Courts have uniformly rejected arguments by defendants that the EEA must be interpreted to require heightened levels of knowledge in order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness.49 In United States v. Roberts, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United Stated50 requires that the government prove, in a prosecution under section 1832, that the defendants "knew the information they converted met the legal definition of a trade secret under the statute."51 The court cited the statute's legislative history, in which Congress wrote that:
It is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant knew his or her actions were illegal, rather, the government must prove that the defendants' actions were not authorized by the nature of his or her relationship to the owner of the property and that the defendant knew or should have known that fact.52
Other courts have made similar rulings. In United States v. Chung,53 the defendant moved to dismiss the charges brought against him under section 1831, arguing that the EEA's definition of "trade secret" fails to provide fair notice and is unconstitutionally vague because the terms "not generally known," "not readily ascertainable through proper means," "reasonable measures," and "independent economic value, actual or potential" are "not adequately defined so as to provide a reasonable person with notice of their meaning."54 The court denied the motion, noting that Chung "was well aware of the steps [his employer] took to keep the documents [at issue] confidential—including proprietary...
