Banks v. Gen. Motors

BILLIE R. BANKS, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Defendant.

14-CV-970S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

November 20, 2020

DECISION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

This is an employment discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. §§ 290, et seq. Plaintiff, an African American female, contends that Defendant General Motors discriminated against her on the basis of her race and sex, creating and permitting a hostile work environment. She also alleges that Defendant retaliated against her for complaining about her working conditions.

Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 76)¹. Defendant contends that much of Plaintiff's claims are time barred and that she failed to state a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination or establish retaliation against her under any of the legal standard she claims. For the reasons stated herein,Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 76) is granted in part, denied in part. The motion is denied as to aspects of Plaintiff's retaliation claim but is granted for the balance of her claims.

II. Background

A. Facts

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant starting in 1996, when it owned the assembly plant in Lockport, New York (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 1, 2). Defendant later promoted Plaintiff as a safety supervisor at that plant (id. ¶ 3). From 1999 to 2009 Defendant General Motors did not operate the Lockport plant (Docket No. 89, Def. Reply to Pl Counterstatement to ¶¶ 2, 3; see also Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 3); Delphi Automotive purchased the Lockport plant from Defendant in 1999, and owned it until September 2009 when General Motors reacquired it (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 6-7).

One of Defendant's arguments is that many of Plaintiff's incidents are time barred for a Title VII claim (Docket No. 76, Def. Memo. at 4) as well as for claims under other antidiscrimination statutes (id. at 4-5). Plaintiff discusses incidents from 2004 (including events that occurred when the Lockport plant was owned by a different entity) until she filed her EEOC Charge in October 24, 2013 (Docket No. 83, Pl Counterstatement ¶ 8; id., Pl. Memo. at 3; Docket No. 82, Pl. Ex. 14, Dep. Ex. 160, at P193, Dep. Ex. 309, at P185, P189), and beyond.

As discussed below, Plaintiff only can rely upon events from 300 days before filing her EEOC Charge to be timely for her Title VII claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). UsingOctober 24, 2013, the date she filed her New York State Division of Human Rights Charge (as discussed below) as a dividing point, the factual allegations described herein will be divided between events before and after that date.

Another division of the facts are incidents that Plaintiff directly was involved in and those incidents involving other African American or female General Motors employees that Plaintiff learned of that she alleges are part of the hostile work environment. She alleges offensive conduct directed at other employees that she became aware of but did not personally witness (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 88, 90, 92-96).

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant submitted a Statement of Facts it believes not to be in dispute (Docket No. 76). Plaintiff disputes facts as asserted by Defendant and adds additional details not stated in Defendant's Statement (see generally Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement). Sometimes she supports these details with references to documents and testimony in the motion papers while other times she provides no record references (id.). Defendant then submitted a Reply to Plaintiff's Counterstatement (Docket No. 89), disputing some of the details asserted in her Counterstatement.

This Court generally will reference the Defense Statement of Facts and note only when pertinent where Plaintiff raises a material dispute but not necessarily the particular details that she disputes.

1. Events to October 24, 2013, Involving Plaintiff

From October 2002 until Plaintiff filed her charges in October 2013 (and thereafter), she alleges that she was subjected to different terms and conditions ofemployment than Caucasian male employees (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 43-48; Docket No. 82, Pl. Ex. 14, Amended EEOC Charge at P194, hereinafter "Amended EEOC Charge"). During this period, she claims being subject to unwanted comments, tirades, and disparaging treatment believed to be due to her race and/or gender (Docket No. 82, Amended EEOC Charge at P194). She also claims working in a sexually and racially hostile work environment, while Defendant, aware of these conditions, refused to investigate, stop or prevent this behavior (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 25-27). For example, she claimed that her directives as a safety supervisor went unheeded by Caucasian male employees while those from white counterparts were followed (Docket No. 82, Am. EEOC Charge at P195).

Plaintiff alleges that she was erroneously found not to be disabled when she took medical leave in 2002, leading to her termination and then reinstatement (Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 10, at 7-9). In January 2004, a Caucasian employee called Plaintiff a "dumb nigger" (hereinafter referenced "n___") (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 10). She alleges that she was berated for withholding air sampling data from the United Auto Workers union (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 21-25). She claims she was denied support staff (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 57); later she received an assistant, Jared Richardson, who then made negative comments about her performance and mocked her during her presentations (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 13-19; see Docket No. 82, P. Counterstatement ¶¶ 13-19). She complained that she had to do the work of a white male employee, performing his ergonomics duties (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 40-42).

Plaintiff then took a series of sick leaves (in May 2010, from September 2013 to May 2014, and January 2016) allegedly due to her stress, panic, disorder, depression, and anxiety created by the hostile work environment (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 88, 91, 95; Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 108-09; Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 109; see Docket No. 89, Def. Reply to Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 108).

2. Incidents Involving other General Motors Employees Prior to October 2013

Plaintiff also alleges incidents involving other African American or female General Motors employees who experienced racial or sex discrimination or harassment. Many of these incidents, however, Plaintiff never experienced or saw for herself. One incident involves an African American employee seeing a noose hung at the plant (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 88; Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 89) and later hearing the epithet "n___" said to him on the production floor and written in the bathroom (Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 88, at 73-74). Another employee complained to Plaintiff that he was called "n___" everyday in the workplace (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 92; Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 92). Another African American employee was referred to as a "silverback" by a manager (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 90; see Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶¶ 88, 90) while another Black employee was present for the playing of "Rapper's Delight" (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 94; see Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 94). Another African American employee saw the Confederate flag flown on the Lockport plant (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 95; Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 95).

3. Post-EEOC Charge Incidents Directly Involving Plaintiff

After filing her EEOC Charge, Plaintiff alleges she continued to be subject to a hostile environment, discrimination, and retaliation against her by her supervisors and co-workers (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 61, 74, 110).

From January 2012 through August 2013, a white male safety trainer, George Miller, refused on multiple occasions to provide Plaintiff with data necessary for her job but would furnish that information to her white male colleagues (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 32; see Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 32). Two employees reported to Plaintiff that Miller also referred to her as an "idiot" during training sessions and that he said she did not know what she was doing (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 33-34).

She accused a male Caucasian maintenance supervisor of undermining her before her union counterparts (Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 44; see Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 44). On August 23, 2013, a subcontractor to Defendant violated Defendant's safety protocols and Plaintiff wanted that subcontractor removed from the plant. That same maintenance supervisor responded by denouncing Plaintiff in a tirade which sufficiently intimidated her to rescind the expulsion order of the subcontractor. (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 45; see Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 45).

While on medical leave in September 2013, Plaintiff learned that her job was being posted (Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 49, at 34-35; see Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 53, 108-09). Meanwhile, Defendant hired Caucasian male Bob Duke in April 2014 in Plaintiff's safety supervisor position; she claims that this hiring was in retaliation for her discrimination complaints (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 53-54).Plaintiff claimed Duke was given less responsibilities and furnished with more support staff than she was when she worked as a safety supervisor (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶ 55).

On April 24, 2014, she advised Defendant that she could return to work as of May 5, 2014 (Docket No. 82, Pl. Counterstatement ¶ 49, at 36). She then was offered a different position with less responsibility and on the second shift (Docket No. 76, Def. Statement ¶¶ 59-61). When she attempted to return to work, Defendant's psychiatrist, Dr....