Ayers v. Kalal

Justin K. Ayers, et al., Respondents, v. John William Kalal, et al., Appellants.

A19-1292

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

April 6, 2020

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Bryan, Judge

Dakota County District Court

File No. 19HA-CV-14-2487

Christopher L. Goodman, Brian M. Hansen, Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, L.L.P., St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Dyan J. Ebert, Cally Kjellberg-Nelson, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota; and

Patrick L. Arneson, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BRYAN, Judge

Appellants challenge the district court's decision to award attorney fees as a sanction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in its choice to exercise its inherent authority and in deciding that the conduct in this case merited an award of attorney fees. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees under its inherent authority, we affirm.

FACTS

A. Background and First Appeal

Appellant City of Burnsville employed appellant John William Kalal to conduct snow removal. In January 2011, a snowplow driven by Kalal collided with a motor vehicle driven by respondent Justin K. Ayers. At the time of the accident, Kalal was driving the snowplow across an intersection, but Kalal was not plowing snow. It is undisputed that Ayers had the right-of-way. Ayers sued Kalal and the city (together, appellants), alleging that Kalal negligently operated the snowplow and that the city was vicariously liable for Kalal's negligence.

Appellants raised various immunity defenses in their motion for summary judgment. At the summary-judgment hearing, the district court expressed concern about appellants' theories of immunity, asking how a snowplow operator could be immune from a duty to observe traffic laws. The district court noted its disagreement with such a blanket statement of the law. At one point, the district court stated that it was problematic to argue that a snowplow operator could run a stop sign or fail to yield the right-of-way with complete immunity and regardless of the consequences. In response, appellants argued that because snowplowing was inherently discretionary, snowplow operators have official immunity to "roll through" stop signs and "blow" traffic lights in the same way that police officers andambulance drivers have immunity to run red lights. The district court disagreed with this view of the law and denied appellants' motion for summary judgment.

Appellants brought an interlocutory appeal, and we affirmed the district court's decision. Ayers v. Kalal, No. A15-0694, 2015 WL 9264116, at *1, 3 (Minn. App. Dec. 21, 2015) (Ayers I). We concluded that appellants' claims of immunity were contrary to established law, which require "[e]very driver crossing a highway on a city street" to exercise "some judgment as to when it is safe to cross a highway." Id. at *2 (citing Schroeder v. St. Louis Cty., 708 N.W.2d 497, 506-08 (Minn. 2006) and Shariss v. City of Bloomington, 852 N.W.2d 278, 281-82 (Minn. App. 2104)).

B. Jury Trials, Motion for Costs and Disbursements, and Second Appeal

The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the district court ultimately rejected appellants' request to include questions regarding snow and ice immunity on the special verdict form. At the trial, Ayers presented testimony from a medical expert who concluded that Ayers suffered permanent injuries. Appellants did not obtain a medical expert, procure any independent medical examination, produce expert testimony at trial, or challenge through their own evidence Ayers's medical expert's opinion that the injury was permanent. In addition, appellants presented no evidence that something other than Kalal's driving conduct caused the injuries to Ayers and did not raise any comparative fault claims. The jury found that Kalal's negligence was the direct and only cause of Ayers's injuries and determined that Ayers had not suffered a permanent injury as a direct result of the collision. The jury calculated Ayers's damages to be $42,178.07.

Both sides filed post-trial motions. Ayers contested the jury verdict regarding permanency and moved for judgment as a matter of law for damages greater than those awarded by the jury or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court granted Ayers's motion for a new trial because the jury's verdict was not justified by any reasonable interpretation of the evidence. The motion for new trial was granted only with respect to the amount of damages to be awarded for Ayers's injuries. For their part, appellants also challenged the verdict. Appellants moved the district court to reduce the amount of the judgment corresponding to the amount of economic loss benefits paid to or on behalf of Ayers by his no-fault benefits insurer. The district court denied appellants' offset request.

At the second jury trial, Ayers again presented expert medical testimony regarding his injuries. Appellants again did not obtain a medical expert, procure any independent medical examination, produce expert testimony at trial, or challenge Ayers's medical expert's opinion through their own evidence. The second jury awarded damages of $152,810.07. After the second trial, appellants again moved the district court to deduct economic loss benefits from the judgment, specifically requesting a reduction in the amount of $23,000. Ayers moved the district court for entry of final judgment and applied for costs and disbursements in the amount of $34,704.03.¹ Appellants raised numerous objections to the disbursements, including objections to the following: a motion filing fee cost of $107; a medical overcharge of $27.82; delivery charges of $16, $11, and $24; service costs throughout the case totaling $416.32; a medical evaluation charge of $2,500;costs associated with printing and copying approximately 10,000 pages of deposition and trial exhibits for $2,523.66; Ayers's mediation fee of $675; witness fees of $75 and $180.44; and $2,835 in costs to prepare transcripts for the summary judgment hearing, a pretrial hearing, and the first jury trial.

On October 31, 2017, the district court held a hearing regarding the posttrial issues and appellants' objections to Ayers's request for costs and disbursements. During the hearing, the judicial officer expressed frustration and disbelief. In his 20 years of dealing with car accident cases, the judge remarked that he had never seen a lawyer contest these types of disbursements. The district court criticized the manner in which appellants litigated, saying that it was unfair to Ayers, the district court, and the State of Minnesota. The district court characterized appellants' conduct as outrageous, told Ayers's counsel to add up the time spent addressing the objections, and told appellants that "costs are coming."² In the ensuing order, the district court also denied appellants' motion to offset damages by $23,000, finding that because the insurer could still assert a subrogation claim to recover this amount, it was properly included in the judgment. The district court also awarded Ayers costs and disbursements of $34,602.03.³

Appellants filed a second appeal, seeking review of several issues. Ayers v. Kalal, 925 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. App. 2019) (Ayers II). They contested the district court's decisionnot to ask the first jury for special findings regarding snow and ice immunity. Id. at 295. In addition, appellants challenged the district court's decisions to grant a new trial and to deny appellants' motion to offset damages by $23,000. Id. at 297, 300. Last, even though appellants initially objected to a wide variety of disbursements before the district court, on appeal, appellants only sought review of the pertinent date for calculating prejudgment interest and the district court's decision to award one specific cost: a $2,500 cost for medical evaluation. Id. at 303.

Appellants also moved the district court to stay the execution of proceedings to enforce judgment pending disposition of the second appeal. The district court held a hearing, and again criticized the way appellants continued to defend the case. The district court categorized appellants' position on immunity as "outrageous" and also pointed out that appellants had inconsistently applied this defense. It also referenced appellants' failure to pay reasonable disbursements and noted that appellants did not retain a medical expert for the second trial. The district court also focused on appellants' tactics, their alleged failure to make a settlement offer at mediation, and their strategy to use this case to deter future plaintiffs on other cases. The district court stayed enforcement of the judgment pending this court's consideration of Ayers II.

We affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. Ayers II, 925 N.W.2d at 303. We affirmed the district court's decision not to include questions concerning snow and ice immunity in the special verdict form because Ayers alleged a claim of negligent driving, not a claim that appellants negligently maintained the roadway:

Although Kalal was driving a snowplow and the city is responsible for maintaining the road, [Ayers's] claim is not based on the city's failure to maintain the roads resulting in snow or ice accumulation (conduct which the statute would protect). [Ayers's] claim is that Kalal negligently failed to yield the right-of-way to [Ayers] (conduct to which the statute does not speak).

. . . The relevant statute unambiguously restricts immunity to claims based on snow or ice conditions. Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4(a). Accordingly, and unlike some immunity statutes, there was no factual question for resolution by the jury in this case because, regardless of whether snow or ice conditions were present on the highway,

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