B.D. v. Dist. of Columbia

B.D., a minor, by and through his parents and next friends Anne and Brantley Davis, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil No. 15-1139 (RJL)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

December 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION (DECEMBER 2021) [DKTS. #44 #46]

RICHARD J. LEOM, United States District Judge.

Plaintiffs Anne and Brantley Davis, as parents and next friends of their son, B.D. (collectively “plaintiffs” or “the Davises”), bring this action against the District of Columbia (“defendant” or “the District”), alleging that the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) and the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (“OSSE”)- the agencies through which the District complies with its educational obligations- deprived B.D. of his rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls.' Mot.”) [Dkt. #44] and Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mot.”) [Dkt. #46]. Upon consideration of the parties' briefing, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART both motions.

BACKGROUND

This case is one in a series involving the District's provision of special education and related services to B.D under the IDEA. See Am. Compl. [Dkt. #6] ¶¶ 9-15. The parties' long-running dispute over B.D.'s education is well documented in other opinions of this Court and our Circuit Court. See B.D. v. District of Columbia, 75 F.Supp.3d 225 (D.D.C. 2014);5.D. v District of Columbia, 817F.3d792 (D.C. Cir. 2016);RD v. District of Columbia, Case No. 15-cv-1139, 2020 WL 5763608 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2020); B.D. v. District of Columbia, Case No. 13-cv-1223, 2020 WL 5763630 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2020). In this Opinion, I will focus only on the facts relevant to the immediate dispute, which primarily concerns the Davises' parental rights to participate in B.D.'s educational planning during the 2013-14 and 2014-15 school years.

A. Statutory Background

The IDEA guarantees children with disabilities a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) with services designed to meet each child's unique needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The “primary vehicle” for achieving the statute's goals is the individualized educational program (“IEP”)-a comprehensive and individualized document that “sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). Once a child is identified as disabled, the local education agency (“LEA”) responsible for the child must develop an IEP for the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c). That IEP must then be reviewed at least annually by an IEP team including the student's parents, educators, specialists, LEA representatives, and the child, where appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B), 1414(d)(4). In reviewing the IEP, the IEP team must determine whether the IEP's goals are being achieved and revise the IEP as necessary to address lack of expected progress, the results of any evaluations, additional information about the child provided by the parents, and the child's anticipated needs. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii).

Parents who believe their child's IDEA rights have been violated may file an administrative due process complaint and are entitled to a due process hearing before an impartial hearing officer. Id. § 1415(f). It is up to the hearing officer in the first instance to make a determination “on substantive grounds” whether the child has been denied a FAPE. Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E). Where parents base their complaint on “a procedural violation, a hearing officer may find that a child did not receive a free appropriate public education only if the procedural inadequacies (I) impeded the child's right to a free appropriate public education; (II) significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents' child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Any party aggrieved by the outcome of the administrative hearing may then file a civil action in district court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

B. Factual Background

B.D. is classified “as a student with multiple disabilities.” AR 28.^[1] As such, DCPS and OSSE recognize B.D. as eligible to receive special education and associated services under the IDEA. AR 28. His conditions include an extreme form of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, developmental coordination disorder, anxiety disorder with obsessive compulsive features, and a variety of other learning disorders. AR 28-30.

In October 2012, B.D.'s IEP team developed an IEP recommending that B.D. be educated in a therapeutic residential school. AR 108-61, 175-76. OSSE accordingly began to search for an appropriate location.^[2] One such program in Massachusetts-the Eagleton School (“Eagleton”)-accepted B.D., and this became his assigned location. AR 106-07. The Davises voiced numerous concerns regarding Eagleton's ability to meet B.D.'s unique needs, and eventually refused to accept this placement. AR 162-69, 181.

Several contentious months followed in which the District and the Davises sought to find and agree on an appropriate placement for B.D. Despite contacting numerous residential schools, these efforts were unsuccessful, and litigation eventually ensued. AR 189-251. In June 2013, against a backdrop of ongoing litigation, the parties again sought to convene B.D.'s IEP team to update his IEP and discuss finding an appropriate placement. AR 231-308. Around this time, OSSE again referred B.D. to Eagleton, informing the Davises in the end of June that he was again being considered for admission there. AR 236-47, 327-33.

1. The July 16, 2013 Meeting

The IEP team initially scheduled an IEP meeting for June 21, 2013. AR 310-16.

Two days prior to the meeting, however, DCPS postponed because B.D.'s case manager had a “personal” matter to attend to. AR 352. The parties agreed to reschedule the meeting for July 16. On July 8, however, the Davises alerted DCPS that B.D. had been accepted into the residential program at Rogers Memorial Hospital (“Rogers Memorial”) in Wisconsin and that they intended to enter him in that program as soon as space became available. AR 361-65. The Davises stated that “[i]f DCPS expects Rogers Memorial to implement any IEP goals for [B.D.], then the process of updating and revising his IEP should continue now.” AR 365. Two days later, DCPS responded with a letter from counsel explaining that DCPS could not place B.D. at Rogers Memorial because that facility had not received the requisite certifications under local regulations. AR 372. DCPS's letter did not specifically address the July 16 IEP meeting, but stated that “DCPS is not required to, nor will it propose a revised IEP while [B.D.] is unilaterally placed by the Davises at Rogers Memorial.” AR 372. The letter concluded by asking the Davises to keep DCPS apprised of B.D.'s progress and stating that DCPS “looks forward to hearing about this progress and [B.D.'s] readiness to transition back to DCPS.” AR 372.

On July 15, 2016, under the assumption the July 16 meeting was still going forward, DCPS circulated a dial-in number and location for the meeting. See AR 388. Caught off guard, the Davises requested to reschedule, explaining that while they “would very much like to attend an IEP meeting, ” they had assumed the meeting was cancelled in light of DCPS's letter stating that DCPS would not move forward with revising B.D.'s IEP in light of his placement at Rogers Memorial and DCPS's failure to provide an agenda, a list of participants, and other information. AR 384. The Davises explained that due to their assumption that the meeting had been cancelled, they had not made the necessary childcare arrangements, preventing them from attending on short notice. AR 384. The following day, plaintiffs' counsel emailed the school reiterating the Davises' inability to attend and again requesting DCPS reschedule the meeting. AR 397-98.

DCPS nevertheless held the meeting on July 16, 2013 without the Davises present. The meeting minutes state that the need to “remain in compliance [with the requirement that IEPs be updated least annually]” was the reason for moving forward in the Davises' absence. AR 394, 432. At the meeting, those present reviewed, among other things, B.D.'s progress, his present “levels, needs, baselines, and goals, ” and his least restrictive environment. AR 393. The notes repeatedly state that updates to B.D.'s goals were impossible to make because the IEP team lacked current information regarding B.D.'s behaviors and progress. For the social emotional goals category, the notes state that “[t]o the best of the team's knowledge, [B.D.] still presents with maladaptive behaviors.” AR 395. For the speech and language therapy section, the notes explain that “no progress notes or updated data” were available. AR 395. For the occupational therapy section, the notes state that “[n]o progress reports” were available and as a result the team “can't make any modifications to the IEP.” AR 395. In recognition of the Davises' absence, the meeting notes state that “[a] meeting will re-convene if requested at a mutually agreeable time and place.” AR 394.

2. The October 1, 2013 Meeting

Three days after the July 16 meeting, OSSE issued a notice of location assignment placing B.D. at Eagleton. AR 478-79. The Davises...