Avila v. Acacia Network, Inc.

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JIMMY AVILA, Plaintiff, v. ACACIA NETWORK, INC.; TREVOR GRIFFITHS, Program Director, PMP; AJA DOUGLAS, Quality Assurance Director; NEW YORK CITY FIELD OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH; KIM F. BEN-ATAR, Deputy Director of Housing; NYC ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES; THOMAS GLENOY, APS Senior Supervisor; 1412 COLLEGE AVENUE LLC, Defendants.

No. 1:24-CV-0884 (LTS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

April 15, 2024

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Jimmy Avila, of the Bronx, New York, who is proceeding pro se, filed this action asserting claims of disability-based discrimination, as well as claims of retaliation, under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); claims of constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and claims under state law, seeking damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff sues: (1) Acacia Network, Inc. (“Acacia”), which may be Plaintiff's apartment sublessor; (2) Trevor Griffiths, whom Plaintiff describes as “Program Director, PMP”; (3) Aja Douglas, who appears to be Acacia's Director of Quality Assurance of Supportive Housing; (4) the “New York City Field Office of Mental Health,” which the Court understands to be the New York State Office of Mental Health (“NYSOMH”); (5) “Kim F. BenAtar,” who appears to be Kim Benatar, Deputy Director of Housing at the NYSOMH; (6)”NYC Adult Protective Service,” which the Court understands to be the Adult Protective Services Program (“APS”), a program of the New York City Department of Social Services' Human Resources Administration (“HRA”); (7) Thomas Glenoy, whom Plaintiff describes as an “APS Senior Supervisor,” and (8) 1412 College Avenue, LLC which may be the owner of the apartment building where Plaintiff resides.

By order dated February 8, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id.

But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.

BACKGROUND

While Plaintiff does not specify whether he suffers from a disability, he has attached to his complaint a copy of a letter, dated June 2, 2023, issued by Hasnian Afza, M.D., a psychiatrist employed by NYC Health + Hospitals, which states that Plaintiff “has been diagnosed with Schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type,” and that he “is at risk of relapse, psychiatric decompensation and potential rehospitalization without stable housing and financial resources.” (ECF 1, at 30.) In that letter, Dr. Afza “strongly recommend[s] that [Plaintiff] receive supporting housing and eligible financial disability benefits.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges the following: On January 3, 2024, “Plaintiff entered into a lease and relocation agreement with [Basics, Inc.]”^[1](ECF 1, at 3.) “Upon thorough review and consultation with legal counsel, it was brought to . . . Plaintiff's attention that several clauses within the aforementioned agreement violate . . . Plaintiff's tenant rights and the [ADA].” (Id.) “[T]here is a provision within the lease which states that . . . Plaintiff ‘refuses social services'^[2][;] [it] is inaccurate and constitutes a misrepresentation of . . . Plaintiff's intentions as a person protected by the [ADA.]” (Id.) This is because “Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable accommodations[,] including the provision of social services when deemed necessary by . . . Plaintiff's healthcare providers.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that, “[b]y including this false statement in the lease, Acacia . . . is effectively prohibiting . . . [him] from accessing the support and services that are essential to . . . [his] well-being.” (Id.) In addition, “Plaintiff believes . . . that the circumstances under which the lease was presented and signed amount to duress as . . . [he] was compelled to agree to the terms and conditions that restrict . . . [his] tenant rights and ignore the recommendations of . . .[his] healthcare professionals.”^[3](Id. at 3-4.) Because of that, Plaintiff believes “that the lease agreement is invalid and unenforceable due to the conditions under which it was executed.” (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, “Plaintiff demands that the lease and relocation agreement be revised to accurately reflect . . . [his] rights and entitlement to reasonable accommodations under the [ADA] as well as any and all other relief deemed necessary and applicable.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that, in addition to discriminating against him, Defendants retaliated against him “for succeeding in a previous legal action for violations of these laws and obligations[,] which prompted [them] to specifically include these discriminatory terms and conditions in the subsequent agreement . . . [and] to wrongfully call[] [APS] and report[] . . . Plaintiff to [APS].”^[4] (Id. at 5-6.) He also alleges that “[t]he APS Defendants[,] while acting under the color of law[,] came to [his] home . . . and were asked to leave numerous times by . . . [him]; . . . [he] protested the misconduct of the APS Defendants by exposing their misconduct on various platforms[,] including You[T]ube.”^[5](Id. at 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that his actions “prompted the APS Defendants to take retaliatory action against . . . [him] by attempting to wrongfully hospitalize . . . [him].” (Id.)

In addition to the injunctive relief mentioned above, Plaintiff seeks damages and a trial by jury.^[6]

DISCUSSION

The Court understands that Plaintiff is asserting: (1) claims of disability-based discrimination, as well as claims of retaliation, against Acacia and 1412 College Avenue, LLC, and against any individual defendants employed by Acacia and 1412 College Avenue, LLC, including Douglas and, possibly Griffiths, under the FHA; (2) claims of disability-based discrimination, as well as claims of retaliation, against Acacia, 1412 College Avenue, LLC, the NYSOMH, and APS, under the Rehabilitation Act; (3) claims of disability-based discrimination, as well as claims of retaliation, against the NYSOMH and APS, under Title II of the ADA; (5) claims of federal constitutional violations against Benatar, APS, and Glenoy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (6) claims against all of the defendants under state law.

A. Overlap with previously-filed cases: Avila v. Acacia Network, Inc., 1:23-CV-7834 (LTS), and Avila v. Acacia Network, 1:23-CV-10260 (LTS)

Before Plaintiff filed the present pro se action on February 2, 2024, he filed other pro se actions in this court. On September 1, 2023, he filed a pro se action against Acacia and Griffiths; that action, known as Avila v. Acacia Network, Inc., 1:23-CV-7834 (LTS) (“Avila I”), is pending before the Court. On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed another pro se action against: (1) Acacia; (2) Douglas; (3) the entity that apparently owns Plaintiff's previous apartment building, 1212 Grant Realty LLC; (4) Manny Stein; and (5) the Director of the NYSOMH's New York City Field Office, Caren Abate; that action, known as Avila v. v. Acacia Network, 1:23-CV-10260 (LTS) (“Avila II”), is also pending before the Court.

Even granting Plaintiff's present complaint the liberal construction that is due, Plaintiff seems to be reasserting claims in the present action against Acacia, Douglas, and Griffiths that he has asserted in Avila I and Avila II. For this reason, the Court dismisses without prejudice, any claims against Acacia, Douglas, and Griffiths that Plaintiff is asserting in this action that he is also asserting in Avila I and Avila II. See Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (“As part of its general power to administer its docket, a district...