Auld v. State

673 S.W.3d 267

Eric Daniel AULD, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 04-22-00071-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

Delivered and Filed: March 15, 2023

Discretionary Review Refused November 8, 2023

APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Patrick Ballantyne, LaHood Norton Law Group, 40 N.E. Loop 410, Ste. 525, San Antonio, TX 78216

APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Stephen B. Harpold, District Attorney, 198th District Court, 402 Clearwater Paseo, Ste. 500, Kerrville, TX 78028

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Irene Rios, Justice, Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

A jury found appellant, Eric Daniel Auld, guilty of the murder of Magan Nicole King, and the trial court assessed punishment at ninety years’ confinement. In three issues on appeal, Auld challenges the trial court's denial of his pretrial motions to suppress. We affirm.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On November 3, 2016, Kerr County Sheriff's Deputy Emilio Vasquez was dispatched to the Auld Ranch to perform a welfare check after Magan's mother reported her missing. Magan's mother knew that her daughter and her daughter's friend, Brandi Desrosiers, had gone to the ranch. While at the ranch, Vasquez spoke to Auld and Steven Jilek. Auld lived and worked on the ranch. Auld told Vasquez that Magan and Brandi were at the ranch, but Magan had returned to San Antonio. Also on November 3rd, Brandi called the Kerr County Sheriff's Office to report information she had about Magan. Kerrville Sheriff's Office Investigator James Ledford and Captain Carol Twiss traveled to San Antonio to interview Brandi. Based on information gathered from this interview, Ledford wrote affidavits in support of his request for warrants to conduct searches at the Auld Ranch.

At issue in this appeal are two warrants. The so-called "Physical Evidence Warrant," sought "evidence of the crime of Murder to include," among other items: human corpses, blood, hair, bodily fluids, photos, and clothing. The physical evidence collected and photographs taken pursuant to this warrant comprised most of the evidence admitted at trial. The so-called "Burn Pit" warrant sought "evidence of the crime of Murder to include:" a burn pile where a cell phone and purse belonging to Magan was burned and bullet fragments from the location where Magan was shot and/or the location where Magan's body was recovered. Auld's motions to suppress the warrants were denied following a hearing held over two days, September 30, 2020, and January 20, 2021.

In his first issue on appeal, Auld asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the search warrants were issued based on affidavits containing material omissions concerning the credibility of Ledford's source (Brandi). In his second and third issues on appeal, Auld contends the trial court erred in determining he lacked standing to challenge the search of the "burn pit."

THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE WARRANT

Auld asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the Physical Evidence Warrant because the warrant was issued based on an affidavit that contained material omissions.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Lerma v. State , 543 S.W.3d 184, 189-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). "At a motion to suppress hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony." Id. at 190. Therefore, we afford almost complete deference to the trial court in determining historical facts; however, we review de novo whether the facts are sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion in a case. Id. When, as here, a trial court makes express findings of fact, we must examine the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and uphold those fact findings so long as they are supported by the record. Tilghman v. State , 624 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We then apply a de novo standard of review to determine the legal significance of those facts. Id.

The issuance of a search warrant depends upon the existence of probable cause. Diaz v. State , 632 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). "Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found at a specified location." Id. "The test is whether a reasonable reading of the supporting affidavit provides a substantial basis for the magistrate's conclusion that probable cause existed." Id. "In determining whether probable cause exists to support the issuance of a search warrant, the magistrate to whom the probable cause affidavit is presented is confined to considering the four corners of the search warrant affidavit, as well as to logical inferences the magistrate might draw based on the facts contained in the affidavit." Hyland v. State , 574 S.W.3d 904, 910-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Generally, a reviewing court applies a presumption of validity regarding a magistrate's determination that a search warrant affidavit supports a finding of probable cause. Id. at 911.

"But the presumption of validity regarding the magistrate's probable cause determination may be overcome if the defendant can show the presence of false statements in the search warrant affidavit that were either made deliberately or with reckless disregard for truth." Id. A criminal defendant may challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in a search warrant affidavit. Diaz , 632 S.W.3d at 892 (citing Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) ). "When the defendant challenges the warrant affidavit on the ground that it contains known falsehoods, ... the trial court is not limited to the ‘four corners’ of the affidavit." Cates v. State , 120 S.W.3d 352, 355 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). "Limiting a falsity challenge to the four corners of the warrant affidavit negates the underlying challenge and raises serious due process concerns." Id. ; see also Franks , 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (stating that "if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request"); State v. Verde , 432 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref'd) ("[I]n a Franks hearing, the trial court may consider not only the probable cause affidavit, but also the evidence offered by the party moving to suppress because this attack on the sufficiency of the affidavit arises from claims that it contains false statements."). The defendant bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence a material misstatement that was made intentionally or knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. Diaz , 632 S.W.3d at 892.

This appeal does not involve allegations that Ledford's affidavit contained misstatements or falsehoods, but instead omissions. Auld asserts Ledford was aware of facts seriously undermining Brandi's general credibility and her ability to perceive and process the events she described, but he failed to provide these facts to the magistrate. Auld argues these omissions were material and deprived the magistrate of a fair and informed evaluation of the information conveyed by Brandi.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has assumed, but not yet decided, that Franks applies to material omissions. See Diaz , 632 S.W.3d at 892 ("We have assumed that Franks applies to material omissions, but we have not decided the issue."); Renteria v. State , 206 S.W.3d 689, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ("In any event, assuming that Franks applies to omissions, the magistrate would have had probable cause to issue the warrant even with the inclusion of the information that appellant claims should have been included in the search-warrant affidavit."). However, in a 2015 opinion, this court held Franks applies "to challenges of material omissions contained in probable cause affidavits." Gonzales v. State , 481 S.W.3d 300, 311 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.).

The Gonzales court held that, "[a]pplying the Franks analysis to material omissions requires varying the analysis somewhat." Id. The trial court must determine "whether the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence (1) the omissions were in fact made and (2) they were made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit." Id. If the defendant carries this burden, the trial court must determine whether, if the omitted material had been included in the affidavit, the affidavit would still establish probable cause. Id. If, after including the omitted material, the affidavit did not establish probable cause, then the search warrant would be voided and the fruits of the search excluded. Id. "Under those circumstances, we would no longer defer to the magistrate's initial probable cause determination." Moffett v. State , No. 04-19-00039-CR, 2019 WL 4178642, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 4, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). "Instead, the question on appeal ‘becomes the same as it would be for the magistrate conducting an initial review of a search warrant affidavit.’ " Id. (citation omitted). "Therefore, under those circumstances, we review the search warrant affidavit with the omitted material to determine whether the affidavit established probable cause under a totality-of-the circumstances approach." Id.

B. Did Auld Prove Ledford Omitted Facts Knowingly and Intentionally, or With Reckless Disregard for the Truth?

We first determine whether Ledford omitted facts from his affidavit and, if he did, whether he did so intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of his affidavit. Auld asserts Ledford was aware of information that seriously undermined Brandi's general credibility and her ability to perceive and process the events she described, but he failed to provide these facts to the magistrate. Auld also contends Ledford failed to investigate Brandi's credibility, corroborate her story, or...