B.A. v. State

219 N.E.3d 134

In the Matter of the Commitment of: B.A., Appellant-Respondent,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner

Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-MH-632

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed September 12, 2023

Attorney for Appellant: Casandra J. Nelson, Law Office of Casandra J. Nelson, LLC, Noblesville, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Monika P. Talbot, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Mathias, Judge.

[1] B.A. appeals the trial court's order that she be involuntarily committed to the Logansport State Hospital. B.A. raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether B.A. preserved her argument of insufficient service of process, which she raised for the first time during the closing arguments of the fact-finding hearing on the Hospital's petition.

2. Whether the Hospital presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court's order that she be committed to the Hospital.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In December 2021, the State charged B.A. with Level 2 felony criminal confinement (where the "victim [wa]s used as a shield or hostage"); Level 5 felony criminal confinement; Class A misdemeanor domestic battery; Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime; and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement in the Hamilton Superior Court. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 9. In February and again in March 2022, two different clinical psychologists concluded that B.A. was not competent to understand the criminal proceedings against her or to aid in her own defense.

[4] In August, the Hamilton Superior Court committed B.A. to the Logansport State Hospital for competency restoration services.¹ In February 2023, the Hospital petitioned the court for B.A.’s involuntary regular commitment. According to an attached physician's statement of Dr. Danny Meadows, B.A. suffered from "[b]ipolar I disorder with mixed features and PTSD." Id. at 11. Dr. Meadows opined that B.A.’s conditions "substantially disturb[ed her] thinking, feeling, or behavior[ ] and impair[ed] her ability to function." Id. He further opined that that impairment resulted in her inability to function independently, noting that

[B.A.] is unaware that she is psychotic, which affects both her judgement [sic] and insight. She is also unaware whenever she becomes verbally aggressive/threatening towards others, which occurs whenever she does not get her way (feels that she is being served a "child size serving," isn't served bread due to being on an 1,800 calorie diet, etc.), her delusional beliefs are challenged (during an evaluation[/]weekly or monthly assessment and/or her competency evaluation), or she feels betrayed, threatened, or wronged in some way (even if this is based on delusional beliefs). [B.A.’s] delusional beliefs are fixed, involve her being a CIA agent and [that] the Hamilton Co. police, her assigned attorney, and the judge involved in her criminal court case [are] working with multiple family members (her ex-husband, mother, and sister) in a sex trafficking ring, which her two minor daughters are now involved in.

Id. And, in the petition for B.A.’s involuntary commitment, Dr. Meadows added:

[B.A.] is currently homeless and unemployed. She reports knowing a number of famous individuals and frequently asks staff to contact them on her behalf for a variety of reasons. While she remains overtly psychotic, [B.A.] continues to believe that she does not have a mental illness and should only be prescribed seizure medication.

Id. at 9.

[5] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the Hospital's petition in March. B.A. appeared at that hearing in person and by counsel, and, at the commencement of the hearing, her counsel informed the court that they were "ready to proceed" on the Hospital's petition. Tr. p. 4. Dr. Meadows then testified and adopted his statements in his written physician's statement.

[6] Dr. Meadows also elaborated on how B.A.’s mental illness substantially impaired her judgment, reasoning, or behavior, resulting in her inability to function independently:

Q [by B.A.’s counsel]: And your commitment [petition] is solely based on your belief that my client is gravely disabled?

A Yes, that's correct.

* * *

A ... [S]pecifically, ... [i]t is that we believe that [her mental illness] is impinging greatly on her judgments and her insight, which would then lead to her having additional difficulties if she were to be released. Now in actuality if she were to be released ..., we would let the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department ... know that and she would be escorted back to the Hamilton County Jail.

* * *

Q ... Can you please elaborate ...?

A All right, so based on the presentation of her mental health symptoms, we believe that she is not able to make rational and reasoned decisions. And that harm could come to her based on ... how her mental health ... symptoms[ ] are manifesting. So, the[ ] issue that we have is that we're not ... saying that she doesn't have the ability to meet basic needs currently, but she is in a supervised setting. So, if she w[ere] not in this twenty-four-hour supervised setting ..., if she were to go back into the community[,] based on her presentation and severity of her mental health symptoms we believe that she can come to harm potentially based on those symptoms.

Id. at 13-15. And Dr. Meadows testified that he has B.A. on a medication plan and that, under that plan, she has shown "some improvement" with "mood issues" but less improvement with her "delusional beliefs." Id. at 18.

[7] Following Dr. Meadows's testimony, B.A. testified. She appeared to deny suffering from mental illness and stated only that she once suffered from epilepsy. She also discussed living in both Florida and Indiana, and when asked if she had an Indiana address, she responded that she was not sure because her mother-figure from her childhood "doesn't want me to live with her." Id. at 20. When asked what she would do for employment, B.A. stated:

Well, I would probably go back to, just for safety and peace, I probably would go to the fashion mall and go to the Body Shop. I already have large connections in the retail area. I'd probably go back[;] right now I can't work in it now but it's my side job. That I probably will take if I stay in Indiana, I will take that on fully. Yeah, and teach on occasion on weekends. Teach professional ballet and professional modern dance.

Id. at 21.

[8] Following B.A.’s testimony, the court invited the parties to make their closing statements or arguments. B.A.’s counsel then, for the first time, objected to the proceedings on the ground that the Hospital had not properly served B.A. with its petition for her commitment. Id. at 22-24. The court responded that it had "appointed [B.A.’s counsel] after the filing of the documents for the purpose[ ] of representing her with respect to the petition and these proceedings." Id. at 27. The court then overruled B.A.’s objection and ordered her involuntary civil commitment.

[9] This appeal ensued.

1. B.A. did not preserve her argument of insufficient service of process.

[10] On appeal, B.A. first asserts that the Hospital failed to provide her with sufficient service of process. A judgment rendered in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is void. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). We review whether a judgment is void or valid de novo. M.H. v. State , 207 N.E.3d 412, 416 (Ind. 2023).

[11] As we stated in Munster v. Groce , 829 N.E.2d 52, 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) :

[i]n the seminal case regarding due process and notice, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires at a minimum "that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 313 [70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865] (1950). "This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest." Id. at 314 . "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. " Id. "[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. at 315 .

(Emphasis added.)²

[12] An untimely defense of insufficient service of process is waived. See Ind. Trial Rule 12(B) ; see also Ind. Code § 12-26-1-6 (2022) (stating that the Indiana Trial Rules apply to civil commitment proceedings unless another statute provides otherwise). Likewise, our Supreme Court has held that claims of insufficient notice and opportunity to prepare a defense are waived when there is not a timely objection in the trial court. Salahuddin v. State , 492 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ind. 1986) ("By not objecting, [the defendant] waived the issue, even though ... the error is of constitutional dimension."); see also Daniel v. State , 526 N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (Ind. 1988) ("As no objection was made at trial to the late filing ..., this allegation of error has been waived."). An objection for an alleged inadequate opportunity to prepare a defense further requires a party to move for a continuance, and the failure to do so also results in waiver. Daniel , 526 N.E.2d at 1162. And our Supreme Court has further held that a party "should not be heard to argue [s]he was denied notice and opportunity to be heard" where her "counsel specifically acknowledged that they were prepared to proceed" on the matter at issue. Salahuddi...