Baker v. St.-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.

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MICHELE BAKER, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS CORP., et al., Defendants.

No. 1:16-CV-0917 (LEK/DJS)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

March 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE E. KAHN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Michele Baker; Charles Carr; Angela Corbett; Pamela Forrest Michael Hickey, individually and as parent and natural guardian of O.H., infant; Kathleen Main-Lingener; Kristin Miller, as parent and guardian of K.M., infant; Jennifer Plouffe; Silvia Potter, individually and as parent and natural guardian of C.P., infant; and Daniel Schuttig, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought a putative class action against Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. (“Saint-Gobain”); Honeywell International, Inc. (“Honeywell”), formerly known as Allied-Signal, Inc. (“Allied-Signal”) or AlliedSignal Laminate Systems, Inc. (“AlliedSignal Laminate”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. (“DuPont”); and 3M Co. (“3M”). Dkt. No. 171 (“Second Amended Complaint”). After the Court approved a Settlement Agreement between Saint-Gobain, Honeywell, 3M, and Plaintiffs, Dkt. No. 316 (“Settlement Agreement”), DuPont remained the sole Defendant in this case.

On September 30, 2022, the Court issued a Memorandum-Decision and Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Dkt. No. 145 (“Motion to Certify Class”), in this case against DuPont, Dkt. No. 324 (“September 2022 Order”). Specifically, in the September 2022 Order, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class with respect to: (1) the PFOA Invasion Injury Class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2); both (2) the Municipal Water Property Damage Class and (3) the Private Well Water Property Damage Class pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3); and (4) the Nuisance Damage Class pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(c)(4). September 2022 Order at 56.

On October 12, 2022, DuPont filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 2022 Order. Dkt. No. 327 (“Motion for Reconsideration”). Then, on October 14, 2022, DuPont filed a motion for leave to appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pursuant to Rule 23(f). See generally Case No. 22-2616 (2d Cir.).^[1] Subsequently, on October 18, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their combined opposition to DuPont's Motion for Reconsideration and cross-motion to file a Third Amended Master Consolidated Complaint. Dkt. Nos. 331 (“Cross-Motion”), 331-1 (“Proposed Third Amended Master Consolidated Complaint (Redlined Copy)”), 331-2 (“Proposed Third Amended Master Consolidated Complaint (Clean Copy)”). Thereafter, on October 25, 2022, DuPont filed a document purporting to be a combined reply to the Motion for Reconsideration and opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion. Dkt. No. 332 (“First Combined Reply and Opposition”). However, this document appears to be a copy of DuPont's Motion for Reconsideration. Compare Mot. for Recons., with First Combined Reply and Opp'n. The next day, on October 26, 2022, DuPont filed a corrected combined reply and opposition. Dkt. No. 333 (“Second Combined Reply and Opposition”). Several days later, on November 2, 2022, DuPont filed a notice of withdrawal of its Motion for Reconsideration, but stated that “DuPont continues to oppose Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Leave to Amend for the reasons set forth in DuPont's Reply in Support of [i]ts Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross Motion [f]or Leave [t]o Amend.” Dkt. No. 336 at 1 (“Notice of Withdrawal of Motion”) (citations omitted). On January 31, 2023, the Second Circuit issued a mandate denying DuPont's Rule 23(f) petition stating that “an immediate appeal is not warranted.” Dkt. No. 345.

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion to file a Third Amended Master Consolidated Complaint is granted. Additionally, for the reasons stated below, the Court issues a conditional order sua sponte decertifying the Nuisance Damage Class contingent on Plaintiffs' filing of the Third Amended Master Consolidated Complaint with the Court.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' factual allegations were detailed in the September 2022 Order, familiarity with which is assumed. September 2022 Order at 2-3. A description of the PFOA Invasion Injury Class, the Municipal Water Property Damage Class, the Private Well Water Property Damage Class, and the Nuisance Damage Class was set forth in the September 2022 Order, familiarity with which is assumed. September 2022 Order at 3-4.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2): “[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).^[2] “Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a liberal policy in favor of allowing amendments.” Warboys v. Proulx, 303 F.Supp.2d 111, 115 (D. Conn. 2004). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has “upheld Rule 15(a)(2)'s ‘liberal standard' as ‘consistent with [its] strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits.” Attestor Value Master Fund v. Republic of Arg., 940 F.3d 825, 833 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3. Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Secs., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 190 (2d Cir. 2015)).

“In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowing the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.'” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.” Id. “The party opposing amendment bears the burden of demonstrating good reason for denial.” Cook v. City of New York, 243 F.Supp.3d 332, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of DuPont's Second Combined Reply and Opposition

Local Rule 7.1(c) sets forth the requirements for filings with respect to cross-motions. See L.R. 7.1(c). The relevant portion of Local Rule 7.1(c) states: “The original moving party must file its reply/opposition papers with the Court and serve them on the other parties not more than SEVEN DAYS after service of the cross-motion/opposition to motion.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Here, Plaintiffs filed their Cross-Motion on October 18, 2022. See generally Cross-Mot. Accordingly, the deadline for DuPont to file its combined reply and opposition papers was October 25, 2022. While DuPont filed a filed a document purporting to be a combined reply and opposition on October 25, 2022, this document appears to be a copy of DuPont's Motion for Reconsideration. See generally First Combined Reply and Opp'n. Thus, when DuPont filed a corrected combined reply and opposition on October 26, 2022, this was untimely because it did not fall within the seven-day deadline set in Local Rule 7.1(c). See generally Second Combined Reply and Opp'n. Nevertheless, the Court will consider DuPont's Second Combined Reply and Opposition in light of the fact that “the district court has the inherent power to decide when a departure from its Local Rules should be excused or overlooked.” Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters., Inc., 932 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1991).

B. DuPont's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion

In the Second Combined Reply and Opposition, DuPont argues that Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion seeking to file a Third Amended Master Consolidated Complaint “following certification of various classes-would unfairly prejudice DuPont.” Second Combined Reply and Opp'n at 2.^[3] While DuPont offers various objections to the proposed Third Amended Master Consolidated Complaint, DuPont's main objection to the proposed amended complaint is that Plaintiffs are “deleting substantive allegations on which the Court relied concerning other defendants-while simultaneously pursuing previously certified classes.” Second Combined Reply and Opp'n at 8.

“Although ‘[p]rejudice to the opposing party . . . has been described as the most important reason for denying a motion to amend,' only undue prejudice warrants denial of leave to amend.” Agerbrink v. Model Serv. LLC, 155 F.Supp.3d 448, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Frenkel v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 611 F.Supp.2d 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also A.V. by Versace, Inc. v. Gianni Versace, S.p.A., 87 F.Supp.2d 281, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[P]rejudice alone is insufficient to justify a denial of leave to amend; rather, the necessary showing is ‘undue prejudice to the opposing party.'” (emphasis in original) (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182)). “[T]he non-moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that ‘substantial prejudice would result if the proposed amendment were granted.'” Cook, 243 F.Supp.3d at 355 (quoting Agerbrink, 155 F.Supp.3d at 454).

“In determining what constitutes undue prejudice, courts ‘generally consider whether the assertion of the new claim or defense would (i) require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction.'” Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 199 F.R.D....