Bai Lin Huang v. Amazon.com

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BAI LIN HUANG, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM, INC. and JP MORGAN CHASE, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22 Civ. 3527 (JLR) (SLC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

January 31, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SARAH L. CAVE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TO THE HONORABLE JENNIFER L. ROCHON, United States District Judge:

I.INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Bai Lin Huang (“Ms. Huang”) brings this action against defendants Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) and JP Morgan Chase (“Chase,” with Amazon, “Defendants”) asserting claims for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C § 1981 (“Section 1981”) and for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) under New York law. (ECF No. 1 (the “Complaint”)). Ms Huang's claims arise out of the allegedly wrongful closure of her Amazon customer and seller accounts and the termination of her Amazon-Chase credit card. (Id.)

Defendants have each moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 16 (“Chase's Motion”); 26 (“Amazon's Motion,” with Chase's Motion the “Motions”)). Ms. Huang has opposed the Motions and requested leave to amend (the “Request”). (ECF Nos. 19; 21; 33; 34).

For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the Motions be GRANTED, the Request be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and that Ms. Huang be granted leave to amend only certain of her claims.

II.BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court summarizes the following facts from the Complaint, and presumes them to be true for purposes of deciding the Motions. See Rosen v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 18 Civ. 6670 (AT), 2019 WL 4039958, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019).^[1]In addition, because Ms. Huang is a pro se litigant, the Court also considers allegations in her oppositions to the Motions to the extent “they are consistent with the facts [s]he alleges in the Complaint.” Evans v. City of New York, No. 21 Civ. 8660 (JPC), 2022 WL 1172740, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2022); see Henning v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 14 Civ. 9798, 2016 WL 297725, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2016) (crediting pro se plaintiff's allegation that “appear[ed] in his opposition papers . . . in evaluating the sufficiency of his complaint”); White v. Schriro, No. 14 Civ. 3204 (AT) (FM), 2015 WL 4470168, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2015) (“For the purposes of deciding this motion, the Court accepts as true all facts in Plaintiff's complaint and opposition papers.”); Flores v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., No. 10 Civ. 2407, 2011 WL 3611340, at *1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2011) (“Because of [plaintiff's] pro se status, . . . the Court may consider factual allegations [plaintiff] makes in her opposition papers, in addition to the allegations in the complaint [.]”); Burgess v. Goord, No. 98 Civ. 2077 (SAS), 1999 WL 33458, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1999) (“In general, a court may not look outside the pleadings when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. However, the mandate to read the papers of pro se litigants generously makes it appropriate to consider plaintiff's additional materials, such as his opposition memorandum.”).

Ms. Huang is “an Asian-American Muslim female” who resides in New York. (ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ 32; see id. at 1 ¶ 1).^[2]Amazon is a Seattle-based online “retail advertising, sales[,] and product distribution]” business. (Id. at 4 ¶ 10). Chase is a “Retail Financial Services” business based in New York. (Id. at 4 ¶ 11).

In 2016, Ms. Huang applied to open a business account with Amazon “to sell [her] own designed jewelry” and other handmade products (the “Seller Account”). (ECF No. 21 at 2 ¶ 11; see ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 1). At that time, Ms. Huang had operated a retail customer account with Amazon (the “Retail Account”) for over ten years “without incident.” (ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 1). Amazon approved the application and opened the Seller Account. (Id.; see ECF No. 21 at 2 ¶ 13). Ms. Huang's husband, Erdal Kuyumcu (“Kuyumcu”), a “Turkish-American Muslim,” was “not a partner, signee[,] or member” of Ms. Huang's Seller or Retail Accounts. (ECF Nos. 1 at 4 ¶ 13; 21 at 3 ¶ 19). In 2017, Kuyumcu was convicted in the United States of “exporting materials to Turkey [that were] rerouted to Iran” in violation of federal law. (ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ 15). Ms. Huang was never “accused of violating any laws of the United States, or of having a role in any of [Kuyumcu's] acts[.]” (Id.)

In 2018, Amazon “offered [Ms. Huang] an Amazon Credit Card [the ‘Credit Card'] due to her outstanding Credit score and her business relationship with” Amazon. (ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 1). Ms. Huang alleges that the “Credit Card was a joint venture” between Amazon and Chase. (Id.) Ms. Huang applied for the Credit Card, and her “application was approved in the beginning of April 2018.” (Id.)

In both the Complaint and a sworn affidavit filed with it (ECF No. 1 at 1 (the “Affidavit”)), Ms. Huang states that Amazon and Chase “notified [her in] mid [] April 2018 (15 days after they had approved [her]), that [her Credit Card] account was being closed and their business relations with [her] were being terminated” (the “April 2018 Closure”). (ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 5; see id. at 4 ¶ 16 (“In April[] 2018, [Ms. Huang] was informed by [] Chase via [Amazon] that her [Credit Card] account was being terminated[.]”)). Ms. Huang “subsequently learned that Chase's actions were [] based upon [the] alleged independent conduct of” Kuyumcu. (ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 5; see id. at 4 ¶ 16 (alleging that Chase “indicated that [the April 2018 Closure] was a result of her spouse's conviction.”). According to Ms. Huang, “Chase knew that [] Kuyumcu is [her] husband because . . . [he] had a Business Account with [] Chase [that] was closed during his legal process.” (ECF No. 21 at 3 ¶ 20).

On December 28, 2018, Amazon informed Ms. Huang that it was closing her Retail and Seller Accounts pursuant to its “policy to comply with government sanctions and export regulations” (the “Dec. 2018 Closure,” with the April 2018 Closure, the “Closures”). (ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 1; see id. at 10 (the “Email”)). Amazon advised Ms. Huang that it had “identified similarities between information in [her] account and an individual with whom [Amazon] can't currently due business.” (ECF No. 1 at 10). Ms. Huang appealed the Dec. 2018 Closure, but, on January 2, 2019, Amazon affirmed the Dec. 2018 Closure. (ECF No. 1 at 8; see id. at 1 ¶ 4).

Ms. Huang alleges that the Closures resulted from Defendants' “arbitrary, discriminatory racial targeting of non-Caucasians[,]” and that she “is being unlawfully alienated, burdened, discriminated against, penalized and stigmatized for nothing other than being an Asian-American Muslim.” (ECF No. 1 at 5 ¶¶ 19, 23). Ms. Huang asserts “[u]pon information and belief” that Defendants “routinely engage in a pattern and practice of discriminating against non-Caucasians, who have not themselves[] committed any criminal offenses just because of their religious and/or ethnic affiliation to an individual.” (Id. at 5 ¶ 20). She alleges that, “following September 11th, 2001, [she] has learned of several instances where Muslims[] and non-Caucasians have routinely been subjected to racial animus, and deprived of their Civil Rights by Defendants [] in violation of 42 U.S.C. [§] 1981, by unlawfully placing them in a suspect category.” (Id. at 5 ¶ 21). Finally, Ms. Huang alleges that Defendants' “selective targeting of [her] for disparate and discriminatory treatment is based wholly on [her] religious affiliation and race, since it is similarly well known that Irish, Italian and Jewish customers having accounts with these Defendants are not denied service simply because a family member was convicted of a criminal offense.” (Id. at 5 ¶ 22).

B. Procedural History

On May 2, 2022, Ms. Huang filed the Complaint. (ECF No. 1). She asserts Section 1981 claims (the “Section 1981 Claims”) and IIED claims (the “IIED Claims”) against each Defendant based on the Closures, alleging that “Defendants acted out of racial animus” and “with reckless indifference to the likelihood that emotional distress would result[.]” (Id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 24-32).

1. Chase's Motion

On August 8, 2022, Chase filed its Motion. (ECF No. 16). Chase, whose alleged involvement in this case is limited to the April 2018 Closure, argues that both of Ms. Huang's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and, in any event, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 17 at 7-15).

On August 29, 2022, Ms. Huang opposed Chase's Motion (the “First Opposition”). (ECF Nos. 19; 21). In response to Chase's argument that her Section 1981 Claim is barred by the four-year statute of limitations, Ms. Huang asserts several new allegations that directly contradict her statements in the Complaint and the Affidavit. Specifically, contrary to her allegation in the Complaint that Amazon and Chase informed her of the April 2018 Closure in April 2018 (see ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 5; see id. at 4 ¶ 16), Ms. Huang now contends that she first learned of it on May 14, 2018 “by way of a credit report” from www.creditkarma.com (the “Credit Report”). (ECF No. 19 at 6). Ms. Huang also now claims that she “never received a notice (mail or email) from Chase or from Amazon that they ha[d] closed [her] Credit Card.” (ECF No. 21 at 3 ¶ 18). Ms. Huang asserts that the Credit Report, which reflects that she made a payment for the Credit Card on May 2, 2018, “demonstrates that [she] was unaware that her account with [D]efendants was closed on April 30, 2018.” (ECF Nos. 19 at 5-6; 19-2 at 2-4).

On September 12, 2022, Chase filed a reply. (ECF No. 29). Chase argues, inter alia, that Ms. Huang “should not be permitted to amend the Complaint to include new allegations of when she discovered...