Banks v. Bowser

LOUIS BANKS, Plaintiff, v. MURIEL BOWSER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-2146 (TNM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

May 17, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Louis Banks filed a civil complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on behalf of himself and his minor son ("D.B.") against a host of defendants the Court divides into three groups:

1. District Defendants: Mayor Muriel Bowser, Metropolitan Police Chief Peter Newsham, and Attorney General Karl Racine.

2. Two Rivers Defendants: Two Rivers Public Charter School, Inc., Guye Turner, Jessica Wodatch, Maggie Bello and David Nitkin.

3. Council Defendants: Charles Allen, Anita Bonds, Mary Cheh, Jack Evans, Vincent Gray, David Grosso, Kenyan McDuffie, Phil Mendelson, Brianne Nadeau, Elissa Silverman, Brandon Todd, Robert C. White, and Trayon White, Sr.

The Two Rivers Defendants removed this action. ECF No. 1. This matter is here on the defendants' motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) claiming the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF Nos. 10, 12 and 16.¹

When a court considers a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations set forth in a complaint, and it must hold a complaint drafted by a pro se plaintiff to a less stringent standard than it would apply to a complaint drafted by a lawyer. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even evaluated under this relaxed standard, the Complaint is hopelessly deficient. Based on it, the defendants' briefs, and Mr. Banks' oppositions, the Court grants the defendants' motions and dismisses the complaint in its entirety.²

I.

The heading of Mr. Banks' Complaint reads:

BIVENS ACTION: FOURTH, FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND BREACH OF A SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, WITH SOCPE [sic] OF VIOLATION CONSTUTIONAL [sic] TORTS, AND STATUTES 18-USC 241-242 WITH DC LAWS

ECF No. 1-1 ("Superior Ct. Docs.") at 3 (page numbers designated by ECF). The first section of the Complaint, titled STATEMENT, reads:

Plaintiff's [sic] sues defendant under dispossessed of my rights deprived my ability [to] defend them; that deprivation alone would be actionable under federal statutes known as a Bivens Action statutes 18-USC 241-242 for money due to violation Fourth, Fifth Amended, Negligent, Brach [sic] of Contract, Retaliation, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and states as follows $30million for Monetary, Punitive Damage, Declaratory, and Injunctive relief were [sic], as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional.

Superior Ct. Docs. at 4.

Three incidents appear to have led to the Complaint: Mr. Bank's arrest on April 11, 2015 and later detention, see id. at 4-6 (¶¶ 1-3, 10); an incident on September 17, 2015 involving D.B. and staff at the charter school D.B. attended at that time, see id. at 5-6, 7, 9-10 (¶¶ 5-6, 11, 13, 16 and 18 (Second Claim 4)); and an incident on April 5, 2018, at Two Rivers Public Charter School where D.B. is or was a student, see id. at 4, 8-11 (¶¶ 14-17, 21).

Mr. Banks alleges that, on April 5, 2018, Guye Turner, presumably a Two Rivers employee, made a video recording of D.B. on his cell phone without Mr. Banks' consent. Id. at 4. This action, Mr. Banks asserts, was "taken pursuant to a municipal policy, legislation vote practice, that diminish my and 9 year minor child rights." Id. And Mr. Banks contends that this video recording incident "constitute[d] []threat/harassment/stalking/etc.," id. at 8 (¶ 14), breached a contract, see id. at 8 (¶ 15), was negligent, see id. at 9-10 (¶¶ 16-17), violated D.B.'s Fifth Amendment rights, see id. at 10 (¶ 19), and intentionally inflicted emotional distress, see id. at 11 (¶ 21).

II.

A complaint "must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). To this end, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Middleton v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 318 F. Supp. 3d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A complaint survives Rule 12(b)(6) if it states a plausible claim, that is, a claim "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has actedunlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pleading facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545-46. "A claim crosses from conceivable to plausible when it contains factual allegations that, if proved, would allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and accepts as true all reasonable inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations. See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1994). Consideration is limited to "the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which the court may take judicial notice." Hurd v. District of Columbia Gov't, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). But the Court does not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Nor must the Court accept "inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint." Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

III.

The Court agrees with defendants' observations that the Complaint "is extremely difficult to decipher," ECF No. 10-1 ("Council Defs.' Mem.") at 2, and contains "mere conclusory statements and/or incomprehensible remarks," ECF No. 16 ("Two Rivers Mem.") at 30. Sprinkled throughout the Complaint are labels and phrases that suggest legal claims, yet the Complaint fails to string together enough facts to state a cognizable legal claim against any of thedefendants. The Court must contend with a tangled mass of assertions that do not state any claim for the civil rights action Mr. Banks apparently intends to bring.

A.

Consider the first two claims. Claim 1 purports to bring a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from Mr. Banks' arrest on April 11, 2015. See Compl. ¶ 10. A three-year residual statute of limitations applies to Section 1983 claims. Earle v. District of Columbia, 707 F.3d 299, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 529 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). When Mr. Banks filed his complaint in the Superior Court on August 10, 2018, the limitations period had already run. Similarly, because Count 2 raises a false arrest claim arising from the September 17, 2015 incident, see Superior Ct. Docs. at 7 (¶ 12), the one-year statute of limitations, see D.C. Code § 12-301(4), had run by the time Banks began this lawsuit.

Assuming Claim 2 raises Fourth Amendment claims arising from the September 17, 2015 incident, those claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, but the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. On its face, Claim 2 is barely more than the type of unadorned "the-defendant-harmed-me accusation" that is insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. More, the Complaint fails to allege facts tending to show that either Banks' or D.B.'s was falsely imprisoned, that is, detained was "without a warrant or for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty or freedom of locomotion," Tocker v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 190 A.2d 822, 824 (D.C. 1963), or without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Even liberally construed, Claim 2 appears to be no more than "[m]ere conclusory statements or a formulaic recitation of the elements of [the] cause of action," which is insufficient under the Twombly andIqbal pleading standard. See Patrick v. District of Columbia, 179 F. Supp. 3d 82, 86 (D.D.C. 2016).³

B.

Claim 3, the heading of which is "FEDERAL OFFICIALS RACIAL PROFILING THREAT/STLKING [sic]/HARASSMENT," Superior Ct. Docs. at 7 (emphasis in original), fails because the Complaint alleges insufficient facts to state a plausible legal claim. Although Mr. Banks purports to hold several defendants accountable for the April 5, 2018 incident at Two Rivers, nowhere does he allege facts showing that the District of Columbia Defendants, the Council Defendants, or any of the unrepresented defendants were present, responsible, or involved in any way.

Mr. Banks is no more successful in asserting Claim 3 against the Two Rivers Defendants or "Mr. Guy [sic] Tuner [sic] and Administrative," id., or "Two River Staff member, Administrative, Teacher, Teacher Aids," id. A plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. The statements set forth in the complaint are conclusory and otherwise fail to allege how any defendant racially profiled, threatened, stalked or harassed Mr. Banks or D.B., how any of these purported actions violated common law, a statute or a constitutional provision, or, which law, statute or constitutional provision is implicated.

C.

The first Claim 4, see Superior Ct. Docs. at 8,⁴ repeats the allegation that Mr. Turner used his cell phone to record D.B. without Mr. Banks' permission, id. (¶ 15). Its heading, however, suggests that Mr. Banks brings a breach...