Baker v. Chemours Co. FC

855 S.E.2d 344

Kimberly A. BAKER, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

v.The CHEMOURS COMPANY FC, LLC, A Delaware Limited Liability Company, Shawn Busch, and Kevin Crislip, Defendants Below, Respondents

No. 19-0906

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: January 12, 2021

Filed: February 25, 2021

Walt Auvil, Esq., Kirk Auvil, Esq., The Employment Law Center, PLLC, Parkersburg, West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioner.

Eric W. Iskra, Esq., Samuel M. Brock, III, Esq., Ellen J. Vance, Esq., Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondents.

WOOTON, Justice:

In the proceedings below, Kimberly A. Baker ("the petitioner"), a long-time employee of The Chemours Company FC, LLC ("Chemours"),¹ filed suit against the company, Shawn Busch, and Kevin Crislip (collectively "the respondents") in the Circuit Court of Wood County, alleging claims of "failure to accommodate – gender discrimination," "hostile work environment – gender discrimination," and retaliation. The complaint was dismissed by the circuit court on the ground that the petitioner's claims were res judicata, as they could have been raised in an earlier lawsuit between the same parties. The petitioner argues that although the claims arose during the pendency of the earlier proceeding, she was foreclosed from raising them because the deadline for amendments to the pleadings had passed. The petitioner also argues that the claims are different from those alleged in the earlier lawsuit and would require different evidence. In contrast, the respondents contend that the petitioner could have, and should have, moved to amend the scheduling order in the earlier proceeding to extend the deadline for amendments, and that the new claims were of a type that could have been litigated in the earlier proceeding.

We have analyzed the facts and the parties’ legal arguments under our considerable body of case law, which stretches back more than a century, and upon careful review of the briefs, oral arguments, and the appendix record, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

On March 8, 2017, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Wood County against respondent Chemours ("Baker I "), alleging "hostile environment-gender harassment," gender discrimination, and retaliation. These claims were brought pursuant to the West Virginia Human Rights Act, West Virginia Code §§ 5-11-1 to 20 (2018). The petitioner subsequently amended her complaint to dismiss the hostile environment claim, and to add Jay Starcher and respondent Shawn Busch, her supervisors, as parties alleged to have aided and abetted the acts of discrimination and retaliation.

During the pendency of Baker I , the court entered a scheduling order that, among other deadlines, established a deadline of September 15, 2017, to amend any pleading. Thereafter, in November, 2017, certain provisions in the scheduling order were amended by agreement of the parties, including the discovery cut-off, which was extended to October 14, 2018, and the trial, which was set to be held on December 4, 2018. Neither at this time nor at any other time did the petitioner seek to extend the deadline for amendment of her complaint, despite the fact that alleged acts of harassment and discrimination were ongoing through 2017, and as late as July, 2018.

On October 5, 2018, two months prior to the scheduled trial date of December 4, 2018, respondents Chemours and Bush, as well as Jay Starcher, filed a motion for summary judgment in Baker I. The petitioner filed a response in which she raised new claims of discrimination and harassment which had occurred between 2017 and July, 2018; at least some of these new claims had been developed during the course of discovery, but none were ever added to the lawsuit in an amended complaint.² By order entered December 6, 2018, the circuit court granted the respondents’ motion for summary judgment, refusing to consider the new claims in making its determination:

iii. Plaintiff's claims are limited to those stated by her in her Amended Complaint and the court would not consider additional allegations and/or claims which are outside the scope of those raised in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for purposes of ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Conclusion:

iv. A plaintiff's claims are limited to those asserted in the complaint and it is improper for plaintiff to attempt to raise new theories and/or new claims in response to summary judgment.

Significantly, the petitioner did not appeal from the court's judgment, and thus did not challenge the court's refusal to consider the new claims and evidence in the Baker I litigation.³ Instead, on July 9, 2019, the petitioner filed the instant action, ("Baker II "), against respondents Chemours, Bush, and Crislip, the latter having replaced Jay Starcher as one of the petitioner's supervisors while Baker I was pending.⁴ The causes of action asserted in Baker II were "failure to accommodate – gender discrimination," "hostile work environment – gender discrimination," and retaliation. In particular, the petitioner claimed that despite her known physical impairment, the respondents failed to accommodate her by assigning her to light duty, although such duty was available; that the respondents failed to do anything about the taunts and insults from co-workers which the petitioner endured on a daily basis; and that the respondents refused to consider her applications for different jobs within the workplace, instead promoting men with less seniority to those positions.

It is undisputed that all of the claims in Baker II , having allegedly occurred throughout 2017 and up through July, 2018, arose prior to the discovery cutoff date in Baker I , October 15, 2018. For this reason, the circuit court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss, finding that the claims could have been raised in Baker I and were thus res judicata. This ruling is the basis for the petitioner's appeal.

II. Standard of Review

" ‘Appellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo. ’ Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc. , 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995)." Syl. Pt. 1, Barber v. Camden Clark Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 240 W. Va. 663, 815 S.E.2d 474 (2018). See also Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) ("Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.").

III. Discussion

The petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in its conclusion that res judicata barred litigation of the Baker II claims for three reasons: first, the claims of failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, and retaliation, were different from the claims raised in Baker I in that the specific acts alleged rested upon different evidentiary bases; second, the parties in Baker I and Baker II were different because Jay Starcher was not a party to Baker II and respondent Crislip was not a party to Baker I ; and third, the petitioner could not have litigated the Baker II claims in Baker I , because amendment of her complaint to include those claims was precluded by the deadline set forth in the scheduling order. We address these contentions in turn.

This Court has consistently stated that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is based on a recognized public policy to quiet litigation and on a desire that individuals should not be forced to litigate an issue more than once." White v. SWCC , 164 W. Va. 284, 289, 262 S.E.2d 752, 756 (1980) (citing Marguerite Coal Co. v. Meadow River Lumber Co. , 98 W. Va. 698, 127 S.E. 644 (1925) ); see also Conley v. Spillers , 171 W. Va. 584, 588, 301 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1983) (res judicata seeks "to prevent a person from being ‘twice vexed for one and the same cause[.]’ ") (quoting State ex rel. Connellsville By-Product Coal Co. v. Cont'l Coal Co. , 117 W. Va. 447, 449, 186 S.E. 119, 120 (1936) ). Although acknowledging that the term res judicata has been modernized and is now frequently referred to as claim preclusion, this Court recently recognized that its function has not changed: it " ‘prohibits "splitting" a claim or cause of action. Claims that could have been raised by a prevailing party in the first action are merged into, and are thus barred by, the first judgment.’ " Bison Ints., LLC v. Antero Res. Corp. , ––– W. Va. ––––, 854 S.E.2d 211, 218 (2020) (quoting Chesterfield Vill., Inc. v. City of Chesterfield , 64 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Mo. 2002) ).

The lodestar principles governing application of the doctrine of res judicata were set forth in syllabus point one of Sayre's Adm'r v. Harpold , 33 W. Va. 553, 11 S.E. 16 (1890) :

An adjudication by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties is final and conclusive, not only as to the matters actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated as incident thereto and coming within the legitimate purview of the subject-matter of the action. It is not essential that the matter should have been formally put in issue in a former suit, but it is sufficient that the status of the suit was such that the parties might have had the matter disposed of on its merits. An erroneous ruling of the court will not prevent the matter from being res judicata. "

Sayre's , 33 W. Va. at 553, 11 S.E. at 16.⁵ Thereafter, in syllabus point 4 of Blake v. Charleston Area Medical Center., Inc. , 201 W. Va. 469, 498 S.E.2d 41 (1997), this Court synthesized many of its post- Sayre ’s precedents and established a three-part test for determining whether res judicata bars a cause of action:

Before the prosecution of a lawsuit may be barred on the basis of res judicata , three elements must be satisfied. First, there must have been a final adjudication on the merits in the prior action by a court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.

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