Bailey v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

MEIGO BAILEY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:14-cv-583-J-32JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

April 4, 2019

ORDER

Petitioner Meigo Bailey, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which he amended twice. See Docs. 1, 3, 12 (Petition). Bailey challenges his 2008 state court (Duval County, Florida) convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted second degree murder, armed burglary, and attempted armed robbery. Respondents have responded. See Answer to Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 15) (Response).¹ With the benefit of counsel, Bailey replied and attached an Unsworn Declaration of Carmen Lawrence. See Petitioner's Reply Brief (Doc. 29) (Reply). The Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on Grounds Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven of the Petition. See Doc. 30. Respondents fileda Supplemental Answer. See Supplemental Answer to Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 37) (Supp. Response). Bailey, through counsel, filed a Supplemental Reply. See Petitioner's Sur-Reply Brief (Doc. 45) (Supp. Reply). This case is ripe for review.

I. Procedural History

Following a jury trial, Bailey was convicted of first-degree felony murder with a firearm committed during a robbery or attempted robbery (Count 1), attempted second-degree murder with a firearm (Count 3), burglary of a dwelling with a firearm (Count 4) and two counts of attempted robbery with a firearm (Counts 6 and 7). Resp. Ex. A at 268-75; B at 849-51. After denying his motion for a new trial (Resp. Ex. A at 284-88; 507-10), the circuit court imposed concurrent sentences of life in prison on Count 1, thirty years on Count 3, life in prison on Count 4, fifteen years on Count 6, and fifteen years on Count 7. Id. at 289-301; 507-524.

Bailey appealed his judgment and sentences to the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA). Resp. Ex. C. The State filed an answer brief (Resp. Ex. D), and Bailey filed a reply brief. Resp. Ex. E. The First DCA affirmed and issued a signed, written opinion. Resp. Ex. F. After granting the State's motion for clarification (Resp. Ex. G), the First DCA issued a substitute opinion. Resp. Ex. H. The mandate issued. Resp. Ex. I; Bailey v. State, 31 So. 3d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Bailey sought discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court. Resp. Exs. J, K. The Florida Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction. Resp. Ex. L; Bailey v.State, 36 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 2010). Bailey did not seek review by the United States Supreme Court.

Bailey filed a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the First DCA. Resp. Ex. M. The First DCA denied the petition on the merits, issuing a per curiam order without written opinion. Resp. Ex. N; Bailey v. State, 45 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Bailey filed a motion for award of jail credit pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Resp. Ex. S at 1-3. The trial court denied the motion. Resp. Ex. S at 67-103. Bailey did not appeal. See id. at 118-19.

Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, Bailey filed an initial and amended motion to vacate his judgment and sentence. He alleged five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim of fundamental trial court error. Resp. Ex. S at 4-19. Without an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied the amended motion. Id. at 20-66. Bailey filed a motion for rehearing (id. at 104-08), which the circuit court denied. Id. at 111-17. Bailey filed a notice of appeal, but no brief. Id. at 118-19. The First DCA affirmed per curiam without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. T. Bailey filed a motion for rehearing (Resp. Ex. U), which was denied. Resp. Ex. V. The mandate issued. Resp. Ex. W; Bailey v. State, 134 So.3d 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

II. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition'sfactual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

III. Governing Legal Principals

A. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100(2011). Where the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation,

the federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claims on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court's factual findings are "presumed to be correct" unless rebutted "by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA "imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings" and "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. [at 102](citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 ("The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness."); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) ("[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.").

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations modified).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly present[]" every issue raised in his federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Pope v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting "that Boerckel applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal process.").

In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'"opportunity to pass upon and correct" alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a

...