Banks v. Lumpkin

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JAKROI ALLEN BANKS, TDCJ No. 02227062, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

CIVIL No. SA-21-CA-0656-JKP

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division

January 16, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JASON PULLIAM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Petitioner Jakroi Allen Banks's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1), Petitioner's Supplemental Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 2), Respondent Bobby Lumpkin's Answer (ECF No. 14), and Petitioner's Reply (ECF No. 23). In his petition and supplemental memorandum, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his 2018 state court conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Also before the Court are Petitioner's Supplemental Petition (ECF No. 10) Respondent's Amended Answer (ECF No. 28), and Petitioner's Reply (ECF No. 29) thereto.

Having reviewed the record and pleadings submitted by both parties the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is also denied a certificate of appealability.

I. Background

In June 2018, Petitioner plead guilty to one count of aggravated kidnapping in exchange for the State's waiver of three additional counts of aggravated sexual assault. (ECF Nos. 15-1 at 4-5 (plea hearing); 15-24 at 73-81 (plea agreement)). Following a separate punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to thirty years of imprisonment. State v. Banks, No. 2017CR0571 (175th Dist. Ct., Bexar Cnty., Tex. Oct. 10, 2018); (ECF Nos. 15-3 at 13 (sentencing hearing); 15-25 at 7-8 (Judgment)). The Texas Fourth Court of Appeals later dismissed Petitioner's direct appeal because he waived the right to appeal as part of the plea bargain agreement. Banks v. State, No. 04-18-00908-CR, 2018 WL 6624371 (Tex. App.- San Antonio, Dec. 19, 2018). Petitioner did not file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. (ECF No. 14-1).^[1]

Instead, Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of his conviction by filing an application for state habeas corpus relief. Ex parte Banks, No. 91,607-02 (Tex. Crim. App.); (ECF No. 15-24 at 5-24). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals eventually denied the application without written order on March 17, 2021. (ECF No. 15-6). Three months later, Petitioner initiated the instant proceedings by filing a petition for federal habeas relief raising ten grounds for relief, which he later supplemented with one an additional allegation. (ECF Nos. 1, 2, and 10).

II. Petitioner's Allegations

In his original federal petition (ECF No. 1) and supplement (ECF No. 10), Petitioner set forth the following claims for relief:

1. Circumstances exist that rendered the Texas habeas corpus process ineffective in protecting his rights;

2. The state court's adjudication resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; 3. Petitioner's guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary;

4. Petitioner's guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel;^[2]

5. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to litigate a Fourth Amendment issue;

6. Trial counsel had a conflict of interest with Petitioner, withdrew as counsel, and coerced Petitioner to plead guilty;

7. There was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping;

8. He was denied effective assistance of counsel by his second attorney's failure to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing;

9. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea;

10. He was denied due process because he involuntarily waived his right to appeal without knowing the consequences of the waiver; and

11. He was denied the right to counsel at his arraignment under Article 15.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

III. Standard of Review

Petitioner's federal habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review provided by the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. Under § 2254(d), a petitioner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). This intentionally difficult standard stops just short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).

A federal habeas court's inquiry into unreasonableness should always be objective rather than subjective, with a focus on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable” and not whether it was incorrect or erroneous. McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable, regardless of whether the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion itself. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Instead, a petitioner must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, which is a “substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003).

So long as “fairminded jurists could disagree” on the correctness of the state court's decision, a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In other words, to obtain federal habeas relief on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits in state court, Petitioner must show that the state court's ruling “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103; see also Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 24 (2011).

IV. Analysis

A. Petitioner's State Habeas Proceeding (Claims 1, 2).

Petitioner first challenges the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' denial of his state habeas application without a written order, arguing that the state court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing or abide by the guidelines set forth by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure violated his due process rights. Petitioner also argues that the state court's decision was based on erroneous findings made by the trial court that were inconsistent with the evidence. Such claims do not entitle Petitioner to relief because alleged errors or irregularities occurring in state habeas proceedings do not raise cognizable claims for federal habeas relief. See Henderson v. Stephens, 791 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2015) (“infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas corpus relief”); Ladd v. Stevens, 748 F.3d 637, 644 (5th Cir. 2014) (same). This is because an attack on the validity of a state habeas corpus proceeding does not impact the validity of the underlying state criminal conviction. See Rudd v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 317, 319-20 (5th Cir. 2001) (reiterating that “an attack on the state habeas proceeding is an attack on a proceeding collateral to the detention and not the detention itself.”) (citations omitted). For this reason, Petitioner's complaints concerning his state habeas corpus proceeding do not furnish a basis for federal habeas corpus relief.

B. Voluntary Waiver (Claims 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 11)

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Petitioner judicially confessed to committing the offense of aggravated kidnapping, acknowledged the range of punishment for this first-degree offense, and waived his right to a jury trial and appeal in exchange for a sentencing cap of thirty years. (ECF No. 15-24 at 73-81). Petitioner now challenges the constitutionality of his guilty plea by arguing that: the plea was unknowing and involuntary (Claim 3); he was denied his right to effective counsel (Claims 5 and 6); the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction (Claim 7); he involuntarily waived his right to appeal (Claim 10); and he was denied his right to counsel at arraignment (Claim 11).

All of the above allegations-with the exception of Claim 11-were rejected by the state court during Petitioner's state habeas proceedings. As discussed below, this adjudication was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. Indeed, the record indicates that, despite his contention to the contrary, Petitioner voluntarily plead guilty to the conviction he is now challenging under § 2254. Because his guilty plea was voluntary, Petitioner waived the right to challenge all non-jurisdictional defects in his proceedings.

1. Petitioner's Plea Was Voluntary

It is axiomatic that a guilty plea is valid only if entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S 175, 183 (2005); United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000). A plea is intelligently made when the defendant has “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.” Bousley v. United States, 523...