Baldyga v. Dudley

09-MBAR-0007

Gerard Baldyga v. Town of Dudley et al.

No. 072319A

Superior Court of Massachusetts

January 9, 2009

Opinion No.: 105681

As-is Docket Number: 07-2319A

Venue Worcester

File Date: January 13, 2009

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):

Opinion Title: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT TOWN OF WEBSTER'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Following his conviction in federal court for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, distribution of cocaine possession of firearms and ammunition by a felon, and witness tampering, the plaintiff Gerard Baldyga (Baldyga) challenged this verdict by appeal and collaterally. On appeal the conviction was affirmed in United States v. Baldyga 233 F.3d 674 (1st. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 871 (2001). Baldyga's challenge to his conviction based upon alleged illegal search warrants and supporting affidavits was denied in Baldyga v. United States, 337 F.Supp.2d 264 (D.Mass. 2004).

In state court, Baldyga again raised the alleged irregularities of his arrest and conviction and argued that his civil rights were violated in connection with the search warrant applications and his detainment both in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Underlying these claims was Baldyga's assertion that officials related to this case had fraudulently concealed the causes of these actions as that term is used under M.G.L.c. 260, §12, and therefore the Statute of Limitations did not bar any of these state court claims.

Baldyga petitioned the Single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court under the provisions of M.G.L.c. 211, §3 seeking the exercise of the court's general powers of superintendence of the Trial Courts to review the alleged violation of his rights. This petition was denied by a single justice without a hearing. Upon appeal to the full bench, the denial of the petition under M.G.L.c. 211, §3 was affirmed with an order by the Court to transfer these complaints to the Worcester Superior Court for further pursuit. In doing so, the Supreme Judicial Court expressed "no view on the timeliness of the complaints, or on the merits of any of those claims." Gerard Division of the District Court Department et al., 449 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2007).

The defendant Town of Webster now moves for judgment on the pleadings alleging that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts set forth in his complaint and that the defendant Town of Webster is entitled, at this time to an entry of dismissal.

Applicable Standards

A motion filed under Rule 12(c) Mass.R.Civ.P. for a judgment on the pleadings, is treated in the same manner as a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6). The factual allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, if well pleaded, are taken as being true and dismissal is appropriate only where it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts which could be proven in support of his claims. These standards apply to both Baldyga and the Town of Webster and the fact that Baldyga appears pro se does not alter the standard. He is held to the same standard as a litigant with legal representation. Maza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1006 (1996), see McCoy v. Massachusetts Institution of Technology, 950 3d., Fed 2d. 13, 22 (1st. Cir. 1991). To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's factual allegations as set forth in the complaint will be accepted as true, however, legal conclusions cast in the form of allegations cannot be accepted. Berkowitz v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 262 (2003). Factual allegations of the plaintiff must plausibly suggest entitlement to relief by setting forth detailed factual grounds as opposed to mere "labels and conclusions" or speculation. Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Company, 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), citing Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007).

DISCUSSION

The defendant Town of Webster moves for Judgment on the Pleadings alleging that plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations as well as the presentment requirement under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act and issue preclusion considerations.

The plaintiff's claims emanate from a search of his residence, his arrest and detention which took place on or about March of 1998. Plaintiff pleads in his complaint at Paragraph 4 that he has in fact been complaining about alleged violations of rights that took place at that time for the "past 9 years."

The Statute of Limitations for Civil Rights Actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, M.G.L.c. 12, §11(H)(I) is three years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. M.G.L.c. 260, §5B; Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 Fd.3d 46, 51 (2001). Claims of negligence must be brought within the applicable period of limitations of three years, M.G.L.c. 260, §2A. Negligence claims of the Commonwealth, through its agents, require a presentment of a claim in writing within two years of the accrual of the action and the suit must be commenced thereafter within three years of the accrual. M.G.L.c. 258, §4. Additionally, the defendant makes the argument that the plaintiff is barred from relitigating the issues raised in his conviction, the appeal of that conviction to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Federal Court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus. The issues presented herein having been raised, tried and concluded in these prior proceedings result, the defendant Town of Webster argues, in claim and issue preclusion which doctrine serves to make valid, final judgments conclusive and prevents relitigation of those matters that were or could have been adjudicated previously. O'Neill v. City Manager of Cambridge, 428 Mass. 257, 259 (1998), quoting Blanchette v. School Committee of Westwood, 427 Mass. 176, 180 n.3 (1998); Charlette v. Charlette Brothers Foundry, Inc., 59 Mass.App.Ct. 34, 44 (2003); Heacock v. Heacock, 42 Mass. 21, 23 n.2 (1998).

To counter claims that this action is barred by its untimeliness under the Statute of Limitations, the plaintiff Baldyga has pleaded a claim for relief based upon fraudulent concealment as set forth in M.G.L.c. 260, §12. Although the plaintiff pleads an actual claim of fraudulent concealment and alleges that the defendant town violated his rights by conspiring in an "off the books" investigation of him which allegedly resulted in his being arrested and taken into custody, the application of the Fraudulent Concealment Statute does not provide plaintiff with a separate cause of action but, rather, provides a possible tolling of the running of the Statute of Limitations against the plaintiff during the period that the cause of action was found to have been fraudulently concealed. Compagnie ve Reassurance d'Ile de France v. New England Reinsurance Clerk, 944 F.Supp. 986, 995 (D.Mass. 1996) (limitations is tolled if fraudulent concealment is established until complainants actually become aware of the operative facts); Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototheraputics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 242 (3d. Cir. 2005). Whether pleaded properly or not, the court recognizes that plaintiff is alleging that the actions of certain officials did fraudulently conceal the cause of action and that his claim should therefore not be barred by the Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff's basis for fraudulent concealment is that he had alleged difficulties in obtaining certain documents and information from officials within the court system concerning the actions in issue and that the Attorney General's office would not respond to his complaints of violations. Again, these actions appear to have taken place in the early months of 1998.

In order for the period of limitations to be tolled under the statute, the fraud (M.G.L.c. 260, §12) concealing the cause...