Austin v. Glynn Cnty.

80 F.4th 1342

Langston AUSTIN, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,Ernest Fuller, III, On behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GLYNN COUNTY, GEORGIA,E. Neal Jump, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-10162

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Filed: September 14, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00073-LGW-BWC

Patrick J. Hannon, Peter Lampros, Gordon Gerhard Van Remmen, Hall & Lampros, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Joseph Richard Padgett, Roden Law, Savannah, GA, Thomas A. Withers, Withers Law Firm, PC, Savannah, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Richard K. Strickland, Emily Rose Hancock, Brown Readdick Bumgartner Carter Strickland & Watkins, LLP, Brunswick, GA, Aaron Mumford, Glynn County Attorney's Office, Brunswick, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before William Pryor, Chief Judge, Marcus, Circuit Judge, and Mizelle,^* District Judge.

Mizelle, District Judge:

This appeal turns on whether Sheriff E. Neal Jump of Glynn County, Georgia, and other sheriffs like him, act as arms of the State of Georgia when making compensation decisions for their employees. Under our precedent, the answer is yes. Because Sheriff Jump is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when performing that function, we affirm the district court's denial of leave to amend and subsequent dismissal of the amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Langston Austin and Ernest Fuller III worked as detention officers for Glynn County under Sheriff Jump's supervision. Their duties included maintaining order in Glynn County jails and prisons, supervising inmate activities, inspecting facilities, searching inmates for contraband, reporting on inmate conduct, and escorting and transporting inmates. Although it is unclear from the record whether the Officers are formally deputy sheriffs, see Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1311 n.14 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that Georgia "[s]heriffs also may appoint persons to serve as jailers who are not deputy sheriffs"), it is undisputed that they are at minimum direct employees of Sheriff Jump, in his official capacity, akin to deputies.

The Officers brought a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action alleging that the County "illegally calculated [their] and other [d]etention [o]fficers' overtime wages." The County moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In response, the Officers amended their complaint to include Sheriff Jump in his individual capacity. The County and Sheriff Jump then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, arguing that neither defendant was the Officers' employer under the FLSA.

With our precedent against them about who qualified as an employer under the FLSA, the Officers moved for leave to file a second amended complaint to add Sheriff Jump, in his official capacity, as a defendant. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that amendment would be futile because Sheriff Jump was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity. The district court then dismissed the amended complaint and entered final judgment against the Officers because neither the County nor the Sheriff, in his individual capacity, were "employers" under the FLSA. The Officers timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Each issue raised in this appeal receives de novo review. We review dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting all factual allegations as true and considering them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Blevins v. Aksut, 849 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (11th Cir. 2017). We also review rulings regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity and statutory interpretation de novo. Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005). And we review de novo a determination that a particular amendment to a complaint would be futile. Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

III. DISCUSSION

The FLSA requires that employers engaged in interstate commerce meet minimum labor standards and working conditions, including paying covered employees a minimum wage and overtime. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202, 206, 207; see Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). If an employer fails to pay required wages, the FLSA provides employees a private cause of action to collect those unpaid wages. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). But the FLSA allows suits against "employers" only as defined by the Act. Id. § 203(d). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment bars FLSA actions against arms of the State absent consent. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999); Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308-09.

The Officers advance three arguments—none are meritorious. The Officers first urge us to overturn Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that public officials, in their individual capacities, are not their subordinates' "employers" under the FLSA. Second, the Officers argue that the district court was wrong to conclude that a Georgia sheriff, in his official capacity, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when making compensation decisions regarding his employees. Finally, the Officers argue that, even if Sheriff Jump was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Georgia has waived that immunity in federal court. We explain in turn why each argument fails.

A. Sheriff Jump, in his Individual Capacity, is Not an "Employer" under the FLSA

The district court correctly dismissed the Officers' complaint against Sheriff Jump in his individual capacity because he is not an "employer" under the FLSA. See Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that an Alabama sheriff was not an employer in his individual capacity under the Equal Pay Act); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 686 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The Equal Pay Act is simply an extension of the FLSA and incorporates the FLSA's definition of 'employer.' "). Under the FLSA, an employer "includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Our precedent holds that a sheriff acting in his individual capacity has "no control over [the plaintiff's] employment and does not qualify as [the plaintiff's] employer." Welch, 57 F.3d at 1011; Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686 ("Welch establishes . . . that a public official sued in his individual capacity is not an 'employer' subject to individual liability under the FLSA.").

The Officers argue that other circuits disagree. So be it. Our precedent controls, and we remain impotent as a panel to deviate from it. Wascura, 169 F.3d at 687 ("[W]e are bound by the Welch decision regardless of whether we agree with it."); Thompson v. Alabama, 65 F.4th 1288, 1301 (11th Cir. 2023) ("Later panels must faithfully follow the first panel's ruling even when convinced the earlier panel is wrong." (citations and quotations omitted)).

In sum, because Sheriff Jump, in his individual capacity, is not the Officers' "employer" under the FLSA, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the Officers' amended complaint on that ground.

Two peripheral points to note. First, although the Officers' amended complaint named the County as a defendant, the Officers have not argued on appeal that the district court erred in concluding that the County was not the Officers' employer under the FLSA. Thus, the Officers have forfeited that issue. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) ("When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground."). Second, Sheriff Jump and the County at times before the district court framed the "employer" question in terms of subject-matter jurisdiction. That is likely on account of our holding in Wascura that "where a defendant in an FMLA suit does not meet the statutory definition of 'employer,' there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against that defendant." 169 F.3d at 685. But although Wascura drew on Welch's analysis of the FLSA to interpret the FMLA, Wascura did not backfill its jurisdictional holding on the FMLA into the FLSA.

B. Sheriff Jump is Entitled to Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment when Making Compensation Decisions for Employees

The district court denied the motion to amend to include Sheriff Jump in his official capacity, concluding that Sheriff Jump would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when making compensation decisions for his employees. We agree with the district court.

"The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to States and state officials" when they act as "an arm of the State." Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Whether an official is an "arm of the State" "depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity created by state law." Id.; see also Manders, 338 F.3d at 1308 ("To receive Eleventh Amendment immunity, a defendant . . . need only be acting as an 'arm of the State,' which includes agents and instrumentalities of the State."); cf. Biden v. Nebraska, — U.S. —, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2366-68, 216 L.Ed.2d 1063 (2023) (explaining that, in the standing context, MOHELA was "[b]y law and function . . . an instrumentality of Missouri"). For over twenty years, our Court has applied a four-factor test to determine whether public officials act as arms of the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment: "(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity." Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309; ...