Avila-Arreola v. King Orchards, Inc.

JUAN AVILA-ARREOLA, Plaintiff, v. KING ORCHARDS, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:20-cv-00103-SB

United States District Court, D. Oregon

July 15, 2021

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

HON STACIE F. BECKERMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Juan Avila-Arreola (“Avila”) filed this action against King Orchards, Inc. (“King Orchards”) alleging disability discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“ADA”), and Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.112. Now before the Court is King Orchards' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 35) and Avila's motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 36). The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. For the following reasons, the Court recommends that the district judge deny King Orchards' motion for summary judgment and grant Avila's motion for partial summary judgment.

BACKGROUND^[1]

King Orchards is in the business of growing pears and apples. (Dep. of Eric Wang (“Wang Dep.”) at 23:24-24:4 ECF No. 35 Att. 3.) Naturekist Fruit Company (“Naturekist”) is a fruit packager and wholesaler located on the same property as King Orchards. (Decl. of Eric Wang (“Wang Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-6, ECF No. 35 Att. 2.) Naturekist packs fruit grown by King Orchards, and the two companies share several of the same employees. (Wang Decl. ¶¶ 4-6; Wang Dep. at 28:23-24.)

In 2000, Avila worked for King Orchards as a tree thinner. (Wang Decl. ¶ 2.) In November and December 2017, Avila worked for Naturekist as a fruit packer. (Wang Decl. ¶¶ 3-6.) While employed by Naturekist, Marcial Barajas (“Barajas”), a supervisor at King Orchards became aware that Avila suffered from a knee injury. (Dep. of Juan Avila-Arreola (“Avila Dep.”) at 21:16-21, ECF No. 41; Decl. of Marcial Barajas (“Barajas Decl.”) ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 35 Att. 2, Ex. 1.)

On January 7, 2018, Avila applied for a job pruning fruit trees with King Orchards. (Wang Decl. Ex. 1; Decl. of Juan Avila-Arreola (“Avila Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 36 Att. 1; Wang Dep. at 24:1-4.) Barajas told Avila that King Orchards would not hire him unless Avila provided a doctor's note stating that he could perform the pruning job safely. (Barajas Decl. ¶ 3; Dep. of Marcial Barajas (“Barajas Dep.”) at 7:15-9:7, ECF No. 36 Att. 4; Avila Dep. at 22:7-15.)

On January 9, 2018, Avila's doctor provided him with a note clearing him to “return to regular activities.” (Avila Decl. ¶ 4; Wang Dep. Ex. 4, at 2.) According to Avila, when he informed Barajas that he had a doctor's note and asked for the pruning job, Barajas told him that he would not hire him because his “knee is messed up” and he “could file a suit against the owner” of King Orchards. (Avila Dep. at 22:19-22.) According to King Orchards, Avila never followed up with Barajas or attempted to provide him with a doctor's note. (Barajas Decl. ¶ 3.) Shortly thereafter, Avila began work pruning fruit trees at a different orchard. (Dep. of Larry Packer (“Packer Dep.”) at 6:23-7:23, ECF No. 35 Att. 1, Ex. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005). The court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh evidence, or determine the truth of matters in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

DISCUSSION

Avila alleges that King Orchards discriminated against him by making an unlawful pre-employment medical inquiry in violation of Section 12112(d)(2)(A) of the ADA. (First Am Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 18; Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 7-8.) The parties cross-move for summary judgment.

I. APPLICABLE LAW

Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals in the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of a disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”). Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.139(1) provides that Oregon's disability discrimination laws “shall be construed to the extent possible in a manner that is consistent with any similar provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990[.]” See also Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The standard for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Oregon law is identical to that used in federal law.”). The ADA “requires individuals with disabilities to be given the same consideration for employment as individuals without disabilities.” Harris v. Harris & Hart, Inc., 206 F.3d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 2000). As such, “[a]n individual who is qualified for an employment opportunity cannot be denied that opportunity because the individual is disabled.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App., § 1630.1(a)).

II. STANDING

King Orchards argues that Avila lacks standing to bring this action because he cannot demonstrate that he suffered any compensable injury. Specifically, King Orchards asserts that Avila did not suffer an injury stemming from the alleged unlawful medical inquiry because he never provided King Orchards with the medical release and instead voluntarily sought employment elsewhere. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 4-5.) The Court disagrees.

It is undisputed that King Orchards refused to consider Avila for employment without a doctor's note. (See Barajas Decl. ¶ 2.) Further, King Orchards acknowledges that if Avila had provided the doctor's note, it would have hired him for the pruning job, and thus there is no dispute that Avila's failure to produce the doctor's note disqualified him from hire. (See Wang Dep. at 46:20-47:2, “And is it your understanding that, if he had given him the doctor's note right then, that Mr. Barajas would have hired Mr. Avila? Yeah, most likely”; Barajas Dep. at 9:4-7, “Q: So, if Mr. Avila had given you a letter from a doctor saying that he could do the job safely, you would have given him the job then? A: Yes.”). Avila has presented evidence of both economic and noneconomic damages resulting from King Orchards' failure to hire him, ^[2] and therefore he has established a cognizable injury and has standing to pursue his claims. See Bates v. United Parcel Svc., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 986 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a refusal to hire because of a disability is a cognizable injury under the ADA).

III.MERITS

Turning to the merits of Avila's claims, Avila alleges that King Orchards discriminated against him by refusing to hire him without a medical release in violation of the ADA. (FAC ¶ 18; Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 10.)

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA and Oregon law, Avila must show: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.” Mayo v. PCC Structurals, Inc. 795 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted); Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012).

A. Regarded as Disabled

Avila asserts that King Orchards regarded him as having a disability. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 9.) Under the ADA, a person with a “disability” includes an individual who is “regarded as having” an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). To be “regarded as having such an impairment, ” a plaintiff must show that he “has been subjected to an action prohibited under [the ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 908 F.3d 428, 434 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)). The applicable regulations define an impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).

The undisputed facts support a conclusion that King Orchards regarded Avila as disabled. See Equal Empl. Opportunity Comm'n v. BNSF Railway Co., 902 F.3d 916, 924 (9th Cir. 2018) (“In requesting an MRI because of [the applicant's] prior back issues and conditioning his job offer on the completion of the MRI at his own cost, [the defendant] assumed that [the plaintiff] had a ‘back condition' that disqualified him from the job unless [the applicant] could disprove that proposition . . . . [Defendant] chose to perceive [the applicant] as having an impairment at the time it asked for the MRI and at the time it revoked his job offer.”). There is no dispute that King Orchards believed Avila was unable to perform the essential functions of the pruning job “because of” his knee impairment. (See Barajas Decl. ¶ 2 “Because of the problem [Avila] had with his knee during the packing season, it appeared to me that he would not be able to do this job safely. I therefore told him that before I could hire him for pruning, he would need an opinion from his doctor that he could do this job safely.”; Barajas Dep. at 9:1, stating that when Avila applied for a pruning position with King...