Baldyga v. Dudley

09-MBAR-0015

Gerard Baldyga v. Town of Dudley et al.^[1]

No. 200702319A

Superior Court of Massachusetts

January 29, 2009

Opinion No.: 105690

As-is Docket Number: 2007-02319-A

Venue Worcester

File Date: February 2, 2009

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):

Opinion Title: MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT TOWN OF DUDLEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT

On August 16, 2004, Gerard Baldyga, the plaintiff, filed a complaint against the Town of Dudley, the defendant, alleging numerous instances of misconduct on the part of the Dudley Police Department. While the plaintiff fails to specifically identify the nature of his claims, it appears that the plaintiff is attempting to state causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, G.L.c. 12, §11I (the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act), and G.L.c. 258 (the Massachusetts Torts Claims Act). The defendant now moves to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint claiming that: (1) the plaintiff's complaint violates Mass.R.Civ.P. 8(a); (2) the plaintiff's claims are substantively infirm; (3) the plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and (4) the plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. After a hearing on July 1, 2008, and for the following reasons, the Defendant Town of Dudley's Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED and, as against the Town of Dudley, the case is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint and the pleadings on the motion, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v Abington Cas. Ins. Co., 413 Mass. 583, 584 (1992).

On March 25, 1999, a federal jury convicted the plaintiff of (1) possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1); (2) being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1); and (3) tampering with a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1512(b)(3). The plaintiff's conviction was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 (1st Cir. 2000). The plaintiff then challenged his conviction by way of a habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Baldyga v. United States, 337 F.Supp.2d 264 (D.Mass. 2004).

On August 16, 2004, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Supreme Judicial Court, alleging, among other things numerous instances of misconduct on the part of the Dudley Police Department, the last of which allegedly occured sometime in 1999. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case to the Superior Court on October 15, 2007.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Prior to the decision in Iannachino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623 (2008), a complaint would not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless "it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff c[ould] prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." General Motors Acceptance Corp., 413 Mass. at 584 quoting Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977). The Supreme Judicial Court recently revised this standard by adopting the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), which states: "While a complaint attacked by a... motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations... a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions... Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level... [based] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)... " Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636, quoting Bell A. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (internal quotations omitted). At the pleading stage, the plaintiff is required to present factual "allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) an entitlement to relief in order to reflect[_] the threshold requirement of [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 8(a)(2) that the plain statement possess enough heft to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636, quoting Bell A. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1966 (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant has no impact on the standard under which this court will review his case. Maza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 1006 (1996).

B. The Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by the Applicable Statutes of Limitations

Claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, G.L.c. 12, §11I, and G.L.c. 258, must be brought within three years of the date upon which the cause of action accrued. G.L.c. 260, §5B; Sampson v. Town of Salisbury, 441 F.Supp.2d 271, 275 (D.Mass. 2006); G.L.c. 258, §4. Under all three statutes, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that he has been injured. Sampson, 441 F.Supp.2d at 275; Sheila S. v. Commonwealth, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 423, 428 (2003). The three-year limitations period begins to run on the date of the wrongful act or injury unless the wrong is inherently unknowable. Sampson, 441 F.Supp.2d at 275-76; Sheila S. v. Commonwealth, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 423, 428 (2003).

Here, according to the plaintiff, the last allegedly wrongful action taken by the Dudley Police Department occurred sometime in 1999. The plaintiff filed his complaint on August 16, 2004, approximately five years later. In addition, there are no facts in the record suggesting that the allegedly wrongful actions taken by the Dudley Police Department were "inherently unknowable." On the contrary, the record tends to indicate that, by virtue of his 1999 criminal conviction, the plaintiff was on notice of the alleged wrongs. See Messere v. Murphy, 32 Mass.App.Ct. 917, 918 (1992) (holding that plaintiff's "criminal trial, conviction, and incarceration were events likely to put him on notice of the alleged wrongs"). As a result, all of the plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

C. G.L.c. 260, §12 Does Not Apply to Save the Plaintiff's Claims

According to the plaintiff, G.L.c. 260, §12, saves his claims from being barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. General Laws c. 260, §12, provides: "If a person liable to a personal action fraudulently conceals the cause of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled to bring it, the period prior to the discovery of his cause of action by the person so entitled shall be excluded in determining the time limited for commencement of the action."

In order for G.L.c. 260, §12 to toll the applicable statutes of limitations, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant performed positive acts with the intent to fraudulently conceal the causes of action from the plaintiff. Connelly v. Bartlett, 286 Mass. 311, 318 (1934). In addition, the actions taken must have successfully concealed the causes of action from the plaintiff's knowledge. Tracerlab, Inc. v. Industrial Nucleonics Corp., 313 F.2d 97, 98 (1963). Here, the plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence tending to suggest that the defendant performed any positive acts with the intent to conceal the causes of action from the plaintiff's knowledge. In addition, even if the defendant had performed positive acts with the intent to fraudulently conceal the causes of action from the plaintiff's knowledge, G.L.c. 260, §12 would still not save the plaintiff's claims because the actions did not successfully conceal the causes of action from the plaintiff's knowledge. See id. As discussed above, the plaintiff's criminal conviction put him on notice of the alleged wrongs. See Messere, 32 Mass.App.Ct. at 918.

Therefore G.L.c. 260, §12 does not apply and the plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of...