Baker v. Nutrien AG Sols.

1

LISA BAKER, Plaintiff, v. NUTRIEN AG SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-01490-DAD-SKO

United States District Court, E.D. California

August 5, 2022

ORDER DENYING PLAINIFF' S MOTION TO REMAND AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NOS. 14 19)

This matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by defendants on November 10, 2021, and the motion to remand this action to the Merced County Superior Court filed by plaintiff on November 16, 2021.^[1] (Doc. Nos. 14, 19.) Pursuant to General Order No. 617 addressing the public health emergency posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, both motions were taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. No. 18.)

For the reasons explained below, the court will deny plaintiff's motion to remand and deny defendants' motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint in the Merced County Superior Court on August 24, 2021. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Therein plaintiff asserted a single cause of action for negligence against defendant Nutrien Ag Solutions, Inc. (“Nutrien”). (Doc. No. 1-2 at 8.) Defendant Nutrien removed the action to this federal court on October 6, 2021 based on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) On October 27, 2021, plaintiff filed her operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) in this action. (Doc No. 11.) Therein, plaintiff asserts the same negligence claim, however she now asserts that claim against both defendant Nutrien and newly-added defendant R. Daniel Robinson, a Nutrien employee. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges as follows in her FAC.

Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at the intersection of East Harmon Road and Highway 152 in El Nido, California. (Id. at ¶ 6.) In or around 2017, plaintiff planted approximately ninety-eight acres of alfalfa crop on her property. (Id.) Throughout the following years plaintiff cultivated and harvested that alfalfa. (Id.) In or around September 2020, defendant Robinson met with plaintiff at her property, where it was “obvious and apparent” that alfalfa was being grown. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Robinson's purpose in visiting plaintiff's property was to solicit plaintiff's business. (Id.) Robinson gave plaintiff his business card, which identified him as a “Crop Advisor” employed by defendant Nutrien. (Id.) Before leaving plaintiff's property, defendant Robinson told plaintiff to call him if plaintiff ever needed anything. (Id.)

On October 5, 2020, defendant Robinson followed up with plaintiff by sending her a text message stating that he had recently driven by plaintiff's property again and observed employees working on the property. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Defendant Robinson also texted plaintiff the following: “Let me know if you need anything, soil audits/post harvest amendments or advice, fert, seed, fume, chemicals, ya da ya da ya da.. I do pretty much everything ha.” (Id.) Defendant Robinson's representations to plaintiff led her to believe that he was a knowledgeable and experienced crop advisor. (Id. at ¶ 9.) As a result of those representations and efforts to solicit business, plaintiff began purchasing agricultural products from Nutrien through Robinson. (Id.)

In or around February 2021, plaintiff consulted with Daniel Boyd-a licensed agricultural pest control advisor-regarding plaintiff's alfalfa crop. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Boyd recommended that plaintiff apply several products to her alfalfa crop, including fifteen gallons of “Butyrac 200.” (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently contacted defendant Robinson and requested prices for various items, including the Butyrac 200 that Boyd had recommended to her. (Id. at ¶ 11.) On February 19, 2021, plaintiff sent Robinson a text asking if he had price quotes for the items plaintiff had requested. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Robinson responded to plaintiff's inquiry with the following:

Morning Lisa, still waiting on a price for Raptor

Saber (butyrate) $18.90/gal

MSO/leci (slammer) $19.32/gal

Li 700 (contain) $22.75/gal

(Id. at ¶ 12) (emphasis added). Plaintiff responded to defendant Robinson's text with the following message:

Hi Daniel [Robinson] here's my order

Liquid ams 3 gal

Butyrac 200 15 gal

Raptor 2.5 gal

Contain 1.5 gal

(Id.) (emphasis added). Notably, plaintiff's text did not list Saber or butyrate in her order, though she did include “Butyrac 200.” Nevertheless, in response to plaintiff's order, defendant Robinson delivered fifteen gallons of Saber (butyrate) to plaintiff on February 24, 2021 instead of 15 gallons of Butyrac 200. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Based on defendant Robinson's representations, statements, and text messages, plaintiff assumed that Saber (butyrate) and Butyrac 200 were interchangeable, and that the Saber delivered to her by Robinson on behalf of Nutrien could thus be safely applied to her alfalfa crop. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff therefore applied the Saber chemicals to her alfalfa, which resulted in the destruction of the entire crop shortly thereafter. (Id. at ¶ 15.)

In or around March 2021, plaintiff met with Boyd, defendant Robinson, and plaintiff's foreman. (Id. at ¶ 16.) During this meeting, Boyd inquired if the Butyrac 200 had been applied to the alfalfa crop. (Id.) Plaintiff responded that she had ordered Butyrac 200 from Robinson, but that Saber had been delivered instead. (Id.) During this exchange, defendant Robinson reviewed his prior invoices and text messages with plaintiff, realized that he had sent Saber instead of Butyrac 200, and stated “Oh shit, I screwed up. I sent you Saber instead of Butyrac.” (Id.)

On November 10, 2021, defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, arguing that plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a cognizable negligence claim against them. (Doc. No. 14.) On November 16, 2021, plaintiff filed her motion to remand this action back to the Merced County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 19.) On December 6, 2021, plaintiff filed her opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, and on December 7, 2021, defendants filed their opposition to plaintiff's motion to remand. (Doc. Nos. 20, 21.) On December 13, 2021, plaintiff filed her reply in support of her motion to remand, and on December 14, 2021, defendants filed their reply in support of their motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 22, 23.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Remand

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Smith v. Mylan, Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014); Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997). “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”). As such, a federal court must reject jurisdiction and remand the case to state court if there is any doubt as to the right of removal. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004). A defendant seeking removal of an action from state court bears the burden of establishing grounds for federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Motion to Dismiss

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm 'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983).

“Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Though Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand

In her pending motion to remand, plaintiff argues that although this court had diversity jurisdiction over this action at the time of removal, her subsequent addition of defendant Robinson in her FAC divests this court of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because plaintiff and defendant Robinson are both citizens of California. (Doc. No. 19-1 at 6.)

In their opposition to plaintiff's motion, defendants argue that the court should “scrutinize the propriety of Plaintiff's attempted diversity destroying amendment under...