Aytch v. Cox

MARTINEZ S. AYTCH, Plaintiff, v. JAMES G. COX, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 2:14-cv-00139-GMN-CWH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

May 21, 2015

ORDER

Presently before the Court is the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 38) filed by Plaintiff Martinez S. Aytch ("Plaintiff"). Defendants filed a Response. (ECF No. 49).¹ For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This prisoner litigation involves allegations of constitutional violations and concerns an inmate's medical and religious dietary needs. When this action originated, Plaintiff—a pro se litigant—resided at the Southern Desert Correctional Center ("SDCC") in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC"). (Compl. at 2, ECF No. 5). Plaintiff now resides in NDOC's custody at Ely State Prison. (See Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 43). He brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of NDOC and SDCC officials, including: James Cox ("Cox"), NDOC director; Brian Williams, Sr. ("Williams"), SDCC warden; Marcy Agnes Boni ("Boni"), NDOC dietician; Rabbi Joseph Elchonon ("Elchonon"), NDOC Kashrus consultant; Justin Reyes ("Reyes"), food service manager; K. McCoy("McCoy"), casework classification specialist; and J.J. Youngblood ("Youngblood"), SDCC chaplain (collectively, "Defendants"). (Id. at 3-4).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is a practicing Muslim, and as such, he requires a diet in compliance with the tenets of his religion. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff also alleges that, in addition to requiring a diet compliant with his religious tenets, he requires a low sodium diet pursuant to a doctor's orders. (Id.). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that his request to receive a diet both low in sodium and in line with his religious tenets was denied by Defendant Reyes. (Id.). Plaintiff subsequently filed a grievance with prison officials, arguing a constitutional right to "be provided with food sufficient to sustain him in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of his religion." (Id. at 9). This grievance was denied by Defendant McCoy, who allegedly found that in order to receive a religious diet, Plaintiff must comply with NDOC administrative regulation ("AR") 814 by signing NDOC form 2523—a Release of Liability for Refusal of Medical Treatment. (Id. at 9, 13). Plaintiff states that Defendant McCoy's finding was upheld twice, first by Defendant Williams and then by Defendant Cox. (Id. at 9).

Plaintiff further alleges in his Complaint that Defendant Reyes began providing him with the common fare religious diet without Plaintiff's consent or the consent of a doctor. (Id. at 6:12-18). Plaintiff's blood pressure "became extremely high as a result," and Plaintiff was placed back on the low sodium diet. (Id. at 6:18-23). Again, Plaintiff turned to the NDOC's grievance process to no avail. (Id. at 6:24-28). Plaintiff additionally avers that "he is not being provided the same right to an appropriate religious and medical diet that is being afforded to fellow prisoners who adhere to more conventional religious precepts." (Id. at 7:1-4). For example, Plaintiff alleges that "Rabbi E. Joseph and NDOC dietitian Mary Agnes Boni [have] developed a low sodium medical diet/common fare religious diet menu to accommodate Christian prisoners, Buddhist prisoners, Native American prisoners, Hindus ect. [sic]." (Id. at 10).

Plaintiff's Complaint was screened and filed on May 14, 2014. (ECF No. 5). It contains the following causes of action: (1) violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion; (2) violation of Plaintiff's equal protection rights; and (3) violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 8-11).² In the instant motion, Plaintiff asks the Court for a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to provide him with "a medical low sodium diet and a diet that conforms to his religious tenets (a Halal diet)." (Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 2, ECF No. 38).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an "extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of right." Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). Although the same general principles apply, "[w]here a party seeks mandatory preliminary relief that goes well beyond maintaining the status quo pendente lite, courts should be extremely cautious about issuing a preliminary injunction." Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir.1984). Therefore, "[m]andatory preliminary relief...should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party. Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979). The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") additionally requires that preliminary injunctive relief must be "narrowly drawn," must "extend no further than necessary to correct the harm," and must be "the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

III. DISCUSSION

For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has established each of the four elements necessary for the preliminary injunction to issue, and moreover, that the facts and law are clearly in his favor. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to provide him with a low sodium diet that conforms to his religious tenets.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Although Plaintiff asserts three claims in his Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim and therefore will not address the merits of Plaintiff's remaining claims. See, e.g., Randazza v. Cox, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1156 (D. Nev. 2013).

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const., amend. I. The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). The right to free exercise of religion, however, "is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security." McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987).

According to Plaintiff, AR 814 impinges on his right to freely exercise his religion as it forces him to "choose between accepting his religious diet [and] his medical low sodium diet." (Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 4). As the Ninth Circuit has said, "[w]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). In Turner, the Supreme Court set forth four factors for courtsto consider when determining if a prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: (1) whether there is a valid and rational interest "between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;" (2) "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates;" (3) the impact that accommodating "the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally;" and (4) the absence or existence of "ready alternatives... that fully accommodate[] the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests." 482 U.S. at 89-91.

1. Rational Relation between Prison Regulation and Government's Interest

Although Defendants argue that "Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits, when considering the legitimate penological interests of the NDOC," (Response 5:21-22), nowhere in Defendants' Opposition do they indicate what penological interests are served by AR 814. Nevertheless, this Court has previously found that AR 814 was rationally related to "running a simplified food service"—a penological interest advanced by NDOC in previous litigation. See, e.g., Parks v. McDaniel, No. 03:06-CV-00095-LRH-VPC, 2007 WL 2891499, at *8 (D. Nev. Sept. 28, 2007) ("Prisons have a legitimate penological interest in the costs of 'running a simplified food service, rather than one that gives rise to many administrative difficulties.'") (quoting Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir.1993)); Shilling v. Crawford, No. 205CV-00889-PMP-GWF, 2007 WL 2790623, at *17 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2007) ("[N]ot providing special diets is logically connected to[running a simplified food service], this factor favors the government."). As a result, this factor weighs towards a finding of reasonableness.

2. Alternative Means of Exercising the Constitutional Right

Defendants argue that there are "alternative means available to Plaintiff to exercise his religious beliefs." (Response 5:22). Again, however, they fail to suggest what thosealternatives might be. Neither has Plaintiff alleged that he is unable to otherwise express his Muslim faith by, for example, observing Islamic holidays like Ramadan or congregating for daily prayer and discussion. See O'Lone, 48 U.S. at 351-52 (discussing alternative ways to express the Muslim faith apart from attending Jumu'ah—a congregational service traditionally observed on Friday afternoons). Even if Plaintiff remains able to express his Muslim faith in these alternative...