Baker v. United Parcel Serv. Inc.

596 F.Supp.3d 1251

Justin BAKER, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., Defendant.

No. 2:21-cv-00114-SMJ

United States District Court, E.D. Washington.

Signed March 31, 2022

Matthew Z. Crotty, Crotty & Son Law Firm PLLC, Spokane, WA, Thomas G. Jarrard, Law Office of Thomas G. Jarrard, Spokane, WA, Michael J. Scimone, Pro Hac Vice, Outten & Golden LLP, New York, NY, Robert Joseph Barton, Pro Hac Vice, Block & Leviton LLP, Washington, DC, Peter Romer-Friedman, Pro Hac Vice, Robert D. Friedman, Pro Hac Vice, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Sally W. Harmeling, Jacob M. Knutson, Jeffers Danielson Sonn & Aylward PS, Wenatchee, WA, Dominic E. Draye, Pro Hac Vice, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Phoenix, AZ, James Milton Nelson, Greenberg Traurig, Sacramento, CA, Naomi Beer, Pro Hac Vice, Naomi Beer, Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

SALVADOR MENDOZA, JR., United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26. After review of the file and hearing oral argument from the parties, the Court is fully informed and denies the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a full-time driver for UPS. ECF No. 16 at 5. He has worked for UPS since approximately June 18, 2007. Id. He has also served in the Army Reserve since 2014. Id. Since 2015, Plaintiff has taken annual short-term leave from UPS to engage in qualified military service with the Army Reserve. Id. UPS does not compensate Plaintiff for this leave. Id. at 3. However, UPS provides paid leave to its employees who take jury duty leave, bereavement leave, and sick leave. Id. Plaintiff alleges that failing to similarly compensate those who take military leave violates the protections set out in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 ("USERRA"). Id. Plaintiff sues United Parcel Service, Inc., an Ohio Corporation ("UPS Ohio"), and United Parcel Service, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("UPS Delaware"). Id. at 1. UPS Ohio is a subsidiary of UPS Delaware, a holding company. Id. at 16. Plaintiff sues on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated servicemember employees who took military leave that lasted 14 days or less ("short-term military leave"), seeking (1) a declaration that UPS violated USERRA by failing to pay class members during short-term military leave, (2) an order for UPS to pay employees for such leave in the future, and (3) an order for back pay. Id. at 1.

Now, Defendants move to dismiss the claims, arguing (1) USERRA's text, statutory purpose, and legislative history do not support an argument for payment of ordinary wages where no work is performed, (2) military leave is not comparable to the other forms of leave provided by UPS, and (3) UPS Delaware does not employ Plaintiff. ECF No. 26.

* * *

Two of USERRA's provisions are at issue: Section 4316(b)(1), which entitles employees taking military leave to the "other rights and benefits" their employers give to employees taking similar kinds of leave; and Section 4303(2), which defines those "other rights and benefits." Section 4316(b)(1) provides:

[A] person who is absent from a position of employment by reason of service in the uniformed services shall be—

(A) deemed to be on furlough or leave of absence while performing such service; and

(B) entitled to such other rights and benefits not determined by seniority as are generally provided by the employer of the person to employees having similar seniority, status, and pay who are on furlough or leave of absence under a contract, agreement, policy, practice, or plan in effect at the commencement of such service or established while such person performs such service.

38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1). Section 4303(2) defines "rights and benefits":

The term "benefit", "benefit of employment", or "rights and benefits" means the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, including any advantage, profit, privilege, gain, status, account, or interest (including wages or salary for work performed) that accrues by reason of an employment contract or agreement or an employer policy, plan, or practice and includes rights and benefits under a pension plan, a health plan, an employee stock ownership plan, insurance coverage and awards, bonuses, severance pay, supplemental unemployment benefits, vacations, and the opportunity to select work hours or location of employment.

Finally, the Department of Labor has promulgated final regulations, after notice and comment, that implement USERRA. See 38 U.S.C. § 4331(a). The regulation most relevant here provides:

If the non-seniority benefits to which employees on furlough or leave of absence are entitled vary according to the type of leave, the employee must be given the most favorable treatment accorded to any comparable form of leave when he or she performs service in the uniformed services. In order to determine whether any two types of leave are comparable, the duration of the leave may be the most significant factor to compare. For instance, a two-day funeral leave will not be "comparable" to an extended leave for service in the uniformed service. In addition to comparing the duration of the absences, other factors such as the purpose of the leave and the ability of the employee to choose when to take the leave should also be considered.

20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(b).

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must dismiss the complaint if it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles , 648 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the Court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). But the Court may disregard legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. See id.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must contain "some viable legal theory" and provide "fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Thus, the complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Facial plausibility exists where the complaint pleads facts permitting a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not require probability but demands more than a mere possibility of liability. Id. While the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported only by conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. Whether the complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief is a context-specific inquiry requiring the Court to draw from its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges that UPS Violated USERRA § 4316(b).

USERRA is one of several statutes benefitting veterans. The Court's task is to "interpret the words consistent with their ‘ordinary meaning ... at the time Congress enacted the statute[,]’ " as that is the "fundamental canon of statutory construction." Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070, 2074, 201 L.Ed.2d 490, (2018) (first alteration in original) (quoting Perrin v. United States , 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) ). The Court must "begin and end [its] inquiry with the text." Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010, 197 L.Ed.2d 354 (2017). Still, "the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs. v. Newton , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1888, 204 L.Ed.2d 165 (2019) (quoting Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. , 566 U.S. 93, 101, 132 S.Ct. 1350, 182 L.Ed.2d 341 (2012) ). The Court must also keep in mind that "[b]ecause USERRA was enacted to protect the rights of veterans and members of the uniformed services, it must be broadly construed in favor of its military beneficiaries." Montoya v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff's Dept. , 987 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc. , 452 F.3d 299, 303 (4th Cir. 2006)).

1. Statutory History

USERRA, as detailed more extensively by other courts, was passed in a long tradition of congressional acts attempting to protect American military personnel who performed military service and then returned to their civilian jobs. Travers v. Federal Express Corp. , 8 F.4th 198, 200–01 (3rd Cir. 2021) (recounting the USERRA's statutory predecessors). Briefly, prior to World War II, Congress enacted the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 ("STSA"), requiring all men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six to register for military duty. Pub. L. No. 783, 54 Stat. 885. Along with this registration requirement, the STSA also protected the jobs of those who would soon join the service by requiring employers to restore veterans "to a position of like seniority, status, and pay." Id. § 8(b), (c), 54 Stat. at 890. The STSA also allowed veterans to take military leave and entitled them to "insurance or other benefits offered by the employer ... at the time such person was inducted into such forces[.]" Id. § 8(c), 54 Stat. at 890. In these ways, the STSA advanced the principle that one...