Baker v. Via Christi Regional Medical Center

Page 1040

491 F.Supp.2d 1040

Marcellus H. BAKER, Plaintiff, v. VIA CHRISTI REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.

No. 06-2168-KHV.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

June 13, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Marcellus H. Baker, Sr., Wichita, KS, pro se.

Boyd A. Byers, Sophie K. Counts, Foulston Siefkin LLP, Wichita, KS, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VRATIL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Marcellus H. Baker filed suit against his former employer, Via Christi Regional Medical Center ("Via Christi"), for race discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 73) filed March 19, 2007. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains the motion.

Legal Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir.1993). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A "genuine" factual dispute requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial as to those dispositive matters for which he carries the burden of proof. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party may not rest on his pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241.

"[W]e must view the record in a light most favorable to the parties opposing the motion for summary judgment." Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). Summary judgment may be granted if the nonmoving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial." Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988). Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff does not comply with the local rule which governs the summary judgment process. See Plaintiffs Response To Defendant's Summary Judgment (Doc. # 76) filed April 17, 2007. D. Kan. Rule 56.1 states:

A memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute shall be numbered by paragraph, shall refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the number of movant's fact that is disputed. All material facts set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party.

D. Kan. Rule 56.1. Although plaintiff purports to dispute a number of defendant's statements of material facts, he does not refer with particularity to those portions of the record on which he relies. Pro se litigants should not succumb to summary judgment, however, merely because they fail to comply with technical requirements involved in defending such a motion. See Woods v. Roberts, 47 F.3d 1178 (Table), 1995 WL 65457, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb.17, 1995); Hass v. U.S. Air Force, 848 F.Supp. 926, 929 (D.Kan.1994). The Court has therefore diligently searched plaintiffs brief and the summary judgment record to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist. After a careful review of the record, the Court finds that it must deem all of defendant's facts admitted for purposes of defendant's summary judgment motion. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir.1994).

Facts

Plaintiff is an African-American male. On March 4, 2002, plaintiff completed an application for employment with Via Christi. Plaintiff stated that he "started school" as the reason that he left his employment at Recreation Vehicle Products, Inc. ("RVP"). In fact, RVP had discharged plaintiff on October 19, 2001 because he failed a drug test. In response to the application direction to list all criminal convictions, plaintiff wrote that "over 16 years ago I got in trouble for an assault but have had no trouble with the law since." Plaintiff's Response (Doc. # 76) at 14. In fact, in 1984, plaintiff was convicted of rape and aggravated burglary for which he served nine and one-half years in prison. Plaintiff certified on the application that the information he provided was complete and correct, and that Via Christi could terminate his employment without liability for false statements or omissions on the application.

In March of 2002, Via Christi hired plaintiff as a Patient Care Technician at its St. Francis Campus in Wichita, Kansas. Via Christi was unaware that plaintiff had provided false statements and omitted information on his application with respect to his criminal background and reason for leaving his employment with RVP. Via Christi would not have hired plaintiff if it had known that plaintiff had been convicted of rape and aggravated burglary, that RVP fired him because he failed a drug test or that he provided false statements and omitted material information on his application.

As a new Via Christi employee, plaintiff reviewed the employee handbook which included equal employment opportunity, anti-harassment and conflict resolution polices. The Via Christi anti-harassment policy provides that Via Christi "promote[s] a productive work environment, free of discrimination and inappropriate conduct by any employee ... or any person," and that "[b]ehavior which harasses, disrupts, or interferes with another's work performance or that creates an intimidating, offensive or hostile environment will not be tolerated." The policy further states that Via Christi will promptly investigate any complaint and will take corrective action against any person engaging in conduct in violation of the policy. The policy also provides that employees must cooperate in an investigation. Memorandum In Support Of Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment ("Memorandum In Support") (Doc. # 74), Brogden Decl., Exh. A.

On September 25, 2002, a manager reported to the Via Christi human resources department that some young female employees were having problems with plaintiff. The human resources department conducted an investigation and summarized the witnesses' statements as follows:

— Several female employees reported being uncomfortable around [plaintiff] based on his comments and tone of voice.

— [Plaintiff] was asking a lot of forward questions to three female employees who were between the ages of 18 and 21. Examples included asking one if he could swim in the hot tub at her apartment, and asking another about her fiancée, looking her up and down and commenting that the fiancée was a lucky man.

— [Plaintiff] was persistent about trying to take these young women to lunch. He offered to pay for lunch for one of them in the cafeteria, but she declined. The next time, he paid for her lunch before she got to the register, saying, "It is wrong when a girl has to pay for her own food."

— [Plaintiff] was overly complementary to these young women about their physical appearance, making comments such as "you've got it going on," saying they were "good looking" or "beautiful," and telling one employee he had been watching her since she had been on the floor.

— [A] month earlier the young female relative of a patient had complained to the hospital that [plaintiff] had been staring at her and followed her to the parking lot when she left.

Memorandum In Support (Doc. # 74), Brogden Decl., Exh. B. The human resources department concluded that plaintiff had created an uncomfortable working environment for some co-workers, but that these co-workers had not communicated to plaintiff that his actions and statements made them feel uncomfortable. In early October of 2002, plaintiff's manager spoke with plaintiff about the behaviors that made other employees uncomfortable and set forth behavior expectations.

In the fall of 2002, a co-worker told plaintiff that she had heard other co-workers refer to him as a nigger. Memorandum In Support (Doc. # 74), Plaintiff's Dep. at 53-57, 61. Plaintiff never heard anybody call him or refer to him as a nigger.

In March of 2003, a patient complained that she felt plaintiff was making advances toward her and lingering in her room. A charge nurse discussed the complaint with plaintiff. He said that he was acquainted with...