Baldwin v. U.S. Dep't of Energy

CLARENCE E. BALDWIN, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 18-1872 (EGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

January 23, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), see 5 U.S.C. § 552, against his former employer, the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE" or "defendant"). This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which is granted for the reasons discussed below.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Court grants summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment." Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009) (citations omitted). "Under FOIA, all underlying facts and inferences are analyzed in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester; as such, only after an agency proves that it has fully discharged its FOIA obligations is summary judgment appropriate." Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2014) (citations omitted).

An agency may meet its burden solely on the basis of affidavits or declarations, see Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999), as long as they "describe the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record [or] by evidence of agency bad faith," Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted). The opposing party cannot survive summary judgment with "[m]ere allegations or denials in [his] pleadings[.]" Williams v. Callaghan, 938 F. Supp. 46, 49 (D.D.C. 1996). Rather, he "must come forward with 'specific facts' demonstrating a genuine issue." Saldana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 715 F. Supp. 2d 10, 19 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).

II. DOE'S ASSERTIONS OF FACT ARE CONCEDED

DOE filed its summary judgment motion (ECF No. 17) on April 26, 2019, along with a supporting declaration and Vaughn Index (ECF No. 17-10), among other exhibits. The Court issued an order (ECF No. 18) on April 29, 2019, advising plaintiff of his obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of this Court to respond to the motion. The order specifically warned plaintiff that, if he did not respond by May 29, 2019, the Court would treat DOE's motion as conceded and, if warranted, enter judgment in DOE's favor. Upon review of defendant's Amended Notice of Service (ECF No. 19), the Court issued an order (ECF No. 20) extending plaintiff's opposition deadline to July 26, 2019.

Despite the opportunity provided to plaintiff "to properly address [DOE's] assertion[s] of fact," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), plaintiff has not filed an opposition or other response to DOE's motion. Consequently, the assertions set forth in Defendant's Statement of Material Facts Not As To Which There Is No Genuine Dispute (ECF No. 17-1) and DOE's supporting declaration are undisputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (authorizing court, when non-moving party "fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)," to "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion"); LCvR 7(h)(1) ("In determining a motion for summary judgment, the court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues.").

Nevertheless, "[a] defendant moving for summary judgment must . . . 'discharge the burden the rules place upon [it]: It is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case.'" Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328 (1986) (White, J., concurring)) (additional citation omitted). "The burden that the movant 'always bears' is that of 'informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" Id. at 93-94 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Here, DOE meets its burden.

III. PLAINTIFF'S FOIA REQUEST

Plaintiff began his employment as a Loan Specialist for DOE on February 19, 2017, and he received a Notice of Termination during Probationary Period on January 19, 2018. See Compl., Attach. 2 at 1. Termination would have been effective January 19, 2018 but for plaintiff's resignation on that same date. See id., Ex. 6.

On March 5, 2018, plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to DOE seeking copies of email exchanges he had with seven DOE employees (Robert Marcum, Maher Akladus, Sarika Moudgil, Jeffrey Walker, Woody Stevenson, Sara Prather and Chyness Thompson-Neal) between March 1, 2017 and January 19, 2018. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3; see id., Ex. 1 (FOIA request); see also Def.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 17-2, "Def.'s Mem."), Decl. of Alexander C. Morris (ECF No. 17-3, "Morris Decl.") ¶ 24. In addition, plaintiff sought information about DOE's "budget for training for the loan program office and the loan administrators [f]or . . . fiscal years 2015-2016-2017-2018," and "all task[s] created by Loan [A]dministrator Clarence Baldwin on the following [d]ates[:] August 22-24, 2017[,] October 18, 2017 and January 12, 2018 . . . within the [QuickSilver] system." Compl., Ex. 1. DOE assigned the request a tracking number, HQ-2018-00817-F. Morris Decl. ¶ 8; see id., Ex. B.

IV. DOE's SEARCHES FOR RESPONSIVE RECORDS WERE REASONABLE

An agency "fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents." Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep't of State, 641 F.3d 504, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The agency may submit affidavits or declarations to explain the method and scope of its search, see Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and such affidavits or declarations are "accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents," SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the declarant asserts that "DOE searched all locations likely to contain documents responsive to [p]laintiff's FOIA request." Morris Decl. ¶ 41.

DOE's Office of Public Information ("OPI") is responsible for reviewing and processing FOIA requests to DOE. See id. ¶¶ 3, 14, 25. The declarant explains that DOE's Loan Programs Office ("LPO") and Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer ("HC") were the places where records responsive to plaintiff's FOIA request likely would be found:

17. DOE's decision to search LPO . . . was based on OPI's understanding that Plaintiff was a former LPO employee and Plaintiff's request sought communications between Plaintiff and certain LPO employees listed in [the] FOIA request. Therefore all Plaintiff's communications with those employees and documents related to his work at LPO would be contained within LPO. In addition, the QuickSilver system is a document management system within LPO and information regarding LPO's budget . . . also would be found within LPO's accounting files.

18. DOE's decision to search HC for responsive documents was based on OPI's understanding that two of the custodians listed in Plaintiff's FOIA request were HC employees and any communication between Plaintiff and [these] employees would be contained within HC.

Id. ¶¶ 17-18.

"LPO staff conducted searches of the email accounts of [p]laintiff and the named LPO employees - Robert Marcum, Akladus Maher, Sarika Moudgil, Jeffrey Walker, and Woody Stevenson - to capture any communications to or from Plaintiff and those individuals during the identified date ranges[.]" Id. ¶ 22. In addition, staff searched QuickSilver to locate any tasks created by plaintiff during the date ranges he specified and to locate LPO's budgets from 2014 through 2018. Id. These searches yielded 39 documents. Id.

Similarly, HC staff "conducted searches of the email accounts of the named HC employees - Sara Prather and Chynees Thompson-Neal - to capture any communications to or from Plaintiff and those individuals during the identified date ranges." Id. ¶ 23. These searches yielded six responsive documents. Id. These searches, the Court concludes, were reasonable under the circumstances of this case.

V. FOIA EXEMPTIONS 5 AND 6

DOE released records to plaintiff in three batches. First, on July 16, 2018, DOE released 13 documents (63 pages of records) in their entirety. Morris Decl. ¶ 27. Second, on August 28, 2018, it released six documents (23 pages of records) in their entirety. Id. ¶ 28. Third, on October 18, 2018, DOE notified plaintiff that it had identified 25 responsive documents (71 pages of records) and released seven documents in their entirety. Id. ¶ 30. From the 18 remaining documents DOE redacted certain information under FOIA Exemptions 5 and 6. Id. When DOE discovered that it inadvertently omitted one document from the third release, DOE released it in its entirety on April 19, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 31-32.

A. Exemption 5

Exemption 5 protects from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorand[a] or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). "[T]he parameters of Exemption 5 are determined by...