Bader v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n

DOUGLAS BADER, CHARLES DOYLE,and RALPH J. RINA, Plaintiffs, v. AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION,INTERNATIONAL, Defendant.

No. 14 C 6415

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

June 4, 2018

Judge Jorge L. Alonso

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Douglas Bader, Charles Doyle, and Ralph Rina have brought this action against their labor union, Defendant Air Line Pilots Association, International ("ALPA"). Plaintiffs bring age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and breach of duty of fair representation claims under the under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. Before the court is ALPA's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment as to liability.¹ For the reasons set forth below, ALPA's motion for summary judgment [73] is granted, and Plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment [114] is denied.

BACKGROUND

Prior to 2010, Plaintiffs were Pilot Instructor/Evaluators ("I/Es") at Continental Airlines ("Continental"). Federal law prevents anyone over the age of 65 from serving as a pilot in most commercial operations. While working for Continental, Plaintiffs were unable to fly the line² since they were over 65 years old, but Plaintiffs were able to work for Continental as Non-Line Qualified Flight Instructors ("NLQFIs"). In 2010, United Airlines, Inc. ("United") entered into a merger with Continental. ALPA is the labor organization that represented Plaintiffs and other I/Es at the time of the merger. After the merger, United and ALPA negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement referred to as the United Pilot Agreement ("UPA"), which became effective December 18, 2012. The UPA included a qualification for the I/E position that United had in place since at least 1989 ("United Policy"). The United Policy required that all I/Es fly the line at least 30 days a year. After the merger, Plaintiffs could not serve as I/Es for United because they were unable to fly the line.

In a Letter of Agreement, dated December 18, 2012 ("LOA 18"), which was made a part of the UPA, United and ALPA agreed to a transition period of twelve months after the effective date of the UPA that allowed NLQFIs who exceeded the statutory age limit for pilots to continue to work in the I/E position. The transitional period ran from December 2012 through December 2013. During the transitional period, United also utilized Continental's Advanced Qualification Program ("AQP").³ Under the UPA, after the transitional period, NLQFIs were treated like any other pilots and were removed from the pilot seniority list when they reached the statutory age limit. In June 2013, Plaintiffs delivered a letter ("June 2013 Letter") to the Continental ALPAMaster Executive Council ("Council") requesting that their seniority be restored and that their retirement date be rescinded. The Council responded that it did not have unilateral authority to strike or modify provisions of the UPA. Plaintiffs contend that they did not understand the Council's response at that time to be a final rejection of Plaintiffs' requests and so delayed in pursuing certain claims. Plaintiffs ultimately all retired near the end of the transitional period.

On April 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and included in their complaint ADEA discrimination claims (Count I), breach of contract claims (Count II), breach of the duty of fair representation ("DFR") claims brought under the RLA (Count III), and tortious interference with a business expectancy claims (Count IV). On August 8, 2014, this action was transferred to this district. On November 14, 2014, ALPA moved for a judgment on the pleadings and on January 16, 2015, this case was transferred to the undersigned judge. On July 9, 2015, the court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings in regard to the state law claims in Counts II and IV, and denied the motion in regard to the ADEA claims and DFR claims in Counts I and III. ALPA has filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims and Plaintiffs have filed a partial motion for summary judgment as to liability.⁴

STANDARD

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering such a motion, the court construes the evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. SeeKvapil v. Chippewa Cty., 752 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2014). "Summary judgment should be denied if the dispute is 'genuine': 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Talanda v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); see also Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2014). The court will enter summary judgment against a party who does not "come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in [its] favor on a material question." Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1167 (7th Cir. 2013). It is well settled that at the summary-judgment stage, the court does not make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; those are jury functions. See Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2014). When there are cross motions for summary judgment, the court should "construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made." Premcor USA, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co., 400 F.3d 523, 526-27 (7th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

I. Local Rule 56.1

ALPA asserts that Plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1.⁵ ALPA is correct that Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 by neglecting to cite to the record to support facts and by presenting citations that do not support the asserted facts.(Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment "PSOF" Dkt. No. 104-3); (Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Opposition to United's Motion for Summary Judgment "PSOF OP" Dkt. No. 104-3). A review of the parties' filings, however, shows that neither side has followed Local Rule 56.1. For example, instead of admitting or denying facts as envisioned by Local Rule 56.1, ALPA provides an endless series of objections, arguments, and partial admissions. ALPA continually objects to facts as irrelevant even though they fall within the broad scope of relevancy and ALPA fails to even proffer an explanation as to why the facts would be irrelevant. (R PSOF OP ¶ 1-13, 15-22); (R PSOF ¶¶ 6-21). ALPA also objects to facts as ambiguous instead of simply admitting or denying facts. (R PSOF OP ¶¶ 5-7, 13, 15); (R PSOF ¶ 18). Instead of clearly admitting or denying facts, ALPA also continually admits facts "subject to" objections and even denies facts "subject to" objections. (R PSOF OP ¶¶ 1-7, 9-12, 15-20, 22, 24); (R PSOF ¶¶ 1, 6-21). ALPA also accuses Plaintiffs of misstating the cited evidence, but ALPA fails at times to explain how the facts are misstated. (R PSOF OP ¶ 6); (R PSOF ¶ 10).

ALPA also fails to cite to the record or evidence when necessary to support objections. For example, in response to Plaintiffs' statement of material fact Paragraph 10 in support of their partial motion for summary judgment, ALPA responds: "ALPA objects to this paragraph because it is irrelevant, lacks foundation, misstates evidence and its argumentative. Subject to these objections, ALPA admits the Fred Abbot testified . . .." (R PSOF ¶ 10). ALPA does not explain why the facts would be irrelevant, or why they misstate the evidence, or cite to the record or any evidence. Nor does ALPA even specify what it admits that Abbot testified, providing only a four-dot ellipse at the end of its response. In addition, although ALPA complains that certain paragraphs of Plaintiffs' statements of facts are argumentative, (R PSOF ¶ 10), ALPAprovides its own argumentative responses. For example, in Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' statement of material facts in support of their partial motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs assert that internal ALPA emails consistently referred to "age 65 instructors." (PSOF ¶ 14). Instead of simply admitting that fact, ALPA first objects, stating that facts are irrelevant. Such facts, however, are not irrelevant in this ADEA case. ALPA then indicates that "[s]ubject to [those] objections" it denies the facts and argues that the "[r]eferences to 'over 65' pilots were shorthand for pilots who had reached the federally mandated retirement age." (PSOF ¶ 14). Such evasive responses defeat the purpose of Local Rule 56.1. ALPA's lengthy and often unwarranted objections to virtually all of Plaintiffs' facts undermine the utility of Local Rule 56.1 and the clarity in the record that the rule is intended to promote. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that "[b]ecause of the high volume of summary judgment motions and the benefits of clear presentation of relevant evidence and law, [the Court has] repeatedly held that district judges are entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules designed to promote the clarity of summary judgment filings"). Both sides have thus substantially failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1.

II. ADEA Claims (Count I)

ALPA and Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on the ADEA claims. The ADEA protects individuals who are over 40 years old from discrimination. See Formella v. Brennan, 817 F.3d 503, 514 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that "[t]he ADEA prohibits employment discrimination against people over 40 years old"). The ADEA...