Baker v. Penn State Health Holy

1

HOLLY BAKER, Plaintiff v. PENN STATE HEALTH HOLY, SPIRIT MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:23-CV-1696

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

May 8, 2024

MEMORANDUM

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Holy Baker brings this suit against her employer, defendant Penn State Health Holy Spirit Medical Center (“Holy Spirit”), for alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Holy Spirit now moves to dismiss Baker's amended complaint pursuant to F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. We will deny Holy Spirit's motion.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Baker began working for Holy Spirit as an ultrasound technician in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, in late 2020. (See Doc. 16 ¶¶ 6, 13). She suffered an injury to her wrist while performing an ultrasound in April 2021, for which she underwent surgery that December. (See id. ¶ 14). Holy Spirit initially accommodated the physical restrictions placed upon Baker by her physician by moving her to a “light duty” greeter position. (See id. ¶ 16). In June 2022, however, Holy Spirit informed Baker that the greeter position was no longer available because a full-time greeter had been hired, so she would have to start using her 12 weeks of FMLA leave. (See id. ¶¶ 17, 21, 23).^[1]Baker inquired about other light-duty positions, but she was told none were available. (See id. ¶ 18). She also claims she “applied for intermittent FMLA leave” at some point “in order to care for a family member,” and that her intermittent leave “was ongoing” at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit. (See id. ¶ 25).

Baker asserts that Holy Spirit needlessly “forced” her to take continuous FMLA leave even though her replacement as greeter left after one week and despite the availability of other light-duty positions for which she was qualified and capable of performing, including roles as pre-certification associate, call center scheduler, and unit desk clerk. (See id. ¶¶ 20-22, 24, 26-27). She believes that Holy Spirit interfered with her ability to use intermittent leave “for the treatment of her family member” by requiring her to take continuous leave. (See id. ¶ 25). Holy Spirit terminated Baker in September 2022 as she “approached exhaustion of her FMLA leave” without first attempting to accommodate her disability. (See id. ¶¶ 28-30). In January 2023, Holy Spirit attributed Baker's termination to “a technical error that had been corrected.” (See id. ¶ 31). Baker describes this correction as functionally “meaningless” because she received no compensation or benefits for her time out of work. (See id. ¶¶ 32-33).

Baker filed a dual charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Pennsylvania's Human Relations Commission; she received her right-to-sue notice from the EEOC in July 2023. (See Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 12 n.1). She commenced this lawsuit in October 2023 and subsequently filed an amended complaint alleging interference and retaliation under the FMLA (Count I) and disability discrimination under the ADA (Count II).^[2]Holy Spirit filed the instant motion on the grounds that the amended complaint does not state a plausible claim for relief. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

Holy Spirit argues that Baker has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted relative to all three of the causes of action in her amended complaint. (See Doc. 21 at 5-13). We address these arguments seriatim.

A. FMLA Claims

The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to 12 weeks' leave during any 12-month period for various reasons, including-but not limited to-the employee's own serious health condition (if it renders them unable to perform the functions of their role) or that of a close family member for whom the employee must provide care. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), (b)(1). An employee may take continuous or intermittent leave, see id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(a)-though “what qualifies as intermittent leave versus continuous leave” is not entirely clear from the statute and accompanying regulations, see Price v. Int'l. Paper Co., No. 21-30220, 2022 WL 729430, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2022) (per curiam) (nonprecedential). The FMLA provides for two causes of action: (1) one applies to allegations that an employer interfered with, denied, or restrained the exercise or attempted exercise of rights afforded by the statute, and (2) the other covers allegations that an employer retaliated against an employee for exercising those rights. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2); Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 2012)). Holy Spirit argues that Baker has failed to plead that she was denied benefits under the FMLA to support her interference claim, (see Doc. 21 at 6-7), and that both claims rest upon unpled facts, (see Doc. 24 at 3-4).^[3]We disagree.

1. Interference

Baker's FMLA interference claim requires her to plausibly allege that: (1) she was an eligible employee under the FMLA, (2) Holy Spirit was an employer subject to the Act, (3) she was entitled to leave, (4) she gave notice of her intention to take leave, and (5) she was denied benefits lawfully owed to her. See Ross, 755 F.3d at 191-92. Holy Spirit contests only the last of these elements. (See Doc. 6-7). It argues that the amended complaint is “devoid of any factual allegation that [it] actually denied her FMLA benefits” because Baker received all the leave to which she was entitled and she did not need to take intermittent leave while on continuous leave. (See id.) (emphasis in original).

Courts considering claims akin to Baker's have found charges of FMLA interference to be cognizable on the sole basis that an employer placed an employee on continuous leave instead of available intermittent leave against their wishes. In Brown v. Gestamp of Alabama, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-1862, 2018 WL 3455687 (N.D. Ala. July 18, 2018), for example, an employer denied an employee's recertification of intermittent leave and instead placed him on continuous leave. See Brown, 2018 WL 3455687, at *6. The district court rejected the employer's argument that it could substitute one type of leave for the other without running afoul of the statute as follows:

By placing Mr. Brown on continuous FMLA leave, Gestamp necessarily denied Mr. Brown's concurrent request for intermittent leave. The nature of continuous leave pretermits an employee's ability to take intermittent leave. Gestamp's decision to place Mr. Brown on continuous leave meant that he could not use the intermittent leave he requested.

Id. (emphasis in original). Other courts similarly have entertained compulsory-continuous-leave claims. See Cooke v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., No. 20-14604, 2022 WL 17730393, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 16, 2022) (per curiam) (reversing grant of summary judgment and remanding for factual determination whether unilateral decision to put employee on continuous leave instead of requested intermittent leave constituted interference); Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 478 F.Supp.2d 933, 941 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (explaining that employer's grant of “block leave is immaterial to whether it initially interfered with plaintiff's FMLA...