims such as those brought by Hodge-Peets in federal court in accordance with Garrett, it maintains its sovereign immunity to those claims in our state courts — unless it has otherwise consented...