Ballard v. N.Y. Safety Track LLC

126 A.D.3d 1073

5 N.Y.S.3d 542

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 01845

In the Matter of Kitty L. BALLARD et al., Respondents

v.NEW YORK SAFETY TRACK LLC et al., Appellants.

518627

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

March 5, 2015.

Sahn Ward Coschignano & Baker, PLLC, Uniondale (Jon A. Ward of counsel), for New York Safety Track, LLC and another, appellants.

Young Sommer LLC, Albany (Allyson M. Phillips of counsel), for Town of Harpersfield Planning Board and others, appellants.

Law Office of Douglas H. Zamelis, Cooperstown (Douglas H. Zamelis of counsel), for respondents.

Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., GARRY, ROSE and DEVINE, JJ.

Opinion

DEVINE, J.

Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Burns, J.), entered September 17, 2013 in Delaware County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, partially denied respondents' motions to dismiss the petition, and (2) from a judgment of said court, entered January 17, 2014 in Delaware County, which partially granted petitioners' application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to, among other things, annul a 2013 agreement between certain respondents.

In 2011, respondent New York Safety Track LLC (hereinafter Safety Track) made an application for site plan approval to respondent Town of Harpersfield Planning Board to convert a former airport property to a motorcycle safety training facility.¹ Minutes from a Planning Board meeting indicate that it had conditionally approved the proposed site plan application and the facility was completed thereafter.

In January 2013, after receiving numerous complaints from neighboring landowners that the facility was hosting large, high-speed racing events, respondent Town of Harpersfield Code Enforcement Officer (hereinafter CEO) advised Safety Track that its advertised racing and large track events were not authorized uses pursuant to the site plan that had been approved by the Planning Board. The CEO's letter explained that the scope of permissible land use was defined by Safety Track's site plan application materials, which indicated, among other things, that the facility “would be used for safety courses and training” sessions that were limited to no more than 20 participants at any given time. A few weeks later, the CEO, the Planning Board, respondent Town of Harpersfield and Safety Track executed an “ Agreement for Operation of New York Safety Track” (hereinafter the 2013 agreement) and an events calendar for the 2013 facility's season, which purported to outline Safety Track's approved land uses for May 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013.

Petitioners, a group of concerned landowners within the vicinity of the facility, commenced this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and action seeking, among other things, the annulment of the 2013 agreement and a judicial declaration that Safety Track must limit its uses to those particularly described in its 2011 site plan application. Thereafter, the Planning Board, CEO, respondent Town of Harpersfield Town Board and respondent Town of Harpersfield Town Clerk (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Town respondents) moved to, among other things, dismiss the petition/complaint. In a September 2013 order, Supreme Court partially denied the Town respondents' motion to dismiss, but granted the motion solely to the extent that it sought the dismissal of the fourth cause of action, which alleged a violation of General Municipal Law § 239–m. Thereafter, Safety Track and respondent Mountain Top Airfield LLC and the Town respondents served their respective answers. Supreme Court later issued a judgment determining that petitioners' challenge to the then-expired 2013 agreement was not moot, annulled it and made declarations regarding the scope of Safety Track's permissible land uses. The court also found that the Town had committed various violations of the Public Officers Law and awarded petitioners costs and counsel fees. The Town respondents appeal from both the 2013 order² and the 2014 judgment, and Safety Track and Mountain Top appeal from the 2014 judgment.

The Town respondents argue that Supreme Court erred in finding that petitioners' causes of action challenging the propriety of the 2013 agreement had satisfied the exception to the mootness doctrine, and we agree. “It is well settled that a court's jurisdiction extends only to live controversies” (Matter of NRG Energy, Inc. v. Crotty, 18 A.D.3d 916, 918, 795 N.Y.S.2d 129 [2005] ), and a matter becomes moot “unless the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination of the [claim] and the interest of the parties is an immediate consequence of the judgment” (Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 [1980] ). Where, as here, the passage of time or “a change in circumstances prevents a court from rendering a decision that would effectively determine an actual controversy,” the claim must be dismissed (Matter of Kowalczyk v. Town of Amsterdam Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 95 A.D.3d 1475, 1477, 944 N.Y.S.2d 660 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). The 2013 agreement, by its own terms, pertained solely to Safety Track's land uses and events that occurred during the 2013 track season and expired at the end of that year, thereby rendering the challenges to the 2013 agreement moot (see e.g. Matter of Horton, 255 A.D.2d 642, 643, 679 N.Y.S.2d 467 [1998] ). Further, we do not agree with Supreme Court's finding that the exception to the mootness doctrine was satisfied (see Matter of Cobleskill Stone Prods., Inc. v. Town of Schoharie, 112 A.D.3d 1024, 1025, 975 N.Y.S.2d 926 [2013] ), and therefore reverse the court's judgment in that regard.

Next, respondents assert that Supreme Court's summary determination of the merits of petitioners' fifth cause of action for a declaratory judgment was erroneous in the absence of a formal motion following the parties' completion of necessary discovery. “In a hybrid proceeding and action, separate procedural rules apply to those causes of action which are asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, on the one hand, and those which seek declaratory relief, on the other hand” (Matter of Lake St. Granite Quarry, Inc. v. Town/Village of Harrison, 106 A.D.3d 918, 920, 966 N.Y.S.2d 123 [2013] ; see Matter of 24 Franklin Ave. R.E. Corp. v. Heaship, 74 A.D.3d 980, 980, 901 N.Y.S.2d 863 [2010] ). In the absence of a formalized motion requesting the “summary determination of the causes of action which seek ... declaratory relief, it is error for [a court] to summarily dispose of those causes of action” (Matter of Rosenberg v. New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation, & Historic Preserv., 94 A.D.3d 1006, 1008, 943 N.Y.S.2d 123 [2012] ; see Matter of Alltow, Inc. v. Village of Wappingers Falls, 94 A.D.3d 879, 882, 942 N.Y.S.2d 147 [2012] ).

It is undisputed that there was no pending motion for summary disposition of the declaratory judgment action when Supreme Court rendered its 2014 judgment. Nor did the court provide notice to the parties that it was considering the summary disposition of the declaratory judgment action, such that the parties would be afforded an opportunity to further develop the evidentiary record and offer competent proof supportive of their respective positions (see Matter of G & C Transp., Inc. v. McGrane, 72 A.D.3d 819, 821, 898 N.Y.S.2d 623 [2010] ; During v. City of New Rochelle, N.Y., 55 A.D.3d 533, 534, 865 N.Y.S.2d 279 [2008] ; see also Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v. Garrasi, 80 A.D.3d 1061, 1062–1063, 914 N.Y.S.2d 790 [2011] ). Supreme Court acknowledged that a myriad issues of fact existed in this matter, thereby rendering summary determination of petitioners' action for declaratory relief-in the absence of a formal application for such disposition-improper. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the court's judgment and remit the matter to Supreme Court to conduct further proceedings relating to such cause of action (see Matter of Town of Woodbury v. County of Orange, 114 A.D.3d 951, 954, 981 N.Y.S.2d 126 [2014], lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 903, 2014 WL 4454969 [2014].

Finally, we take no issue with Supreme Court's determination that the Town committed violations of the Open Meetings Law on several occasions leading up to the execution of the 2013 agreement with Safety Track and its subsequent award of reasonable counsel fees and costs to petitioners. Generally, “[e]very meeting of a public body shall be open to the general public, except that an executive session of such body may be called and business transacted thereat in accordance with [Public Officers Law § 105 ]” (Public Officers Law § 103[a] ). While a governing body may enter into an executive session, it may do so only for certain purposes, including, as is relevant here, the consideration of an appointment or to engage in private discussions relating to proposed or pending litigation (see Public Officers Law § 105[1][f] ; Matter of Jefferson Val. Mall [Concerned Citizens to Review] v. Town Bd. of Town of Yorktown, 83 A.D.2d 612, 613, 441 N.Y.S.2d 292 [1981], lv. denied 55 N.Y.2d 604, 447...