Baker v. City of N.Y.

551 F.Supp.3d 258

Aliyah BAKER, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

19 Civ. 8141 (AKH)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed July 28, 2021

Julia P. Kuan, Romano and Kuan, PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Brian Hannigan Zapert, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants City of New York, Brian Hinton, James Tibbal, Miraglos Torres, Shrpresa Tulovic, Joseph Licata.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, U.S.D.J.:

In August 2019, Plaintiff Aliyah Baker ("Plaintiff") brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against five police officers and the City of New York (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging various constitutional and state law violations stemming from her arrest in June 2018. Defendants now move for partial summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See ECF No. 41. Plaintiff opposes and seeks to amend her complaint for a second time under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See ECF Nos. 44, 45. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend is denied.

BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff Aliyah Baker and her husband, Darnell Dover, reside in an apartment on West 135th Street in Manhattan ("Apartment"). Pl. 56.1 (ECF No. 46-1), at ¶ 8. On the evening of June 1, 2018, while on duty as patrol officers, Defendants Joseph Licata and Shpresa Tulovic received a dispatch message informing them of a domestic incident in the Apartment. Id. at ¶ 9. Defendants Licata and Tulovic responded and, upon their arrival, found Mr. Dover in the hallway outside of the Apartment. Id. at ¶ 12. Mr. Dover told Defendants Licata and Tulovic that his key did not work, and he did not know why. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Dover could not enter the Apartment because he was intoxicated and lacked the dexterity to unlock the door. Id. at ¶¶ 57, 60. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that Plaintiff locked Mr. Diver out of the Apartment following an earlier quarrel. Def. 56.1 (ECF No. 41-3), at ¶¶ 13–14. At the scene, Defendants Licata and Tulovic prepared a complaint report ("Complaint Report") and domestic incident report ("Domestic Incident Report"), charging Plaintiff with illegal eviction in violation of Section 26-521(a)(3) of the New York City Administrative Code. Pl. 56.1, at ¶¶ 16, 19. The completed Complaint Report and Domestic Incident Report were referred to the 32nd Precinct for further handling. Id. at ¶ 20.

Two evenings later, Defendants Licata and Tulovic, along with three other police officers from the 32nd Precinct, Defendants Brian Hinton, Milagros Torres, and James Tibbal, returned to the Apartment pursuant to an investigation card. Id. at ¶ 65. After the five officers arrived at the Apartment, they pushed aside Mr. Dover and proceeded to enter Plaintiff's bedroom. Id. at ¶¶ 65–66. Defendant Licata informed Plaintiff that she was under arrest for illegal eviction. Id. at ¶ 35. Before anyone touched her, Plaintiff told the officers that she had an injured shoulder and could not be handcuffed behind her back. Id. at 76. Nonetheless, Defendants Licata and Hinton removed Plaintiff from her bed, turned her around, put her against the window, and handcuffed her behind her back. Id. at ¶¶ 69–70. Plaintiff did not resist the arrest, id. at ¶ 71, and again complained about her pre-existing shoulder injury, id. at ¶ 77. When Defendant Licata grabbed Plaintiff's right arm to handcuff her, she said "ouch, you are hurting my arm." Id. at ¶ 72. Plaintiff was walked out of the Apartment by Defendant Tulovic. Id. at 78. After Plaintiff reached the lobby downstairs, she told the officers that the handcuffs were too tight and her arm was hurting. Id. at 79. The officers did not loosen the handcuffs, and Defendant Licata kept pulling Plaintiff's arm up behind her back. Id. at 79.

Plaintiff spent the night in custody and was arraigned the following day. Id. at 80. She was released on her own recognizance and ordered to reappear in court on July 9, 2018. Id. On July 9, 2018, before Plaintiff arrived in the courtroom, the criminal complaint against Plaintiff was dismissed. Id. at 81.

This litigation ensued. Plaintiff filed a complaint ("Complaint") on August 30, 2019, and an amended complaint ("Amended Complaint") on October 17, 2019, alleging, among other things, claims of excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. See Compl. (ECF Nos. 1), Am. Compl. (ECF No. 14). On January 8, 2021, Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on, (i) Plaintiff's excessive force and failure to intervene claims against all Defendants, (ii) false arrest claim against Defendants Hinton, Torres, and Tibbal, (iii) federal malicious prosecution claim against all Defendants, (iv) state law malicious prosecution claim against all Defendants except for Defendant Licata, (v) assault and battery claims against all Defendants, and (vi) negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision claim against Defendant City of New York ("City"). See generally Def. Br. (ECF No. 41). In her opposition, Plaintiff concedes dismissal of her federal and state law false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against Defendants Hinton, Torres, and Tibbal, as well as her state law negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision claim against the City. See Opp'n. Br. (ECF No. 45). On January 12, 2021, four days after Defendants filed their summary judgment motion, Plaintiff also moved to amend her Amended Complaint primarily to add an additional defendant. See ECF No. 44.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of pointing out evidence in the record, "which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact ...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant may support an assertion that there is no genuine dispute of any material fact by "showing ... that [the] adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the movant fulfills its preliminary burden, the onus shifts to the non-movant to raise the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A genuine dispute of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In making this determination, a court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor, and may grant summary judgment only when no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party." Allen v. Coughlin , 64 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "[I]f there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving party," summary judgment must be denied. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon , 310 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2002). Importantly, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," nor is it to determine a witness's credibility. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rather, "the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION

There are five issues of contention before the Court.² The parties dispute whether summary judgment is appropriate as to (i) Plaintiff's excessive force and failure to intervene claims against all Defendants, (ii) state law assault and battery claims against all Defendants, (iii) federal malicious prosecution claim against Defendants Licata and Tulovic, and (iv) state law malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Tulovic. The parties also dispute whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to further amend her complaint at this juncture. The Court discusses these five issues in turn.

I. Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Licata, Hinton, and Tulovic violated her constitutional rights by using excessive force in "grabbing, pinning, pulling, and handcuffing" her during the arrest.³ Am. Compl. ¶ 48. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants Torres and Tibbal violated her constitutional rights by failing to intervene in other Defendants’ use of excessive force. See id. at ¶ 49. As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff "cannot rely upon another witness where it contradicts her own version of events" to survive summary judgment. Reply Br. (ECF No. 47), at 6 (citing Evans v. Stephens , 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Defendants’ approach, however, is contrary to how a court should appraise evidence proffered by a non-movant on summary judgment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that, on summary judgment, a court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). This rule suggests that a court must consider "any testimony—whether from the plaintiff, the defendant, or a non-party—that forms the version of events most favorable to the non-moving party." Snead v. City of New York , 463 F. Supp. 3d 386, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Defendants’ approach instead urges the Court to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter." A...