Azeez v. Lifespan Corp.

635 F.Supp.3d 75

Terick AZEEZ, Plaintiff, v. LIFESPAN CORPORATION, Defendant.

C.A. No. 1:21-CV-00055-MSM-LDA

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

Signed October 11, 2022

Vicki J. Bejma, Stephen M. Robinson, Robinson & Clapham, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.

James A. Musgrave, Roberts, Carroll, Feldstein & Peirce, Inc., Providence, RI, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.

The plaintiff, Terick Azeez, has filed this action claiming that he was fired by the defendant, Lifespan Corporation ("Lifespan"), in retaliation for complaining about racial discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000E et seq., the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1, and the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1; and that Lifespan violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A), by relying on negative information in his background check to terminate him without first notifying him of the information and providing him an opportunity to respond. Mr. Azeez also brought hostile work environment claims, but he has conceded summary judgment on these counts. (ECF No. 22 at 8, f.1.) The Court now considers Lifespan's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) on the remainder of Mr. Azeez's complaint.

For the reasons below, Lifespan's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

In May 2019, Mr. Azeez was hired for a per diem position in the Lifespan Clinical Research Center ("LCRC"). (ECF No. 17 ¶ 20.) Before beginning his employment, Mr. Azeez submitted to a background check, per Lifespan company policy. Lifespan's background check vendor, ADP, provided Lifespan's Talent Acquisition team with a background report on Mr. Azeez, showing that during college he pled guilty to two drug-related offenses. (ECF No. 24 ¶ 8.) Mr. Azeez has not had any further contact with the criminal justice system since those convictions. (ECF No. 22 at 3.) Lifespan received this report on or about May 24, 2019. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 22.) Mr. Azeez was allowed to begin employment at the LCRC on June 3, 2019. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 5.)

His employment did not proceed completely smoothly, with Mr. Azeez receiving at least one verbal warning from his supervisor, Evelyn Hipolito, in February 2020, for failing to complete certain time-and-effort reports that accompanied his work. (ECF No. 22 at 4.) His performance was, however, sufficient for him to receive a position upgrade in May 2020, when he was hired as a full-time, salaried Research Assistant. Id. at 5.

Soon after, in response to nationwide protests inspired by the murder of George Floyd, Rhode Island Hospital hosted a vigil for its employees. Id. Mr. Azeez attended this event and spoke about experiences with racism that he and other employees of color had experienced while working at Lifespan. Id. In response, Lifespan formed an Anti-Racism Committee, which Mr. Azeez applied to join. Id. On July 24, 2020, Mr. Azeez received an email from David Goldman, Program Manager for Inclusion, Diversity, Equity, HR Compliance, advising him of his selection to the Committee and the need to obtain approval for his participation from his supervisor. Id. at 6. Ms. Hipolito denied this request for approval, citing concerns with Mr. Azeez's performance. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 54.)

In response, Mr. Azeez reached out to Mr. Goldman. The two discussed Mr. Azeez's perception of racial microaggressions he believed he had experienced from Ms. Hipolito, and Mr. Azeez articulated a concern that Ms. Hipolito's refusal to allow him to join the Committee was due to racial discrimination. (ECF No. 22 at 6.) On July 30, 2020, Mr. Azeez called Mr. Goldman again to let him know he wanted to file a formal HR Complaint about this alleged discrimination. Mr. Goldman reported this to Timothy Shayer, the HR Business Partner for the LCRC. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 55.) Mr. Shayer spoke to Mr. Azeez and told him that he did not believe this was a case of racial discrimination. (ECF No. 24 ¶ 87.) Mr. Azeez eventually was given permission to serve on the Anti-Racism Committee, after senior staff at Lifespan intervened in support of his participation. (ECF No. 22 at 7.)

On August 12, 2020, an anonymous report was made to Lifespan's Corporate Compliance hotline revealing that Mr. Azeez had a criminal record. (ECF No. 17 ¶ 64.) The next day, Mr. Shayer contacted David Sinapi, Lifespan's Director of Talent Acquisition, to verify that a background check on Mr. Azeez had been done. Id. ¶ 66. After reviewing the background check, which included the two drug convictions, Mr. Shayer concluded that, "since he has disqualifying information and shouldn't have passed his onboard, this will be the reason for termination." (ECF No. 24 ¶ 113.) Mr. Shayer also discussed with Mr. Sinapi the need to send Mr. Azeez a pre-adverse letter notifying him of this information, but they decided not to send the notice. (ECF No. 22 at 8.) On August 17, 2020, Mr. Azeez was summoned to a meeting at which Mr. Shayer informed him that he was being terminated because of negative information on his background report. Id.

Mr. Azeez brought this action against Lifespan, claiming that he was terminated for speaking out about racial discrimination in violation of Title VII, FEPA, and the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act. He also claims that Lifespan violated the FCRA by firing him without providing him the statutorily required pre-adverse-action notice. In response, Lifespan has moved for summary judgment. Lifespan argues that the termination was unrelated to his complaint of racial discrimination and was simply a matter of following their clear internal policies against hiring anyone with a drug conviction. Lifespan also claims that Mr. Azeez did not suffer an actual injury from any alleged FCRA violation, arguing that the purpose of the FCRA's pre-adverse-action notice requirement is to allow the employee to correct any inaccurate information. Since the information on Mr. Azeez's background check was accurate, Lifespan alleges that he suffered no concrete injury-in-fact from his lack of pre-adverse-action notice.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment's role in civil litigation is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Garside v. Osco Drug. Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. "A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party. A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law." Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000). When determining whether to grant summary judgment, the record is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all factual inferences must be drawn in their favor. See Rossy v. Roche Products, Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 624 (1st Cir. 1989). This review should be "most searching in cases, such as this, that turn upon the issue of motive or intent . . . [as] these difficult questions are most suited for jury determinations, as proof is generally based on inferences that must be drawn." Id. However, a party opposing summary judgment cannot rely on "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 33 (1st Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Retaliatory Firing Claims

Mr. Azeez's claims that he was fired in retaliation for complaining of racial discrimination are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 53. The first step in this analysis is the plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case, which in retaliation claims requires a showing that: 1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; 2) the plaintiff was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment action; and 3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action. Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresí Hotels, Inc., 779 F.3d 19, 30 (1st Cir. 2015). Then, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for the employment action. Currier v. United Techs. Corp., 393 F.3d 246, 254 (1st Cir. 2004). Finally, in the third step, the plaintiff must provide evidence showing that the employer's proffered legitimate reason was a pretext and the real reason for the employment action was discriminatory or retaliatory. Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824 (1st Cir. 1991).

Here, no one disputes that Mr. Azeez can establish his prima facie case. (ECF No. 28 at 4.) Under Title VII and FEPA, protected conduct "refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination." Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2009). Protected conduct includes "the filing of formal charges of discrimination" as well as "informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to management, writing critical letters to customers, protesting against discrimination by industry or by society in general, and expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges." Id. Thus, Azeez's complaints that he was not allowed to serve on Lifespan's Anti-Racism Committee because of discrimination constitute protected conduct. He experienced an adverse employment action when he was terminated. At the prima facie stage...