Ball v. Cocke Cnty.

ANNIE MONETT BALL, Plaintiff, v. COCKE COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-cv-445

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

February 16, 2021

Judge Atchley

Magistrate Judge Guyton

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Deputy Max Laughter and Deputy Katrina Baldwin used deadly force against Henry Stroud. Stroud died due to his injuries. Plaintiff Annie Monett Ball, Stroud's mother, sued Defendants Laughter; Baldwin; Deputy Johnathan Ball; Deputy Wes Keys; the City of Newport; and Cocke County, Tennessee alleging violations of her son's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 8]. Before the Court is Defendants City of Newport and Johnathan Ball's Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon Qualified Immunity [Doc. 36] and Motion for Summary Judgment Based Upon Qualified Immunity on Behalf of Max Laughter, Wes Keys, and Katrina Baldwin. [Doc. 40]. For the following reasons, both motions for summary judgment [Docs. 36, 40] are GRANTED. All claims against Deputies Laughter, Baldwin, Keys, Ball, and the City of Newport are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Furthermore, both parties are ORDERED to brief the issue of whether claims against the remaining defendant—Cocke County—should be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Laugher was working the night shift when, at around midnight, he got dispatched based on a report that a man was walking in the middle of the highway. [Doc. 40-1 at 1]. Johnathan Ball and Laughter were the first officers to arrive on the scene. [Id.] At the scene they discovered Stroud. [Id. at 2].

Stroud was acting erratically, and he approached the deputies with one arm behind his back. [Ex. B at 0:50-1:00].¹ Laughter repeatedly asked Stroud what he had in his hand and told him to put it down. [Id.] Laughter also told Stroud his name and said he would just like to talk. [Id.] Stroud did not comply with the order to put the object in his hand down. [Id.] Stroud yelled at the deputies throughout the encounter, but most of his speech was unintelligible. [Doc. 40-1 at 2]. However, Laughter heard Stroud yell that he wanted the deputies to shoot and kill him. [Id. at 2]. Stroud continued approaching the deputies despite Laughter's orders to stop. [Ex. B at 1:50-1:56].

When Stroud removed his arm behind his back the deputies saw a firearm. [Doc. 40-1 at 2]. Laughter's body camera clearly shows Stroud brandishing a firearm. [Ex. B at 2:00-2:03]. Laughter told Stroud that the object he was holding looked like a firearm. [Id. at 2:05-2:10]. Johnathan Ball also reported on his radio that Stroud had a firearm [Ex. A at 0:50-1:00]. Every other deputy on the scene agrees that Stroud had firearm. [Doc. 40-2 at 2; Doc. 40-3 at 2.]

For the next minute, Laughter ordered Stroud to put the firearm down. [Ex. A at 2:03-3:05]. Stroud did not comply. [Id.] Stroud then walked to the median into other lanes of traffic. [Id.] When he walked over the median Laughter's body camera clearly captured an image of the firearm a second time. [Ex. A at 3:05].

Thirty seconds passed and Stroud moved further into the median. [Ex. A at 3:05-3:35]. Stroud placed an object on the ground. [Doc. 40-1 at 2; Doc. 40-2 at 2; Doc. 40-3 at 2; Doc. 36-1at 2]. Laughter, Johnathan Ball, Baldwin, and Keys believed the object was a firearm [Doc. 40-1 at 2; Doc. 40-2 at 2; Doc. 40-3 at 2; Doc. 36-1 at 2]. Annie Ball argues it was a different object. [Doc. 48 at 5-6]. After Stroud placed the object down, Laughter told him to approach the police so they could talk. [Ex B at 3:55-4:00]. Stroud reached for the object, and Laughter yelled "Don't do that. Don't do that." [Ex. B at 4:00-4:05; Ex. A at 5:50].

Stroud then picked up and raised the object. [Ex. A at 5:50-5:52]. Annie Ball argues that Stroud raised the object and pointed only at his own head. [Doc. 48] In a statement directly after the arrest, Johnathan Ball told investigators that the Stroud pointed the firearm to his head, and he could not tell if Stroud was going to aim at the deputies. [Id. at 3]. Laughter thought that Stroud pointed the firearm at the deputies. [Doc. 40-1 at 3]. Keys and Baldwin thought that Stroud first pointed it at his head then at the deputies. [Doc. 40-2 at 2; Doc. 40-3 at 2]. The video captured by Johnathan Ball's body camera of the incident shows that Stroud raised his hand near his head. [Ex. A at 5:50-52].

Laughter and Baldwin discharged their service weapons. [Doc. 40-1 at 3; Doc. 40-3 at 2]. Keys and Johnathan Ball did not. [Doc. 36-1 at 2; Doc. 40-3 at 2]. Stroud collapsed. Johnathan Ball grabbed his medical equipment and ran over to Stroud. [Ex. A at 6:00-6:30]. He asked the officers nearby if they had found Stroud's firearm. [Ex. A at 6:30]. The deputies responded that they did, and Johnathan Ball's body camera shows that the firearm is lying in the dirt. [Ex. A at 7:00]. Johnathan Ball could not feel Stroud's pulse and determined that he could not provide the medical care necessary to revive Stroud. [Doc. 36-1 at 2]. Stroud was found to be carrying a Powerline CO2 Pistol, but the pistol lacked any distinctive markings that would differentiate it from a real firearm. [Doc. 40-1 at 3].

Annie Ball sued the City of Newport and Cocke County, Tennessee. [Doc. 8]. She also sued Laughter, Keys, Baldwin, and Johnathan Ball in their individual capacities. [Id.] She alleges that the individual defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by using excessive force. [Doc. 8 at 9]. She further alleges that the municipalities violated § 1983 by failing to train its officers. [Id. at 11].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may meet this burden either by affirmatively producing evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact or by pointing out the absence of support in the record for the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has met this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest upon the allegations in the pleadings; rather, they must point to specific facts supported by evidence in the record demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).

At summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence: the Court must determine if a reasonable jury, based on the evidence in the record, could find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Id.at 251-52. If a reasonable juror could not find for the nonmovant, the Court must grant summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

III. ANALYSIS

Qualified immunity "shields governmental officials from monetary damages as long as their actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Sumpter v. Wayne Cnty., 868 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court uses a two-part test; the parts may be conducted in either order. Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). In part one, the Court determines whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official violated a constitutional right. Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 519 (6th Cir. 2012). In part two, the Court determines whether the right was clearly established at the time the violation occurred. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden proof in "show[ing] that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity." Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't. of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir. 2001).

A. Deputies Keys and Ball

First, Johnathan Ball argues that he did not fire a shot, and Annie Ball concedes that Johnathan Ball did not shoot at Stroud. [Doc. 46 at 1]. Therefore, Johnathan Ball did not use excessive force against Stroud. Similarly, Keys did not fire a shot, and Annie Ball conceded that Keys did not discharge her service weapon. [Doc. 48 at 16]. Because Keys and Johnathan Ball did not use any force against Stroud, the § 1983 claims against Keys and Johnathan Ball are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B. The City of Newport

To find a municipality liable pursuant to § 1983 for failing to train its officers, there must be an underlying constitutional violation. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011). Annie Ball has conceded that Johnathan Ball—the only employee of Newport who is in this case—did not violate the constitution. [Doc. 46 at 2]. Annie Ball argues instead that Newport's motion is not ripe for review. [Id.] Newport's motion, however, is ripe for review.

To survive these motions for summary judgment, Annie Ball was given the opportunity to conduct a limited discovery to determine if any Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. [Doc. 31]. While municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity, Annie Ball would need to prove that the defendants violated the constitution to prevail in her claim against the individual defendants and the municipalities. Holzemer, 621 F.3d at 519. Despite having discovery on whether an employee of Newport violated the constitution, Annie Ball failed to present any evidence of the same. Therefore, ...